Pantazes v. Pantazes

• Decision Date: 01 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 604,604
• Parties: Dean James PANTAZES v. Michael PANTAZES, et ux. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 712

77 Md.App. 712

551 A.2d 916

Dean James PANTAZES v. Michael PANTAZES, et ux.

No. 604, Sept. Term, 1988.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 10, 1989.

Hal C.B. Clagett, III, Upper Marlboro, for appellant

George Z. Petros (Fisher & Walcek on the brief), Marlow Heights, for appellees.

Argued before BISHOP, ALPERT, and FISCHER, JJ.

BISHOP, Judge.

The appellant, Dean James Pantazes, appeals from a $41,750 judgment entered upon a jury's verdict in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (Mason, J.), in favor of his brother, Michael Pantazes, and his sister-in-law, Melanie Pantazes. Appellant asks the Court to consider:

I. Whether the appellee's claims for defamation and malicious prosecution were barred by a release which appellee executed pursuant to Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27 § 737 (1987), "Expungement of Police and Court Records."

II. Whether the damages awarded by the jury are duplicitous.

FACTS

In January 1985 Michael Pantazes (Michael) was contacted by an employee of the Budget Rent-A-Car Company (Budget) who demanded payment for damage which Michael had allegedly inflicted on one of Budget's cars. The employee told Michael that Dean Pantazes (Dean) had informed Budget that Michael was the one who damaged the car. Later, in February 1985, Michael was summonsed by the Sheriff's Department for Prince George's County and served with a statement of charges which alleged that he "did willfully and maliciously destroy, injure and molest the right side of 1985 Lincoln the property of Budget Rent-A-Car." Attached thereto was an "Application for Statement of Charges", signed by one of Budget's employees, alleging that Dean saw Michael scratch the car.

When Michael appeared in the District Court on March 8, 1985, the criminal charges against him were dismissed by the State. Shortly thereafter, Michael filed a "Petition for Expungement of Records" pursuant to Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27 § 737 ¹ which included, in accordance with the statute,

the following: ²

GENERAL WAIVER AND RELEASE

I, Michael Pantazes, hereby release and forever discharge the Montgomery County Police Department, all of its officers, agents and employees and any and all other persons from any and all claims which I may have for wrongful conduct by reason of my arrest, detention or confinement on or about January 23, 1985.

This General Waiver and Release is conditioned on the expungement of the record of my arrest, detention, or confinement and compliance with Section 736(c) of Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and shall be void if these conditions are not met.

[Dated] 14 March 1985

[Signed] Michael Pantazes

As a result, and in compliance with Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27 § 737(c) and Md.Rule 4-508, on July 2, 1985, the District Court for Montgomery County ordered the expungement of all police and court records with reference to Michael "pertaining to the arrest, detention or confinement on or about 1/20/85."

On November 14, 1985, following the expungement of records, Michael filed the complaint in the case sub judice in which he alleged, inter alia, that Dean's statements to Budget were defamatory and that Dean had maliciously caused Michael to be prosecuted for malicious destruction of property. On the third day of the trial, Dean's counsel moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Waiver and Release which Michael had signed in the expungement proceeding precluded the tort claims against Dean. The circuit court judge denied the motion because, the court reasoned, Michael had not been subjected to any "arrest, detention, or confinement," and, therefore, the release was of no effect. The court stated that

"[i]f the general release had included the word 'charges', we would have been out of here yesterday morning before twelve o'clock, and I would have been twenty five cents poorer."

At the conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict against Dean Pantazes and Michael DeLorenzo (the Budget employee who signed the application for statement of charges) on both the defamation and malicious prosecution counts. By way of a special verdict sheet the jury awarded the following damages:

                $12,000  Malicious prosecution by both
                         Defendants
                 14,000  Punitive damages for malicious
                         prosecution by Dean
                     50  Defamation by Dean
                    700  Punitive damages for defamation
                         by Dean
                 15,000  Consortium by both defendants
                -------
                $41,750
                I
                The Release
                

We discuss separately the effect of the release on the counts for malicious prosecution and for defamation.

A. Malicious Prosecution

In Pemrock, Inc. v. Essco Co., 252 Md. 374, 249 A.2d 711 (1969), the Court held that:

[A] general release to all mankind barred further suits against other entities involved in the occurrence which produced the settlement with one participant that led to the release. Relied on were various cases holding a release of "all other persons" did release a joint tort-feasor, includingThomas v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 229 Md. 332; .... [182 A.2d 823 (1962) ]

Peters v. Butler, 253 Md. 7, 10, 251 A.2d 600 (1969). "Thus, language releasing 'all other persons, firms and corporations' discharges remaining tort-feasors even though they are not named in the release." Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 Md.App. 515, 525, 492 A.2d 1358 (1985).

It would appear that this general rule would apply to the case sub judice so as to release appellant in the action for malicious prosecution. Budget, Dean Pantazes, and the law enforcement officials can all be considered as joint tort feasors ³ in the malicious prosecution. Secondly, the release of "any and all other persons" is the sort of "general release" to which the rule inPemrock has been found applicable. See Peters v. Butler, 253 Md. at 10, 251 A.2d 600; Pemrock, Inc. v. Essco Company, Inc.; Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 Md.App. at 524, 492 A.2d 1358. Appellees, however, claim that the rule is not applicable to the release sub judice.

Appellees, as did the trial court, take the position that although the release that Michael Pantazes signed is a "general release", malicious prosecution is not related to "the occurrence which produced" the release with the State, Peters, 253 Md. at 10, 251 A.2d 600; consequently, the parties to the malicious prosecution charge are not affected by the release of March 14, 1985. They contend that the "occurrence which produced the settlement" was a nonexistent "arrest, detention or confinement", as specifically stated in the release, and since none of these events occurred, it could not possibly be related to the occurrence (the malicious prosecution) which is the basis of the present litigation. In other words, appellees contend that the "General Waiver and Release" to the State and "all other persons" releases the public from liability for a non-occurrence, for which no one could possibly be liable, in exchange for which Michael Pantazes was granted an early expungement of his records. We do not agree with appellees' understanding that Michael Pantazes made such an "illusory promise," Stamatiades v. Merit Music, 210 Md. 597, 614, 124 A.2d 829 (1956) ("[W]here the option reserved to the promisor is unlimited ... his promise becomes illusory and incapable of forming part of a legal obligation." (quoting Williston, Contracts, (Rev.Ed.) Vol. I § 43)).

The flaw in appellees' reasoning is that they treat the signing of the "General Waiver and Release" as if it were part of a criminal proceeding in which they, knowing of a potential ambiguity in the State's position, can remain silent and later capitalize on that ambiguity. For example, consider the trial testimony of the attorney who represented and advised Michael Pantazes at the time of the expungement process:

I knew from the evidence, and from my investigation, from the paperwork that, to my knowledge, there was no arrest, no detention, or no confinement on the date in question. And thus, there could be no release to anybody including Mr. Dean Pantazes, for having caused the arrest, detention, or confinement, because there was no such cause of action civilly could be based upon that since it never happened.

* * *

THE COURT: If you don't comply with the statute, you're not entitled to the expungement.

THE WITNESS: If--that is not the way I read it--if there was a proper objection by the State's Attorney to the form of the release, number one; number two, if the Court sustains the objection by the State's Attorney in the petition for expungement, then in that event, one is not entitled to the release, if the Court rules that way.

In this State, however, releases are normally construed and applied according to the rules of contract law, Bernstein v Kapneck, 290 Md. 452, 458, 430 A.2d 602 (1981); Parish v. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 101, 242 A.2d 512 (1968); Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 Md.App. at 530, 492 A.2d 1358, not criminal law. There is no reason why this rule should not be applied to the present situation.

The State and Michael Pantazes, in good faith, entered a mutually beneficial, bilateral agreement, Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co., 147 Md. 588, 593, 128 A. 280 (1925), which was fully supported by adequate consideration on both sides, Beall v. Beall, 291 Md. 224, 229, 434 A.2d 1015 (1981); Broaddus v. First National Bank, 161 Md. 116, 121-2, 155 A. 309 (1931). Had Michael Pantazes waited the three years required by § 737, which is the period of limitations for civil actions, Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. 5-101 (1984 & Supp.1988), then, after that time, the State would have been required, § 737, to expunge his records without the release requirement. Where, as here, the petitioner elects to obtain expungement of his records prior to the running of the limitations period, then the predicament is created wherein certain evidence is rendered unavailable ⁴ by which persons sued might defend themselves in a civil action. For this...