Papandrea v. Hartman

• Decision Date: 30 April 1986
• Citation: Papandrea v. Hartman, 507 A.2d 822, 352 Pa.Super. 163 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
• Parties: Augustus J. PAPANDREA, Sr. and Geraldine I. Papandrea, His Wife, Appellants v. Barry J. HARTMAN.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 822

507 A.2d 822

352 Pa.Super. 163

Augustus J. PAPANDREA, Sr. and Geraldine I. Papandrea, His Wife, Appellants v.Barry J. HARTMAN.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 17, 1985.

Filed Feb. 26, 1986.

Reargument Denied April 30, 1986.

John J. Krafsig, Harrisburg, for appellants.

Richard B. Swartz, Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.

WICKERSHAM, Judge:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, entered on a jury's verdict in favor of defendant-appellee, Barry J. Hartman, and against plaintiffs, Augustus J. Papandrea, Sr. and Geraldine I. Papandrea, appellants, in a trespass action growing out of an automobile collision.We reverse.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, defendant-appellee, the following appears of record: At approximately 3:30 P.M. on the 28th of May, 1982, appellee was driving his automobile on North Progress Avenue in Susquehanna Township, Dauphin County.It was not dark, and Hartman was moving at a reasonable rate of speed since the roadway was wet.

Hartman was approaching an intersection and could see, some 600 feet ahead, that another vehicle had stopped and its driver (appellant herein) was waiting for the traffic signal to change in his favor.The other vehicle was stationary in the left turning lane.Hartman slowed to enter the turning lane and began to apply his brakes.Hartman was traveling at less than 5 miles per hour, when his brakes allegedly failed, causing his vehicle to strike that of appellants.Appellant, Augustus Papandrea, was rendered totally disabled from the collision.

The case proceeded to trial and a jury found for Hartman.Post-verdict motions were denied and judgment was entered for appellee and against plaintiffs-appellants.This appeal timely followed.

On appeal, appellants present five issues for our review.¹We address the first of appellants' issues, which centers on the following relevant portion of the instruction to the jury by the court below:

[THE COURT]: Now, I want to point out to you some of the law that is specifically involved in a situation of this type.Now, remember that I did tell you that recovery is based on negligence.

The Defendant has pointed out in his request to the Court that this Defendant cannot be negligent because he asserts that the Defendant had brake failure and because of the brake failure the Defendant was not involved in any act of negligence.There is some law to this effect that when one finds himself in a position of danger that is not the result of his negligence, he is not responsible if he makes a mistake in judgment in getting out.An honest exercise in judgment is all that is required of him even if he could have done better had he had time to deliberate.

There is also some law to the effect that where there is mechanical failure such as a brake failure, and the party neither knew of it nor had reason to know that his mechanical failure would take effect and if in this particular case if you find that the action of the Defendant from the time of the brake failure until the moment of impact were not negligent, then of course the Plaintiff--excuse me, the Defendant, would be entitled to the invocation of this doctrine which we refer to as sudden emergencies.

On the other hand, there is a lot of law which is favorable to the Plaintiff and this has been referred to by the Plaintiff as the assured clear distance ahead rule.That rule reads as follows:

Any person having a vehicle on the highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic surface and width of the highway and of any other restrictions or conditions when and where existing; and no person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

Now, of course, you have got a lot of things to consider in that connection because we have had the Defendant who claims that he was going at something like five miles an hour; on the other hand, you have the Plaintiff pointing out that his car was damaged in the rear to the extent of two hundred and some dollars.You have a dispute as to that by the Defendant because the Defendant asserts that he observed the car and there was no damage that he was able to observe.This all goes into the question of credibility.

In connection with this conflict between the sudden emergency rule and the assured clear distance rule, there is some other law which is to the effect that the sudden emergency doctrine, where it is used in connection with the defense, you must consider the assured clear distance rule and in a case of this nature where the Defendant alleges that in the operation of the vehicle he developed an unforeseen defect in mechanisms it has been said that these alleged defects are of the type of unforeseen occurrences contemplated by the rule and that a person cannot invoke the sudden emergency doctrine if he is not driving his car at an assured clear distance and takes that chance of having an accident.Of course, again, I merely point out those rules to you.

Perhaps, I can read this.This is what one of the cases has said: 'A defendant cannot invoke the sudden emergency doctrine as a defense to the assured clear distance ahead rule, where he alleges in the operation of his vehicle the developing of unforeseen defective mechanisms, as these alleged defects are not those types of unforeseen occurrences contemplated by the sudden emergency doctrine.'So much for that.

There were no witnesses to the accident and you will have to determine whether or not, under these rules, the rules which I have given you in connection with negligence, the sudden emergency rule and the assured clear distance rule, whether or not this Defendant was negligent.

Now, if you determine from the evidence that there was no negligence on the part of the Defendant which was the proximate cause of the injuries to the Defendant--to the Plaintiff--the Plaintiff cannot recover.That is the end of the case and, of course, that was argued to you by the defense attorney.

On the other hand, if you conclude from the evidence that the Defendant was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of these injuries to this Plaintiff, then your verdict would be for the Plaintiff and you would then come to consider the question of damages.

Now, we are not suggesting to you by what we have just said that the Defendant was negligent.That is not our function.You are the ones that have to make that determination.Once you make that determination then you come to this question of damages.

R.R.at 98a-101a.

Appellants' allegation of error is that the trial judge improperly charged the jury on both the "Sudden Emergency Doctrine"² and the "Assured Clear Distance Ahead Rule."³

Initially, it is well settled that:

where the accuracy of a charge is at issue, an appellate court must look to the charge in its entirety against the background of the evidence to determine whether or not error was committed and whether that error was prejudicial to the complaining party.Berry v. Friday, 324 Pa.Super. 499, 472 A.2d 191(1984);Slavish v. Ratajczak, 277 Pa.Super. 272, 419 A.2d 767(1980).We must review the charge in this light.

Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa.Super. 329, 342, 483 A.2d 474, 481(1984)(allocatur granted).In reviewing the charge we must first determine whether a sudden emergency was proven by appellee, and, then, if the facts giving rise to the emergency leave no room for doubt, the issue becomes a matter of law for the judge.Polumbo v. DeStefano, 329 Pa.Super. 360, 366, 478 A.2d 828, 831(1984).

This analytical framework must be built for "the presence of a sudden emergency negates the applicability of the 'assured clear distance' rule[.]"Id. at 365, 478 A.2d at 831;Chiodo v. Gargloff & Downham Trucking Co., 308 Pa.Super. 498, 454 A.2d 645(1983)(where a sudden emergency arises the "assured clear distance ahead" rule is inapplicable).The distinction is relevant as [t]he case law in this Commonwealth indicates that the sudden emergency doctrine and the assured clear distance rule are mutually exclusive points of law and that in a given factual situation it is error to charge on both doctrines.Sullivan v. Wolson, 262 Pa.Super. 397, 396 A.2d 1230(1979);Brown v. Schriver, 254 Pa.Super. 468, 386 A.2d 45(1978).This is based on the rationale that the assured clear distance rule applies to essentially static or static objects, including vehicles moving in the same direction, while the sudden emergency doctrine applies only to moving instrumentalities thrust into a driver's path of travel.Brown v. Schriver, supra.However, there is case law for the proposition that it is proper for the court to charge on both points of law if the facts do not conclusively establish the existence of a sudden emergency situation.Potenburg v. Varner, 284 Pa.Super. 19, 424 A.2d 1370(1981).

Elder v. Orluck, supra at 343-44, 483 A.2d at 481-82.

Therefore, at the apex of our decision is whether a "sudden emergency" actually exists under the facts of this case.The well-reasoned Chiodo opinion instructs us that "[t]he 'sudden emergency' doctrine was not designed for the purpose of aiding the operator of a vehicle developing unforeseen defective mechanisms.These defects were not those types of unforeseen occurrences contemplated by the 'sudden emergency' doctrine."Id. at 502, 454 A.2d at 647(emphasis added).In Chiodo this court found that the brake failure of a tractor-trailer did not give rise to a "sudden emergency" defense.

We note additional, if not conflicting, precedent in this state's courts.Our supreme court in Gilligan v. Shaw, 441 Pa. 305, 272...