Pantojas v. Apfel, 98 Civ. 3391 (LAK).
| Decision Date | 16 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98 Civ. 3391 (LAK).,98 Civ. 3391 (LAK). |
| Citation | 87 F.Supp.2d 334 |
| Parties | Luis PANTOJAS, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Luis Pantojas, pro se plaintiff.
Lorraine S. Novinski, Assistant United States Attorney, Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, New York City, for defendant.
Plaintiff Luis Pantojas brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") disability benefits. Pending before the Court is the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Commissioner's motion and dismisses the complaint.
Plaintiff applied for SSI disability benefits on January 17, 1996, apparently on the grounds that he suffered from high blood pressure, a heart problem, and diabetes.1 Plaintiff's application was denied on March 11, 1996.2 Plaintiff requested a reconsideration of his application on March 18, 1996.3 After reconsidering plaintiff's claim, in light of new medical evidence and information received subsequent to the original decision as well as the original record, plaintiff's claim once again was denied on June 28, 1996.4 Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on September 11, 19965 which was held on June 24, 1997.6 Plaintiff appeared without representation and testified through the use of a Spanish interpreter.7 On July 2, 1997 the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim for SSI.8 This determination became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for a review9 on January 27, 1998.10
At the time he filed his application in 1996, plaintiff was 39 years old.11 He is a U.S. citizen, has an eighth grade education, and does not speak English.12 He spent 1989 to 1995 in prison and has no work history.13 When he originally filed for disability, plaintiff claimed that he was disabled as a result of diabetes, a heart condition, and high blood pressure.14 Evidence in the administrative record demonstrates that he was admitted to St. Agnes Hospital on January 24, 1994 for a cerebrovascular accident in the left thalmus area (a stroke)15 and that he has been treated at North General Hospital since October 1995 for alcoholism and cocaine use.16 Additionally, he claims that he is bothered by asthma which he has had since birth.17 In his complaint, plaintiff includes his asthma and the effects of his stroke as disabilities that prevent him from working.18
The record contains medical reports from several physicians who have examined Mr. Pantojas. On February 26, 1996 he underwent a physical examination conducted by Dr. Peter Graham.19 Dr. Graham found that plaintiff's breath sounds were clear with no rales, rhonchi, or wheezing, he had a full range of motion of all joints without pain, and his muscle strength was adequate.20 An EKG showed regular sinus rhythm, his cardiogram was normal, and the doctor found that his hypertension was controlled by medication. The doctor concluded that plaintiff was able to "sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, handle objects, hear, speak and travel" and that his prognosis was stable.21
Dr. Graham referred the plaintiff for a psychiatric evaluation due to a previous history of psychiatric disorder. The doctor who performed this evaluation, Dr. Luigi Marcuzzo, found that plaintiff was pleasant and cooperative, appropriately dressed with good personal hygiene, and related appropriately to the interviewers. He concluded that plaintiff would benefit from psychiatric treatment and alcohol and drug rehabilitation treatment, but that he had no significant psychiatric limitation with respect to sustained concentration, persistence, social interaction, and adaption, and no limitations at all with respect to memory and understanding.22
On May 22, 1996, after the first denial of plaintiff's claim but before reconsideration, plaintiff underwent another physical examination at New York Diagnostic Centers, Inc.23 The examining physician, Dr. Howard Finger, found that plaintiff had hypertension and that his blood pressure was poorly controlled, had some weakness and loss of dexterity in his right hand as a result of the stroke, chest pain, chronic asthma with mild symptoms, non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, hypercholesterolemia, and chronic recurrent headaches. Plaintiff's pulmonary function tests were essentially normal. His overall prognosis was guarded, but Dr. Finger concluded with regard to work-related activities that plaintiff had no gross difficulty in terms of sitting, was mildly limited in the duration of time he could stand, and was mildly to moderately limited in the distance he could walk and in his ability to lift and carry.24
On June 24, 1996 plaintiff underwent a treadmill examination with Dr. Graham. The examination was curtailed because of fatigue, but plaintiff experienced no chest pain and the doctor noted that "no significant arrythmia [sic]" was present.25
Finally, on May 22, 1997, after plaintiff's claim was denied on reconsideration but prior to his hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, Mr. Pantojas' treating physician, Dr. Adrian Gherman, completed and submitted a medical report.26 Dr. Gherman stated that he first examined the plaintiff on October 5, 1995, and had seen him every one to five months since, most recently on May 16, 1997.27 Plaintiff's initial and current complaints were of headaches, poor vision in his right eye, and pain in his right thigh when walking. Dr. Gherman stated that the plaintiff "is able to walk, but no[t] fast," and that he was responding satisfactorily to treatment for the stroke, non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, transient hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and bronchial asthma.28
At his hearing on June 24, 1997, Mr. Pantojas testified that he is always in pain, can walk two to two and one half blocks, cannot stand for very long, can sit restlessly and can lift no more than 10 pounds.29 He testified also that he sometimes cooks for himself, washes his own dishes, and goes shopping. He attends religious services and writes poetry and songs. Plaintiff stated also that he suffers from "terrible headaches" and that the last time he worked outside of prison was in 1987 when he sorted papers and put them in boxes.30
In assessing a claim for disability benefits, the Commissioner engages in a five-step process designed to determine whether a person has a "disability" within the meaning of the statute.31 The first step considers whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." If so, then benefits are denied.32 If not, the second step considers whether the claimant's impairment is "severe." If not, benefits are denied.33 If so, the third step considers whether the impairment meets or equals a condition set forth in the "Listing of Impairments" contained in the regulations.34 "These are impairments acknowledged by the Secretary to be of sufficient severity to preclude gainful employment."35 If the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, the claimant is "disabled" and is entitled to benefits, and the inquiry ends. If not, the fourth step examines the claimant's "residual functional capacity," which involves an analysis of the claimant's capacity to engage in basic work activities and a decision as to whether the claimant has the capacity to engage in his or her prior work. Benefits are denied if the claimant's residual functional capacity allows the claimant to perform his or her prior work.36 If the claimant's residual functional capacity does not rise to the level required by his or her prior work, however, the claimant is entitled to benefits unless the Commissioner can demonstrate that the claimant, in light of his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, has the capacity to perform "alternative occupations available in the national economy."37
Applying the sequential evaluation process to plaintiff's claim, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 3, 1996, when the claim was filed.38 Proceeding to the next step, the ALJ weighed the significance of plaintiff's non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, hypertension, bronchial asthma, a history of drug and alcohol abuse (in remission) and status-post left cerebrovascular accident with mild residuals and found that they resulted in a "severe impairment."39 At the third step, the ALJ found that plaintiff's impairments are not listed in or medically equivalent to any listed in the relevant regulations.40 Because plaintiff has no past relevant work experience that his "residual functional capacity" would allow him to perform, the ALJ skipped the fourth step and proceeded to the fifth step. The ALJ observed that the evidence shows plaintiff's impairments limit him to work at the sedentary exertional level and that he has no additional non-exertional limitations.41
Considering all of the medical evidence as well as plaintiff's testimony at the hearing and the various statements made in his applications, the ALJ found that plaintiff is capable of sitting for at least six hours, standing or walking for two hours, and carrying objects weighing up to ten pounds during the course of an eight-hour workday. Noting that this is compatible with the ability to perform sedentary work and taking into consideration plaintiff's vocational profile (age, education, and work experience), the ALJ concluded that "jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy which he can perform and that he is, therefore, not `disabled' within the meaning of the Social Security Act."42
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