Papineau v. Heilman

• Decision Date: 27 June 2012
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 3:12-cv-05256 RBL
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
• Parties: JUDY GRIFFITH PAPINEAU, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Brooks Papineau, Plaintiff, v. HANNAH HEILMAN; CITY OF TACOMA; TIM KOBEL; JOHN DOES 1-5; PIERCE COUNTY, WASHINGTON, Defendants.

JUDY GRIFFITH PAPINEAU, Individually and as Personal Representative

of the Estate of Brooks Papineau, Plaintiff,

v.HANNAH HEILMAN; CITY OF TACOMA; TIM KOBEL;

JOHN DOES 1-5; PIERCE COUNTY, WASHINGTON, Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:12-cv-05256 RBL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA

Dated: June 27, 2012

HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS IN PART AND GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND

[Dkt. # 13, 28]

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Pierce County's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #13], and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. #28]. The case arises from the death of Plaintiff's husband, Brooks Papineau, and from the County's subsequent search and seizure of his vehicle. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and the Motion to Amend is granted.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY

On June 15, 2011, Tacoma Police Officer Hannah Heilman stopped Mr. Papineau on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. While Officer Heilman sat in her patrol car requesting backup for processing Mr. Papineau, he exited his truck. Officer Heilman apparently claimed that Mr. Papineau shot at her as he walked toward her car, although the question of Mr. Papineau's actions is disputed. It is undisputed, however, that Officer Heilman fired several shots at Mr. Papineau and that he died shortly after arriving at St. Anthony's Hospital in Gig Harbor.

Following the shooting, Pierce County Detective Mark Merod applied for a warrant to search Mr. Papineau's truck and its contents. The warrant application stated that Mr. Papineau exited the vehicle holding a handgun and that he fired at Officer Heilman. It also stated that the handgun was lying next to Mr. Papineau when other officers arrived.

The magistrate judge issued a search warrant for Mr. Papineau's truck, including "indicia of occupancy, identification, paperwork, papers, mail, bills, or other documents" to determine "dominion and/or control" of the truck, and trace evidence of "the suspect and/or victim of the alleged crime" in the truck. Mot. to Dismiss, App. at 4. The officers found a Koran, a knife, a handgun, and other miscellaneous items inside the truck. They seized the truck and its contents.

In contrast to Officer Heilman's account, the Complaint alleges that Mr. Papineau exited his truck, unarmed and carrying his wallet, to speak with the officer when she shot him multiple times without warning. Mrs. Papineau also alleges that Mr. Papineau had a handgun in his truck, but that he was not holding it when Officer Heilman shot him. Further, following the truck's seizure, Mrs. Papineau alleges that the officers left the vehicle in an uncovered area with the windows partly open, resulting in weather and mold damage. Mrs. Papineau claims sherequested release of the truck and the other seized items. In response, the City asked the County not to release the truck and its contents so that the City could continue its investigation.

Mrs. Papineau has sued Officer Heilman and the City for unreasonably seizing her husband and for depriving her of her relationship with her husband. She also alleges that the City and the County violated her fourth- and fourteenth-amendment rights by unreasonably searching, seizing, and damaging the truck and its contents. She seeks damages from the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the County to release her seized property, and reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The County seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against it for failure to state a claim under Fed. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Mrs. Papineau has also moved to file a second Amended Complaint in order to add state-law claims. Pl.'s Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl. [Dkt. #28]. The second Amended Complaint includes claims for assault and battery, infliction of emotional distress, defamation, conversion, and negligence. Id. ¶¶ 5.3, 5.5-5.8.

II. DISCUSSION

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim has "facial plausibility" when the party seeking relief "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although the Court must accept as true a complaint's well-pled facts, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat an otherwise proper Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007); Sprewell v. Golden StateWarriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted). This requires a plaintiff to plead "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

As an initial matter, on April 30, 2012, Magistrate Judge Creatura ordered that all property belonging to Mr. Papineau's estate be immediately placed into Mrs. Papineau's custody. Order on Defs.' Mot. for Protective Order [Dkt. # 22]. The items included the truck, the gun, and other personal effects. The court ordered that other evidence not belonging to Mr. or Mrs. Papineau remain in the County's custody. Mrs. Papineau's request for injunctive relief (and the County's motion to dismiss the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief) is therefore moot. See also Pl.'s Mot. to Amend at 8 (removing request for declarative and injunctive relief). Accordingly, the Court will address only the constitutional claims against the County.

A. Municipal Liability

Mrs. Papineau asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, alleging that the County's officers unreasonably seized and damaged her property, which was the "proximate and foreseeable result of the policies, customs and usages" of the County. Am. Compl. at 4 [Dkt. #5].

To set forth a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's employees or agents acted pursuant to an official custom, pattern, or policy that violates the plaintiff's civil rights; or that the entity ratified the unlawful conduct. See id. at 690-91; Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646-47 (9th Cir. 1991). Additionally, amunicipality may be liable for a "policy of inaction" where "such inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Municipal liability for inaction attaches only where the policy amounts to "deliberate indifference." Id. The custom or policy of inaction, however, "must be the result of a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." Id. (citations and internal punctuation omitted). Thus, to impose liability on a local government entity for failing to act to preserve constitutional rights, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that: (1) a municipality or its employee deprived plaintiffs of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has customs or policies that amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) those customs or policies were the "moving force" behind the constitutional right violation. Id. at 681-82.

A municipality is not liable simply because it employs a tortfeasor. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. A municipality may not be held liable for the torts of its employees unless they were acting pursuant to an official policy or longstanding custom or practice. Botello v. Gammich, 413 F.3d 971, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Brown, 520 U.S. at 403; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986); and Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)).

1. County Liability for Damages to Vehicle

"The due process clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that "the Fourteenth Amendment is not a font of tortlaw to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States." Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998) (citation omitted).

Here, Mrs. Papineau attempts to transform a negligence claim—the officers leaving the car windows rolled down—into a constitutional one. But, as noted above, a municipality is liable for a "policy of inaction" where the failure constitutes "deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights. An officer's single act of failing to roll up a truck's windows cannot amount to a "policy of inaction." Thus, to the extent that Mrs. Papineau's constitutional claims are based on the truck's alleged weather and mold damage, the claim is dismissed with prejudice.

2. County Liability for Unreasonable Seizure of the Vehicle by JudicialDeception

The Complaint states that Detective Merod repeated Officer Heilman's allegedly false account of the shooting and added his own false statement, i.e., that Mr. Papineau's gun was found outside rather than inside the vehicle. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3.9-3.10. These false statements, according to Mrs. Papineau, render the resulting warrant invalid and the seizure of the truck and its contents unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

"Government investigators may be liable...