Paopao v. State, Dshs, No. 59728-1-I.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Writing for the Court: Appelwick
• Citation: 145 Wn. App. 40,185 P.3d 640
• Parties: Karine PAOPAO, individually and on behalf of the class of similarly situated persons, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES and the Secretary of Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent.
• Docket Number: No. 59728-1-I.
• Decision Date: 09 June 2008

185 P.3d 640 145 Wn. App. 40 Karine PAOPAO, individually and on behalf of the class of similarly situated persons, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES and the Secretary of Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent. No. 59728-1-I. Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1. June 9, 2008.

[185 P.3d 642]

Daniel F. Johnson, David E. Breskin, Breskin Johnson & Townsend PLLC, Seattle, William W. Houck, Issaquah, for Appellant.

Carrie L. Bashaw, Attorney General's Office, Olympia, for Respondent.

APPELWICK, J.

¶ 1 A settlement between Karine Paopao, a Medicaid recipient, and the State, negotiated as an accord and satisfaction in reasonable reliance on existing decisional law, is not subject to vacation based on a subsequent United States Supreme Court decision, mutual mistake of law or ultra vires agency action. We affirm.

Facts

¶ 2 On November 14, 2002, a car, driven by Juanita Salazar, struck Karine Paopao. Paopao suffered extensive injuries due to the accident. Because Paopao was unable to pay

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her medical bills, she sought assistance from the Medicaid program administered by the Washington Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). DSHS paid Paopao's medical expenses, totaling approximately $66,000.

¶ 3 In 2004, DSHS asserted a lien on any amount Paopao received from Salazar or her own insurance company. In May 2005, Paopao settled with Salazar's insurance company for $25,000. Paopao's own underinsured motorist coverage paid her $30,000. Paopao recovered a total of $55,000. The settlements were not apportioned between medical expenses and other losses.

¶ 4 DSHS initially sought reimbursement for the entire amount it expended for her medical expenses. After negotiations, DSHS and Paopao settled the Medicaid lien for $20,000. On November 3, 2005, Paopao sent final payment to DSHS. DSHS released the lien in February of 2006.

¶ 5 In May of 2006, the United States Supreme Court filed Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn, which limited a state's authority to assert and enforce a lien in excess of an amount representing medical expenses when a Medicaid recipient recovers from a third party tort-feasor. 547 U.S. 268, 285, 283, 126 S.Ct. 1752, 164 L.Ed.2d 459 (2006).

¶ 6 Four months after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ahlborn, Paopao filed a putative class action lawsuit in King County Superior Court, seeking damages, injunctive relief, and asserting a claim for a declaratory order based on unjust enrichment. Relying on the holding in Ahlborn, Paopao argued her settlement with DSHS was invalid and should be voided.

¶ 7 DSHS filed for summary judgment arguing Paopao's claims were barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction and that she failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Paopao in turn filed for partial summary judgment asking the court to find that Ahlborn can be applied retroactively, that DSHS' receipt of $20,000 from the negotiated settlement violated Ahlborn, DSHS' negotiation of the agreement was an ultra vires act, and that the statute of limitations had not run. After hearing oral arguments, the trial court granted summary judgment for DSHS and denied Paopao's motion. The trial court denied Paopao's request for reconsideration. Paopao appeals.

Discussion

A. Standard of Review

¶ 8 Paopao appeals the trial court's granting of summary judgment to DSHS. When reviewing a summary judgment order, the appellate court undertakes the same inquiry as the trial court. Thompson v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 77 Wash.App. 500, 504, 892 P.2d 760 (1995). Summary judgment is proper when all facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). The moving party bears this burden of proof. Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 Wash.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). "A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends." Barrie v. Hosts of Am., Inc., 94 Wash.2d 640, 642, 618 P.2d 96 (1980).

B. Accord and Satisfaction

¶ 9 In 2005, the parties settled DSHS's claim for reimbursement of medical expenses from the amount Paopao received from the third party tort-feasor. DSHS asserts this agreement was an accord and satisfaction, which extinguished any claim Paopao had as to the validity of the lien.

¶ 10 Accord and satisfaction requires the parties have a bona fide dispute, an agreement to settle that dispute, and performance of the agreement. DAVID K. DEWOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN WASHINGTON PRACTICE: TORT LAW AND PRACTICE § 16.2 (3d ed.2007). An accord and satisfaction is a new contract — a contract complete in itself. Evans v. Columbia Int'l Corp., 3 Wash.App. 955, 957, 478 P.2d 785 (1970). Its enforceability does not depend on the antecedent agreement. N.W. Motors, Ltd. v. James, 118 Wash.2d 294, 305, 822 P.2d 280 (1992); Perez v. Pappas, 98 Wash.2d 835, 843, 659 P.2d 475 (1983). When an accord is fully performed, the previously existing claim is discharged and all defenses and arguments based on the

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underlying contract are extinguished. N.W. Motors, 118 Wash.2d at 305, 822 P.2d 280; Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 37 Wash.App. 690, 694, 682 P.2d 317 (1984). A strong presumption attaches that the parties have considered and settled every existing difference. Burrows v. Williams, 52 Wash. 278, 287, 100 P. 340 (1909). To overcome this strong presumption requires "testimony so clear and convincing that the court can free the transaction from all doubt as to the intent of the parties." Id. An accord and satisfaction, like any contract, can be set aside, in whole or in part, for such reasons as mutual mistake, supervening illegality, or frustration of purpose. 1 Am.Jur.2d 812, Actions, § 24 (2005); Teel v. Cascade-Olympic Constr. Co., 68 Wash.2d 718, 720, 415 P.2d 73 (1966).

¶ 11 We agree with DSHS that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction. The initial lien asserted by DSHS was disputed by Paopao. To resolve the dispute, the parties subsequently agreed to settle the claim for $20,000. Paopao performed on the agreement by tendering payment of $20,000 in November of 2005. The letter accompanying Paopao's payment stated "[t]his check represents full and final payment in settlement of all sums owing to date in full accord and satisfaction of all monies owed to you in payment of any and all liens DSHS, has against our client, Karine Paopao, for the above-referenced matter." (emphasis added). In turn, DSHS released the lien. There was no apparent reservation of rights or defenses on the underlying agreement. We hold that by performing on the agreement, which constitutes an accord and satisfaction, Paopao released her right to any claims and defenses under the original dispute.

C. Vacation and Retroactive Application of Ahlborn

¶ 12 Despite the accord and satisfaction reached by the parties, Paopao urges this court to retroactively apply Ahlborn and void her settlement with DSHS. Paopao argues that pursuant to Ahlborn, the settlement agreement is void because DSHS lacked legal authority to assert a claim on the portion of her recovery that represented more than medical expenses. DSHS therefore received more of her third party recovery than it was legally entitled.

¶ 13 In Ahlborn, the United States Supreme Court held that when a Medicaid recipient settles a tort...