Panopulos v. Maderis

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Writing for the Court: SHENK; GIBSON; CARTER
• Citation: 303 P.2d 738,47 Cal.2d 337
• Parties: Amelia PANOPULOS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gussie MADERIS, Defendant and Respondent. Catherine FITTS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gussie MADERIS, Defendant and Respondent. Beatrice SCHUNKE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gussie MADERIS, Defendant and Respondent. Elizabeth HODENSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gussie MADERIS, Defendant and Respondent. S. F. 19514-19517.
• Decision Date: 21 November 1956

Page 738

303 P.2d 738 47 Cal.2d 337 Amelia PANOPULOS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Gussie MADERIS, Defendant and Respondent.
Catherine FITTS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Gussie MADERIS, Defendant and Respondent.
Beatrice SCHUNKE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Gussie MADERIS, Defendant and Respondent.
Elizabeth HODENSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Gussie MADERIS, Defendant and Respondent. S. F. 19514-19517. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. Nov. 21, 1956.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 19, 1956.

Page 739

[47 Cal.2d 339] James F. Boccardo and Edward J. Niland, San Jose, for appellants.

Campbell, Custer, Warburton & Britton, Frank L. Custer, San Jose, and W. R. Dunn, Burlingame, for respondent.

SHENK, Justice.

These are appeals by the plaintiffs Amelia Panopulos, Catherine Fitts, Beatrice Schunke and Elizabeth Hodenson from judgments on verdicts for the defendant Gussie Maderis in four separate actions for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident which occurred while the plaintiffs were riding in the defendant's automobile. The causes were consolidated and tried together.

The plaintiffs and another lady accompanied the defendant in her automobile from San Jose to Mountain View where they attended a public card party, as they

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had done or other occasions. On the return trip Mrs. Fitts sat in the front seat next to the defendant who was in the driver's position, and Mrs. Schunke sat on the extreme right of the front seat. The other three ladies sat in the back. Upon arriving in San Jose the defendant stopped her automobile in front of Mrs. Fitts' home on level ground, stepped out of the car and stood at the side thereof. The automobile was equipped with automatic transmission and the defendant left the shift lever in neutral position with the motor running. From the neutral position very little force was required to move the gear shift lever to drive or low positions, whereas had it been left in the park position it would have been first necessary to lift the lever before changing its position. In the park position the rear wheels would be locked and the car could not be moved without skidding. From either the low or drive, but not in neutral position the automobile would proceed forward if the speed of the motor was advanced beyond the idling speed, except when the emergency brake was properly engaged.

After alighting the defendant invited Mrs. Fits to leave the car on the driver's side. This she proceeded to do. She was elderly and infirm and had never driven an sautomobile. In attempting to slide across the seat she apparently caused the gear shift lever to be moved to either the low or drive position and touched the accelerator, although there is no direct evidence to that effect. The car went forward, jumped a curb and crashed against a wall some 300 feet from where the defendant alighted. All four plaintiffs were injured.

The evidence was conflicting as to whether the plaintiffs [47 Cal.2d 340] were paying passengers or guests within the meaning of the guest law as incorporated in section 403 of the Vehicle Code. That section is a limitation on the liability of the driver of a vehicle in cases where the rules of ordinary negligence would otherwise apply. McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d 279, 282, 70 P.2d 909; Walters v. Du Four, 13i Cal.App. 72, 22 P.2d 259, 23 P.2d 1020. It provides in its pertinent parts: 'No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride * * * has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of such vehicle * * * for the conduct of such driver on account of personal injury to or the death of such guest during such ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that such injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or wilful misconduct of said driver.'

At the trial the plaintiffs sought to show the inapplicability of section 403 solely upon the theory that they were paying passengers and not guests of the defendant driver. The defendant acquiesced in that theory and in response to a special interrogatory the jury found that the plaintiffs were guests and not paying passengers. That finding is supported by substantial evidence and there is no contention to the contrary. It thus established the relationship contemplated by the statute and on the theory on which the causes were tried foreclosed liability on the part of the defendant. There was no evidence of intoxication or wilful misconduct.

The judgments might well be affirmed on the theory on which the causes were tried without further discussion were it not for another theory advanced by the plaintiffs for the first time on appeal to the effect that section 403 is not applicable to the facts of this case for another and independent reason. The plaintiffs now contend that section 403 is not applicable because, as a matter of law, the defendant was not the 'driver' of the vehicle at the time of the accident as contemplated by section 403.

In reply the defendant asserts that where a cause has been tried on a theory acquiesced in by the parties, an appellant cannot seek a reversal on an entirely new theory. See Durkee v. Chino Land and Water Co., 151 Cal. 561, 569, 91 P. 389; Merrill v. Kohlberg, 29 Cal.App. 382, 386, 155 P. 824. It is the general rule that a party to an action may not, for the

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first time on appeal, change the theory of the cause of action. Ernst v. Searle, 218 Cal. 233, 240, 22 [47 Cal.2d 341] P.2d 715; Gray v. Janss Investment Co., 186 Cal. 634, 641, 200 P. 401. There are exceptions but the general rule is especially true when the theory newly presented involves controverted questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact. If a question of law only is presented on the facts appearing in the record the change in theory may be permitted. See Schirmer v. Drexler, 134 Cal. 134, 66 P. 180. But if the new theory contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put in issue or presented at the trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against it on appeal. See Gibson Properties Co. v. City of Oakland, 12 Cal.2d 291, 299, 83 P.2d 942; Anderson v. Derrick, 220 Cal. 770, 777, 32 P.2d 1078; Shumate v. Johnson Publishing Co., 139 Cal.App.2d 121, 130, 293 P.2d 531; Townsend v. Wingler, 114 Cal.App.2d 64, 68, 249 P.2d 613. It may not properly be said that the person manually directing the operation of an automobile in the course of making a trip therein would, under all circumstances, and as a matter of law, lose his status as a driver of the car as contemplated by section 403 merely because he vacates the driver's seat and is out of the car at the time of an accident. Whether he is or is not the driver of the car at that particular time would seem to depend on the facts of each case. In that event the party seeking to avoid liability by establishing his status as the driver should have the right to present evidence on the subject at the trial in response to appropriate allegations and proof and have the questions passed upon by the jury under appropriate instructions.

However, when as here the facts with reference to the contention newly made on appeal appear to be undisputed and that probably no different showing could be made on a new trial it is deemed appropriate to entertain the...