Pappas v. Pappas

Decision Date18 January 1973
Citation320 A.2d 809,164 Conn. 242
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesAndrew PAPPAS v. George PAPPAS.

Jackson T. King, Jr., Norwich, for appellant (defendant).

Paul B. Groobert, Manchester, with whom, on the brief, were C. George Kanabis and Melvin Scott, New London, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff Andrew Pappas brought this action seeking a reconveyance of an interest in three parcels of land located in the town of East Lyme, property which, it is claimed, was conveyed to the defendant George Pappas by the plaintiff under an agreement wherein the defendant would reconvey the property back to the plaintiff on demand. From a judgment rendered for the plaintiff by a state referee, exercising the powers of the Superior Court, the defendant has appealed to this court.

The defendant assigned several errors relating to the court's finding but two of these were expressly withdrawn and since he failed to brief the remainder they are treated as abandoned. State v. Grayton, 163 Conn. 104, 109, 302 A.2d 246, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1045, 93 S.Ct. 542, 34 L.Ed.2d 495; State v. Benson, 153 Conn. 209, 217, 214 A.2d 903.

The facts in this case may be stated as follows: In December, 1962, the plaintiff Andrew Pappas, age 67, while on a visit to Greece, married a twenty-three-year-old woman. On their return to Connecticut difficulties arose in the marriage and in October, 1968, the plaintiff became aware that his wife was contemplating a divorce action against him. The plaintiff then consulted with his children, Constantine Pappas, Pauline Millaras and the defendant George Pappas, and formulated a plan to transfer his real estate to them until his marital difficulties were over and then have the property transferred back to him. Prior to the transfer, the defendant agreed to reconvey the properties after the plaintiff had settled his problems with his wife. On October 23, 1968, the plaintiff transferred to his three children real estate consisting of a residence and certain commercial property having a value in excess of $100,000. After the transfer, the plaintiff continued to reside in the residence and to receive the income from the commercial property. The plaintiff had been a longtime resident of East Lyme, and had been engaged in business there for many years, acquiring ownership of substantial amounts of real estate and other asserts.

On October 30, 1968, the plaintiff's wife instituted a suit for divorce and alimony. In count two of that action she sought to set aside the above-mentioned property transfer as a fraudulent conveyance. At a deposition taken in connection with the divorce action, the plaintiff testified that he transferred the real estate to his children in satisfaction of certain financial and other obligations to them. The plaintiff had, in addition, paid a conveyance tax on the transfer of the property indicative of consideration having passed, when in fact no consideration was ever given. The divorce action was concluded in November, 1969, wherein the plaintiff paid a lump sum alimony award to his wife of $25,000. Immediately thereafter the plaintiff demanded a reconveyance of the property from his children. The defendant's brother and sister reconveyed their interest but he refused. Subsequently, the plaintiff brought this action seeking specific performance of the agreement to reconvey the property. The trial court imposed a constructive trust and ordered the defendant to convey the property to the plaintiff.

The issues pressed by the defendant in this appeal are: (1) Did the court err in lending its aid to a plaintiff who had defrauded both his wife and the court; and (2) did the court err in imposing a constructive trust where no such relief was specifically requested?

As already noted, the transfer was made one week before the divorce action was instituted. The court expressly found that '(i)t was the plaintiff's plan to transfer his real estate to his three children until his marital difficulties were over, and then have them transfer it back to him.' Nevertheless, as part of his plan for the ultimate retention of this property, the plaintiff misrepresented the transfer as being absolute. The plaintiff persisted in this misrepresentation when, in connection with the divorce action, he testified falsely under oath concerning the consideration given for the transfer. This testimony, given after the initiation of the divorce action, along with the plaintiff's testimony in this case, constituted a fraud on the court.

It is a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence that for a complainant to show that h...

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52 cases
  • Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking
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    • September 6, 1983
    ...163 (D.Del.1982); Kirkland v. Mannis, 55 Or.App. 613, 639 P.2d 671, rev. denied, 292 Or. 863, 648 P.2d 850 (1982); Pappas v. Pappas, 164 Conn. 242, 320 A.2d 809 (1973), to demonstrate the non-existence of a hard and fast rule which CMOBC never asserted ("the privilege must preclude judicial......
  • Eldridge v. Eldridge, 15716
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    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • April 21, 1998
    ...way of punishment but on considerations that make for the advancement of right and justice." (Citations omitted.) Pappas v. Pappas, 164 Conn. 242, 245-46, 320 A.2d 809 (1973). We cannot ignore the fact that it was the defendant's conduct that precipitated the plaintiff's behavior and result......
  • State v. Lee
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    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 16, 1994
    ...that are against public policy. Sorrells v. United States, supra, 287 U.S. at 455, 53 S.Ct. at 217-18; see, e.g., Pappas v. Pappas, 164 Conn. 242, 246, 320 A.2d 809 (1973) ("clean hands doctrine is applied not for the protection of the parties but for the protection of the court"). Justice ......
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    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • July 28, 1989
    ...defense in a dissolution action, it is a doctrine primarily for the protection of the court, not the parties. Pappas v. Pappas, 164 Conn. 242, 246, 320 A.2d 809 (1973). The doctrine concerns the merits of the claims and the position of the parties. In deciding whether it lacks subject matte......
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