Papineau v. Hefflon

• Decision Date: 06 March 1934
• Citation: 171 A. 509,118 Conn. 688
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: PAPINEAU v. HEFFLON et al.

171 A. 509

118 Conn. 688

PAPINEAU v. HEFFLON et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 6, 1934

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; John A. Cornell Judge.

Action by Henry Papineau against James L. Hefflon and another to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court and tried to the court. Judgment for the plaintiff against the named defendant and for the defendant Saybrook Garage, Inc., and appeal by the plaintiff.

No error.

Foster K. Sistare and Perry J. Hollandersky, both of New London, for appellant.

John C. Blackall, of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The assignments of error seek, by correction of the finding, to overthrow conclusions by which the additional defendant, the Saybrook Garage, Inc., was relieved from liability. It is found that the defendant Hefflon, at the time when the car driven by him struck and injured the plaintiff, was operating it under an agreement with the garage to purchase it provided, upon test, he was satisfied, but that he might return it if it proved unsatisfactory. Under such conditions the garage would not be liable for negligence of Hefflon as there was no claim that he was accompanied by and acting under the supervision and control of any agent or employee of the garage. Marshall v. Fenton, 107 Conn. 728, 142 A. 403; Murphy v. Mace, 112 Conn. 684, 152 A. 582. The appellant's attempt to substitute a finding that the garage rented the automobile to Hefflon and therefore became liable for negligent operation by him, under section 1627 of the General Statutes (Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163), has scant substantiation in the evidence, while the finding made on this point is adequately supported. Consequently the desired correction cannot be made.

The further conclusion, that the defective condition of the brakes was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, depends upon the finding as to the speed at which the car was traveling, the distance before striking the plaintiff that Hefflon applied the brakes, and the distance within which a car traveling at a speed of twenty miles per hour would stop after the application of brakes in normal working order. The evidence relating to these facts is in some respects conflicting,...