Paparo v. Borough of Yeadon
| Decision Date | 07 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-841 |
| Parties | ANTHONY PAPARO, v. BOROUGH OF YEADON, SHARON COUNCIL-HARRIS, Individually and as PRESIDENT OF YEADON BOROUGH COUNCIL; LEARIN JOHNSON, Individually and as VICE PRESIDENT OF YEADON BOROUGH COUNCIL; TOMEKA JONES-WATERS, Individually and as PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF YEADON BOROUGH COUNCIL, and CARLETTE BROOKS, Individually and as a Member of YEADON BOROUGH COUNCIL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Anthony Paparo brings a race discrimination claim against his former employer, the Borough of Yeadon, after he was removed from his position as Chief of Police for the Borough of Yeadon. Plaintiff alleges that he, a white man, was fired on the basis of his race. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff alleges that the justifications provided by Defendants for firing Plaintiff are false and defamatory; that the hearing provided to him violated his right to procedural due process; and that the Defendants have retaliated against him. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 99-121.)
Defendant Borough of Yeadon and Defendants Sharon Council-Harris Learin Johnson, Tomeka Jones-Waters, and Carlette Brooks (the “Individual Defendants”) (together “Defendants”) argue that Defendants are immune from the state law claims of defamation and false light privacy, that Plaintiff was given an adequate due process hearing, and that Plaintiff fails to adequately plead a § 1981 (through § 1983) claim against Defendant Borough of Yeadon. (Motion for Partial Dismissal (“Mot. to Dismiss,” ECF 11) at 7-8, 12-16, 17-18.) Finally, Defendants argue that portions of the Amended Complaint must be stricken for “inclusion of scandalous and impertinent matter.” (Id. at 18-19.)
Plaintiff replies, arguing that Plaintiff adequately pleaded that Individual Defendants had final authority to establish official policy, satisfying the elements of a Monell claim; that the due process hearing afforded him was inherently tainted so as to violate his right to procedural due process; and that the Individual Defendants are not entitled to immunity. (Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (“Pl.'s Resp.,” ECF 12) at 16-17,19-21, 23-24.)
Plaintiff alleges that he, a white man, was fired on the basis of his race after four Black Members of the Yeadon Borough Council (the Individual Defendants) voted to remove him from his position as Chief of Police under false pretenses. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-6.) Plaintiff alleges that the four Individual Defendants, particularly Defendant Learin Johnson, made numerous comments about their intent to fire Plaintiff and replace him with a Black Chief of Police. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that the Individual Defendants then began to spread false and defamatory information about Plaintiff, including that Plaintiff had mismanaged taxpayer funds and violated Borough law. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 57-61.) These statements consisted of posters presented at a February 10, 2022 Council meeting and a “Truth Matters Fact Sheet” that was distributed by the Individual Defendants and published on Defendant Borough of Yeadon's website after Plaintiff was terminated. (Id. at ¶¶ 8388, 108-116.)
At the February 10, 2022 Council meeting, Plaintiff alleged that he demanded a nameclearing hearing in order to respond to the allegations raised by the Individual Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 89-91.)
The Council agreed to grant him a “due process hearing,” which was scheduled for February 17, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 91.) Plaintiff argues that the February 17, 2022 hearing violated his right to procedural due process because the majority of the deciding Borough Council consisted of the Individual Defendants, rendering the Board inherently biased against Plaintiff and unlawfully mingling the Council's investigatory and adjudicatory functions. (Id. at ¶ 97.) Plaintiff also claims that the hearing lacked due process because it took place without any witnesses or documents being presented in support of the accusations, without Plaintiff being given the opportunity to answer questions, and without any discussion or renderings of findings of fact or conclusions of law. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 96.)
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have engaged in retaliation against him, including unpaid wages, defamation, false light privacy, and allegations of theft. (Id. at ¶¶ 99-121.) Plaintiff claims damages consisting of lost wages, benefits, and pension credits; irreparable harm to his reputation; and physical pain and suffering. (Id. at 38-39.)
Plaintiff brings the following claims against the Borough of Yeadon and the Individual Defendants:
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts I, IV, VI, and VII, and a concurrent Motion to “strike impertinent language” contained in the Amended Complaint. (Mot. to Dismiss.) Defendants argue that the decision to fire Plaintiff was driven by concerns over Plaintiff's “improper use of overtime and hiring of numerous part time employees in violation of [a] Collective Bargaining Agreement.” (Mot. to Dismiss at 3.)
Regarding Counts VI and VII (Plaintiff's claim of defamation and false light privacy, respectively), Defendants argue that the Borough of Yeadon has immunity under Pennsylvania law for intentional torts. (Id. at 7-8.) Defendants also claim high public official immunity for the Individual Defendants. (Id. at 15-16.)
Defendants argue that Count IV (Plaintiff's procedural due process claim) is without merit and should be dismissed (firstly) because the Pennsylvania Borough Code required all members to vote, (secondly) because Plaintiff was an at-will employee with no property interest in his job, and (thirdly) because the hearing was sufficient to meet due process requirements. (Id. at 9-12.) Defendants also claim that Plaintiff has failed to allege damage to his reputation. (Id. at 13-14.)
Regarding Count I, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to set forth a viable §§ 1981 and 1983 claim because Plaintiff has not established that the Borough of Yeadon's policies and customs are discriminatory and violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, as required under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Id. at 17-18.)
Finally, Defendants argue that portions of the Amended Complaint must be stricken for “inclusion of scandalous and impertinent matter.” (Id. at 18-19.) Defendants specifically point to the opening quote and citation to McDonald v. Santa Fe Trial Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), and the assertions made in ¶¶ 1-4 () and ¶¶ 28-29 (). (Id. at 19.)
Plaintiff responded to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. With regards to Count I, Plaintiff argues that he has properly pleaded his §§ 1981 and 1983 claim in accordance with Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) because he has alleged that the Individual Defendants had sufficient authority to render their behavior an act of official government policy. (Pl's Resp. at 16-17.)
With regard to Count IV, Plaintiff argues that he had a “liberty” interest rather than a property interest in his employment and has adequately pleaded that claim. (Id. at 18-19.) Plaintiff also argues that the Borough Code requiring that the Members of Council vote on Plaintiff's employment and that Plaintiff demand a name-clearing hearing cannot be used to counter his constitutional interest in due process and cannot cure the inherent bias of the decisionmakers. (Id. at 19-20.) Plaintiff argues that the rule of necessity is not applicable. (Id. at 21.)
With regards to Counts VI and VII, Plaintiff argues that the Individual Defendants' statements resulting in the alleged defamation and false light privacy were not subject to high public official immunity because the statements in question were made after Plaintiff had been fired, on social media, and not in the course of any official business. (Id. at 23-26.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' Motion to Strike is meritless. (Id. at 27-28.)
Upon review of the record and arguments made by the parties as well as the relevant case law, the Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss as to Count I (the §§ 1981 and 1983 claim against the Borough of Yeadon), Count IV (the due process claim against all Defendants), and Counts VI and VII as to the Individual Defendants (the state law claims of defamation and false light privacy), but the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss as to Counts VI and VII against the Borough of Yeadon. The Court will also deny the Motion to Strike.
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the Court accepts all factual allegations as true and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Doe v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). To survive this motion, a plaintiff must include sufficient facts in the complaint that, accepted as true, ...
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