Papieves v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 20 March 1970
• Parties: , 48 A.L.R.3d 233 Joseph V. PAPIEVES and Margaret Papieves, his wife, Appellants, v. Owen Norman LAWRENCE and Joseph J. Kelly.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 118

263 A.2d 118

437 Pa. 373, 48 A.L.R.3d 233

Joseph V. PAPIEVES and Margaret Papieves, his wife, Appellants, v. Owen Norman LAWRENCE and Joseph J. Kelly.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 20, 1970.

[437 Pa. 374] Harry R. Mayer, Philadelphia, for appellants.

George J. McConchie, Cramp & D'Iorio, Media, for appellee Joseph J. Kelly.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

POMEROY, Justice.

This appeal is from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The only facts before the Court are the averments of the complaint, and for present purposes the demurrer admits every well pleaded material fact set forth in the pleading to which it is addressed and the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 436 Pa. 279, 259 A.2d 443 (1969); Eden Roc Country Club v. Mullhauser, 416 Pa. 61, 204 A.2d 465 (1964); and Mistick v. Cammack, 397 Pa. 296, 154 A.2d 588 (1959).

From the complaint it appears that one Richard Papieves, the fourteen year old son of Joseph V. and Margaret Papieves (plaintiffs-appellants herein), disappeared from his home on June 11, 1965. It was subsequently discovered that on that day the Papieves by had been struck by a motor vehicle operated by a minor, one Owen Norman Lawrence (defendant herein). Whether Papieves was killed or seriously injured in the collision is not of record. Without attempting to obtain medical assistance and without notifying either the or the boy's parents, Lawrence removed Papieve's body from the scene of the accident, took it to his home, and hid it in his garage. Some few days later, Lawrence contacted one Joseph J. Kelly, also a minor, and requested his assistance in disposing of the body of Papieves. Defendant Lawrence and Kelly thereupon took Papieves' body to a field near Darby Creek Road in Marple Township, Delaware County, where they dug a grave and interred the decedent. More than two months later, the partially decomposed body of young Papieves was found, and his remains were returned to his parents.

Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this suit by filing and having served a complaint in trespass against Lawrence and Kelly, alleging that defendants' acts constituted an invasion of, and an unlawful interference with, plaintiffs' right to the possession of the decedent's body; that such acts constituted an unlawful and indecent disposal of decedent's body without the authority or consent of the plaintiffs; and that defendants had so acted with the intent to prevent the plaintiffs from discovering the fate of their son. Plaintiffs averred that as the result of the aforesaid acts they had suffered mental anguish, emotional disturbance, embarrassment, and humiliation; they sought damages in excess of $10,000 against both defendants.

Defendant Kelly filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and a motion for more specific pleadings. As indicated above, the court sustained Kelly's demurrer and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. ¹

In its opinion, the court below stated that it knew of no Pennsylvania cases which would allow such an action in trespass, although the court's equitable powers would have been available, if timely invoked, to prevent such interference with the plaintiffs' right to the decedent's body. Noting the rule of recovery set forth in the Restatement of Torts, § 868 (1939), ² the court found that this Court's adherence to the socalled impact rule set forth in Bosley v Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142, A.2d 263 (1958) rendered the Restatement rule inapplicable. We conclude that defendant's preliminary objections were improperly sustained.

Insofar as we can determine, the issue of recovery for emotional distress resulting from the mishanding of the body of a deceased relative has never before been presented to an appellate court in this Commonwealth. ³ The parties to this action have cited no apposite appellate decision, nor has our research uncovered any such case. ⁴ Every cause of action in tort, however, was once a novel claim, and the absence of Pennsylvania authority for appellants' proposition is not an end to the issue, for a review of the Restatement and the law of other jurisdictions indicates that the case before us is by no means unique.

As indicated above, § 868 of the Restatement provides that one who 'wantonly mistreats' or, acting without privilege, 'intentionally withholds' the body of a decedent is liable in tort to the member of the decedent's family who is entitled to the disposition of the body. Comments A and B to § 868 state that such a cause of action 'exists although there has been no harm except such harm to the feelings as is inseparable from the knowledge of the defendant's conduct * * * The cause of action is primarily for mental suffering caused by the improper dealing with the body. It includes also the right to recover damages for physical harm resulting from such mental suffering.'

Other jurisdictions have recognized claims for mental suffering caused by the defendant's wanton or intentional mishandling of the body of the decedent. Such mishandling of a body has been found to encompass, Inter alia, the unlawful interment or disinterment of a body, intentional interference with a burial, the wanton mutilation or unauthorized embalming of a corpse, and other intentional, reckess or wanton acts likely to cause severe emotional distress. See Sanford v. Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10 (1950); Gostowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933); Stephens v. Waits, 53 Ga.App. 44, 184 S.E. 781 (1935); Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698, 72 P.2d 981 (1937); Sworski 872, § 521, 18 P.S. § 4521. Similarly, (1940); and Brownlee v. Pratt, 77 Ohio App. 533, 68 N.E.2d 798 (1946). After a review of the cases in this area, one leading authority has concluded that a distinct majority of the jurisdictions hold that 'where the defendant, not privileged by statute, intentionally or recklessly invades another's interest in the body of a deceased relative by conduct which it is highly probable will cause acute and poignant emotional distress, he becomes liable therefor although no other interest of the plaintiff is invaded.' Harper and James The Law of Torts, § 9.4, p. 675 (1956). While the decisions in other jurisdictions have frequently spoken of the next of kin's property or quasi-property rights in the body of the decedent, the underlying, and we believe real, issue is the right of a decedent's nearest relatives to protection against intentional, outrageous or wanton conduct which is peculiarly calculated to cause them serious mental or emotional distress. See Stephens v. Waits, Supra; Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 P. 299 (1925); and Prosser, 'Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A new Tort', 37 Michigan Law Review 874 (1939).

The law has only recently recognized that the freedom from mental distress directly caused by wanton or outrageous conduct is entitled to legal protection independent of any other cause of action, and recent years have seen many legal developments in this regard. Compare Restatement of Torts, § 46 (1934) with Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1965); see also Magruder, 'Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,' 49 Harvard Law Review 1033 (1936) and Harper and James, op. cit., chap. 9. We recognize that any extension of legal liability to acts which cause emotional distress is not without its problems. We also recognize that the law cannot serve to guarantee all men's peace of mind; as the late Judge Magruder remarked, 'Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.' Magruder, op. cit., p. 1035. But this case is not in that category. There can be little doubt that mental or emotional disorders brought on by conduct such as that set forth in the complaint at bar may be every bit as real, every bit as debilitating as ailments which have more obviously physical causes. For this reason, the obvious and inherent difficulties of the proof, or disproof, of emotional distress and the measurement of damages for such injury are not adequate cause, standing alone, to deny recovery. We conclude that recovery may be had for serious mental or emotional distress directly caused by the intentional and wanton acts of mishandling a decedent's body which are here alleged. It goes without saying that in order to recover, a...