Pappas v. City of Bay City

• Decision Date: 25 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 3,Docket No. 3816,3
• Citation: 170 N.W.2d 306,17 Mich.App. 745
• Parties: Frances PAPPAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF BAY CITY, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 306

170 N.W.2d 306

17 Mich.App. 745

Frances PAPPAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF BAY CITY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 3816.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

June 25, 1969.

Leave to Appeal Denied Aug. 27, 1969.

Released for Publication Sept. 16, 1969.

Peter F. Cicinelli, Cicinelli, Mossner, Majoros, Harrigan & Alexander, Saginaw, for plaintiff-appellant.

John W. McGraw, Egloff, Mainolfi, Taylor, McGraw & Collison, Saginaw, for defendant-appellee.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and T. G. KAVANAGH ^*, and McINTYRE, JJ.

McINTYRE, Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action against the city of Bay City for injuries suffered after slipping and falling on a public sidewalk. At the close of proofs, the defendant city moved for a directed verdict which was granted and the plaintiff appeals.

In granting this motion for a directed verdict the trial judge predicated his decision on Hopson v. City of Detroit (1926), 235 Mich. 248, 209 N.W. 161, 48 A.L.R. 1150 and the annotation at 80 A.L.R. 1170.

It goes without saying that in the determination of a motion of this nature the testimony must be taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. With this rule in mind, we conclude that between 1950 and the date of the accident, December 20, 1963, no repairs were made to the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell. However, the sidewalk was repaired in March, 1964. Where a sidewalk joined with a curb at a street intersection, and the accident in which the plaintiff was injured did occur while stepping over a curb and onto a sidewalk at a street intersection, it was the standard of the city to repair the sidewalk when it had become depressed 2 and 3/8 inches below the adjacent curb. The reason for this standard by the city was that water would collect behind the curb if the sidewalk sloped down toward it. A neighbor of the plaintiff and her mother had noted that at the point where the plaintiff fell the sidewalk was depressed for a period of at least 10 months before the accident to the point where water would gather in the recess between the sidewalk and the curb and the difference in elevation between the sidewalk and the curb was such that the neighbor had to lift the wheels of her baby stroller over the curb to avoid catching them in the recess. Testimony was given by an investigator that he measured the sidewalk on the corner where the plaintiff fell and found that it was depressed 2 and 3/8 inches on one side and 1 and 3/4 inches on the other side below the level of the curb. Plaintiff testified that in crossing the intersection, she stepped over the curb onto what she thought was a snowy surface and fell. After the fall it was discovered that there was ice under the snow upon which the plaintiff had stepped and she and her daughter concluded that the ice had caused the fall.

At the time of the alleged injury the applicable statute provided:

'Any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in this state, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, sidewalks, cross walks and culverts on the same in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel by the township, village, city or corporation whose corporate authority extends over such public highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, cross walk or culvert, and whose duty it is to keep the same in reasonable repair, such township, village, city or corporation shall be liable to and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled, and to any person suffering damages by reason of such injury, just damages to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case before any court of competent jurisdiction.' (C.L.S.1961, § 242.1; Stat.Ann.1958 Rev. § 9.591).

Despite the many authorities cited in briefs, the appeal turns upon the analysis of four cases which have received the attention of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan and which do not appear at first glance to be entirely consonant in establishing a precedential doctrine. These cases are: Navarre v. City of Benton Harbor (1901) 126 Mich. 618, 86 N.W. 138; Hopson v. City of Detroit (1926) 235 Mich. 248, 209, N.W. 161, 48 A.L.R. 1150; Rex v. Village of Lochmoor (1934) 268 Mich. 159, 255 N.W. 748; Johnson v. City of Pontiac (1936) 276 Mich. 103, 267 N.W. 795. In Navarre, supra, there was a settling of a walk which permitted it to trap a flow of water from both natural sources and from an adjacent garbage tank maintained for the benefit of tenants of a private building and the court reversed a directed verdict for the defendant, stating:

'There was here a concurrence of a peculiar formation of the walk, which arrested the flow of water down the hill, and caused it to flow across the walk at this point, forming an open gutter, with the improper flow of wastage from the garbage tank, resulting in a dangerous and icy place. The case is distinguished from Gavett v. City of Jackson ((1896), 109 Mich. 408, 67 N.W. 517, 32 L.R.A. 861) in these respects: In that case a majority of the Court was of the opinion that there was no improper flowage of water across the sidewalk in question, which was itself in good repair, and not so laid as to cause water to accumulate and form ice. That cannot be said of the present case. The jury would be justified in inferring that the depressed condition of this walk was such as to induce the formation of ice in unusual quantities, and it certainly would be justified in finding that an improper flowage of the wastage from the garbage tank was permitted by the city, and continued for a long period.'

In Hopson, supra, plaintiff was walking on a cement sidewalk in the city of Detroit upon which there was a depression which had settled and the cement had disintegrated making the walk lower in the center. Water from natural causes accumulated in the depression and there was ice at the bottom and a thin layer of water on the top. When plaintiff reached the depression a branch of an overhanging tree grazed her face, she ducked, slipped and fell causing the injury complained of. Plaintiff had testified that she knew of the depression, that it was about 4 inches deep and had existed for two years at least, that rain water settled in the depression and ice formed there in the winter. There was testimony that although the depression existed, the pavement was not broken, and the court held there was no culpable defect in the walk under the statute relative to the duty of the defendant city to keep the walk in repair and reasonably safe for public travel. In reversing verdict for plaintiff the court stated, p. 252, 209 N.W. p. 163:

'The ice filled the depression, except a thin layer of water at the top, leaving no hole or trap into which plaintiff could step or catch her foot. Under the evidence and holding of this court, the verdict should have been directed for defendant at the close of plaintiff's proofs. Plaintiff made no case.'

Our court relied upon Newton v. City of Worcester (1899), 174 Mass. 181, 54 N.E. 521, which enunciated a doctrine that where ice and snow is the sole proximate cause of the accident there shall be no liability unless there is another defect to which, as a proximate cause, the accident is in part attributable. This other defect, however, would not be held to be a proximate cause within the meaning of this rule simply because it causes the accumulation of the ice or snow. In the mind of this court it is extremely difficult to reconcile Hopson with Navarre, more particularly since the Supreme Court in Hopson made no mention of the earlier Navarre case and certainly did not expressly overrule it.

Rex v. Village of Lochmoor, Supra, seems to reestablish the old doctrine in a case where a boy 9 years old suffered death by drowning when he slipped on wet clay accumulating in a rough and broken public sidewalk obscuring the edge of the public walk and was precipitated into a river. The court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff administrator. Without making reference to Hopson, supra, the Supreme Court in 1934 stated:

'It is true that a village is not an insurer of its sidewalks but it must maintain them in a reasonably safe condition for travel. C.L.1929, § 4223. In cases where reasonable and prudent men may fairly disagree upon how the duty shall be performed, the question is for the jury. With a slippery sidewalk sloping downwardly to the low ground and toward a precipitous drop to water and no guard rail to protect a pedestrian, a jury reasonably could find negligence. Navarre v. City of Benton Harbor, 126 Mich. 618, 86 N.W. 138.'

It is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court in Rex had not considered Hopson, particularly when the Rex decision was concurred in by Justice Wiest who had written the Hopson opinion.

The case of Johnson v. City of Pontiac (1936), 276 Mich. 103, 267 N.W. 795, is not in point. In that case the jury found for the plaintiff and defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict which was granted. Plaintiff appealed and the judgment was affirmed. The court conceded that it was the duty of the defendant city to keep its sidewalks in repair and the sidewalk was in fact defective.

The court stated, p. 105, 267 N.W. p. 796:

'Plaintiff may, therefore, recover If she is free from contributory negligence and is entitled in this appeal to have the evidence reviewed in a light most favorable to her claim.' (Emphasis supplied)

The court later stated, p. 107, 267 N.W. p. 797:

'The negligence of defendant city is apparent, but plaintiff's contributory negligence precludes possibility of recovery. She had knowledge of the defect, could see it at the time, had its condition in her mind, and her attention was not distracted by any other cause. The situation is further distinguishable from many of those in the authorities cited by plaintiff in that the accident happened in broad daylight.'

The court then stated that the trial judge was...