Papa v. Pittsburgh Penn-Center Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1966
• Docket Number: PENN-CENTER
• Citation: 421 Pa. 228,218 A.2d 783
• Parties: Frances PAPA and William Papa v. PITTSBURGHCORPORATION, a Corporation, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 783

218 A.2d 783

421 Pa. 228

Frances PAPA and William Papa v. PITTSBURGH PENN-CENTER CORPORATION, a Corporation, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 19, 1966.

William C. Walker, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

James E. Beasley, Philadelphia, Kenneth W. Behrend, Behrend, Phillips & Hudson, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN and O'BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment affirmed on the opinion of Judge David Olbum, of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.

The opinion of Judge David Olbum follows:

Before this Court in this trespass action are defendant's motions for judgment N.o.v., or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

This litigation resulted from a fall by the wife-plaintiff in a common hallway of a multiple-tenanted building owned by defendant corporation. The jury returned a verdict of $25,000 in favor of the wife-plaintiff and of $15,000 in favor of the husband-plaintiff. The husband's verdict was for medical expenses and loss of consortium.

Viewing the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the verdict-winners, as we must in considering a motion for judgment N.o.v., Hay v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 415 Pa. 190, 192, 202 A.2d 824, the following facts are established.

On February 18, 1958, between 1:00 P.M. and 2:00 P.M., Mrs. Papa went to the Penn-Center Building at 6124 Centre Avenue, a small office building owned by the defendant in the City of Pittsburgh, to pay a loan installment at the office of Beneficial Finance Company, one of several tenants who occupied the second floor of the building. It was a cold, snowy day, there had been some accumulation of snow, and the streets were wet and slushy.

The building had no elevator, and in order to reach her second floor destination, Mrs. Papa had to ascend two flights of stairs which were separated by a landing. She entered the building and ascended the two flights of stairs. As she reached the second floor hallway, Mrs. Papa noticed an accumulation of water covering the entire width of the hallway at the top of the stairs, which allowed no room for circumvention. She walked down the hallway to the Beneficial Finance Company office and transacted her business, which consumed five to ten minutes. She returned along the hallway to descend the stairs, holding her purse and a box of candy (which she had purchased earlier), and as she was reaching for the hand-rail at the place where the water had accumulated, both feet went out from under her, causing her to fall down several steps.

Near the point where Mrs. Papa slipped at the top of the stairs, there was a window opening out onto the roof, which window was open at the time of the accident, and to which Mrs. Papa's attention was attracted because cold air and snow were coming into the building through that window. It appears that the building generally was overheated, and that in order to provide some ventilation for the second floor, an employee of one of the tenants would open the window most every day, even during cold and inclement weather. And when the weather was inclement, rain and snow would come into the building and onto the stairs and the hallway. The hallway floor was of smooth, red tile, which was very slippery when wet, and the hallway was often wet, especially during the winter months.

The testimony establishes that, at the point where Mrs. Papa fell, there was an accumulation of water and dirt which extended across the width of the top of the stairs, through which she had to pass in order to leave the building; that this condition was created Both by the snow which blew in from the open window, and by the snow and slush tracked in by users of the building; and that an accumulation of water in the hallway had existed since about 9:30 A.M. on the day of the accident, which was at least 3 1/2 hours before the accident, and had grown worse at the time of the accident. Further, there were no floor mats of any kind at any point in the hallway or on the stairs, and the defendant provided no janitorial service in the building during daytime hours because 'this building isn't big enough to warrant a fulltime janitor service.'

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V.

A simple recital of the facts is sufficient to demonstrate that there was ample evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendant was negligent. In Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 365, 137 A.2d 771, 775, the Court said:

'* * * a landlord of a multiple-tenanted building, reserving control of the common approaches, such as sidewalks, passageways, etc., or parts of the building common to all tenants * * * is bound to keep such approaches and parts reasonably safe for the use of tenants and their invitees and a landlord becomes liable where he either had actual notice of a defective condition therein or was chargeable with constructive notice, because had he exercised reasonable inspection he would have become aware of it: (citing cases)'

Mrs. Papa slipped and fell in an accumulation of water which exposed her to an unreasonable risk of harm. While there was no evidence of actual notice of this condition on the part of the defendant, there was evidence that the unsafe condition had existed for several hours prior to the accident, which the jury could find was sufficient to charge the landlord with constructive notice. Had the landlord performed a reasonable inspection, he would have become aware of this condition. Even without any inspection, the landlord should be expected to anticipate that when it is snowing, persons entering a building will track in snow and slush, and that Some mopping up procedure is necessary from time to time to keep a smooth tile floor in reasonably safe condition for business visitors. See Katz v. John Wanamaker Philadelphia, Inc., 381 Pa. 477, 112 A.2d 65; Flora et ux. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 330 Pa. 166, 198 A. 663; Cohen v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 190 Pa.Super. 620, 155 A.2d 441.

Since counsel for the defendant in his brief does not pursue his point that the wife-plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, no extended discussion of that point is necessary. At the time of the accident, Mrs. Papa was leaving the building by the only avenue of egress available to her, and whether she exercised reasonable care for her own safety was for the jury to determine. Contributory negligence as a matter of law 'should be declared only in a very clear case and only where the evidence is so clear and palpable that there is no room for fair and sensible men to differ * * * Dougherty v. Philadelphia National Bank, 408 Pa. 342, 344, 184 A.2d 238, 239. The question of contributory negligence was clearly and carefully submitted to the jury.

The only argument that defendant presses in support of its motion for judgment N.o.v. is that the negligence of the defendant, if any, was not the proximate cause of the accident, and was superseded by the act of a tenant in opening the window and permitting snow to enter, and that this issue should at least have been submitted to the jury, which was not done. It is true that there was testimony to the effect that an employee of one of the tenants in all likelihood opened the window on the day of the accident, allowing some snow and water to accumulate in the hallway at the top of the stairs. It is also true that the tenants never notified the landlord of this practice of opening the window in the winter to mitigate the heat in the building. Other testimony, however, clearly indicates that the wet condition of the steps and hallway was due, at least in part, to the snow and slush tracked in by the business invitees of the second floor tenants. Without regard to the open window, therefore, the accumulation of water that resulted from the snow and slush which was tracked into the building was 'a causative factor of the accident,' or 'a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,' which was sufficient to impose liability on the defendant. See DeAngelis v. Burns, 404 Pa. 230, 235, 171 A.2d 762; Harrison et vir v. City of Pittsburgh et al., 353 Pa. 22, 24, 44 A.2d 273. Thus, the question of superseding cause is actually academic.

However, assuming, Arguendo, that the sole source of the water's accumulation in the hallway where the accident occurred was the opening of the window by a tenant, of which practice the defendant was ignorant, this would not exculpate the defendant, who was responsible for Maintaining the common hallways in a reasonably safe condition. Defendant's rental manager admitted that he knew that the hallway became wet in the winter from water tracked up to the second floor. Because it was the defendant's duty to maintain the common hallway and stairs, the manner in which, or the reason by which, some corrective measures became necessary to keep the premises reasonably safe does not affect nor diminish defendant's duty to maintain, a duty which is imposed by law. The jury found that the defendant had constructive notice of the wet and dirty condition of the hallway, that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed it, that the defendant had an opportunity to remedy the dangerous condition, and that the dangerous condition was the proximate cause of the accident, or a causative factor of the accident, or a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. This is all that the law requires.

This was not a proper case for a charge to the jury on 'intervening and superseding cause.' To have an intervening and superseding cause there must necessarily be an act of Antecedent negligence. In all of the cases relied upon by the defendant for the application of the doctrine of superseding cause, the defendant who sought to be relieved of liability contended that his Antecedent negligence was superseded by a second independent causative force which was the proximate cause of the accident. See ...