Paquette v. State, Supreme Court Case No. 63S04–1709–CR–570

• Decision Date: 29 June 2018
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 63S04–1709–CR–570
• Parties: Brian L. PAQUETTE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

101 N.E.3d 234

Brian L. PAQUETTE, Appellant (Defendant below),

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Supreme Court Case No. 63S04–1709–CR–570

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: October 12, 2017

Filed June 29, 2018

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Mark A. Bates, Schererville, Indiana, Thomas W. Vanes, Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Andrew J. Kobe, Tyler G. Banks, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 63A04–1612–CR–02891

David, Justice.

We are asked to resolve whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple felony resisting law enforcement charges when those charges stem from a single incident of resisting. For reasons discussed herein, we find that Indiana Code section 35–44.1–3–1 authorizes only one conviction for felony resisting law enforcement where the defendant engages in a single act of resisting while operating a vehicle that causes multiple deaths. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and remand for revised sentencing.

Facts and Procedural History

On the evening of February 2, 2016, Indiana Police State Trooper James Manning ("Trooper Manning") was parked on the northbound shoulder of I–69, near Petersburg, Indiana. A motorist pulled over and informed Trooper Manning that he observed a blue Chevy Tahoe driving northbound on the southbound lanes of the interstate. Trooper Manning activated his patrol vehicle's emergency signals—the lights and siren—and gave chase, driving northbound on I–69. Shortly thereafter, he spotted a blue SUV driving on the wrong side of the road. Officers later learned that Brian L. Paquette was driving that vehicle.

As Trooper Manning approached the blue SUV, he aimed his spotlight at the fleeing vehicle. Trooper Manning then pulled into the median, and Paquette seemed to slow down. Instead of coming to a full stop, however, Paquette made a U-turn onto the northbound lane and continued driving on the wrong side of the road, this time heading south. Trooper Manning immediately veered onto the southbound road and followed Paquette, once again shining his spotlight at the blue SUV.

At the same time, several passenger vehicles traveled north on the northbound road. Among those was a vehicle occupied by Jason and Samantha Lowe, who were returning to their home in Fishers, Indiana after visiting Samantha's mother at an Evansville hospital. Also traveling northbound on I–69 were Stephanie Molinet and Autumn Kapperman, who were riding in a Ford Focus to pick up Kapperman's sister and her newly-born niece from Riley Hospital. Kapperman was expecting a child of her own at the time of the incident.

Trooper Manning followed in pursuit and Paquette continued southbound, driving between two northbound lanes. Within two miles of making the U-turn, Paquette's SUV collided head-on with Molinet's Ford Focus, striking the passenger side where Kapperman was seated. Molinet, Kapperman, and Kapperman's unborn child died as a result of the crash. The impact of the collision caused Paquette's Chevy Tahoe to flip over and land on the driver's side of the Lowe's vehicle, instantly killing Jason Lowe.

Paquette survived the crash. While officers waited for firefighters to extract Paquette from his vehicle, Paquette told an officer that, at the time of the crash, he believed he was being chased by farmers through a field. He also believed he was carrying a female passenger, but officers found no evidence of another passenger at the crash site.

The State charged Paquette with a total of eleven offenses. Among those were three counts for each of the following: resisting law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing death, a Level 3 felony; operating a vehicle with methamphetamine in his blood causing death, a Level 4 felony; and reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony. Each duplicative count related to one of the three deceased victims. Paquette was also charged with operating a vehicle with methamphetamine in his body causing serious bodily injury to Samantha Lowe, a Level 6 felony; and possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony.

Paquette agreed to plead guilty to all charges, but reserved the right to ask the court to enter only one conviction and sentence for the felony resisting law enforcement charge. Paquette argued that he engaged in only one act of resisting, thus conviction on all three resisting law enforcement felony charges—one for each deceased victim—violated a state and federal prohibition on double-jeopardy. On that issue, the trial court ruled against Paquette, finding that conviction and sentence on all three counts of resisting law enforcement was not barred by double-jeopardy protections.

The trial court then entered convictions on all three Level 3 felony counts of resisting law enforcement and on the charge of operating a vehicle with methamphetamine in his blood causing serious bodily injury. The court merged the remaining counts into the four aforementioned counts. For each of the three felony resisting law enforcement convictions, the trial court imposed 16–year sentences to be served consecutively. For the operating while intoxicated conviction, Paquette received a 2.5–year sentence to be served consecutively with the resisting sentences. In total, Paquette was to serve fifty-and-a-half years executed.

Paquette appealed, making a statutory argument instead of a constitutional one. He argued that, as written, Indiana's resisting law enforcement statute authorizes only one conviction for each act of resisting and that the trial court, therefore, erred when it entered three convictions and sentences against him.¹ Relying on its own precedent in Armstead v. State , 549 N.E.2d 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for revised sentencing. It held that the legislature intended only one conviction for each act of resisting, and since Paquette had only engaged in one act of resisting when he fled using a vehicle, he could be convicted of only one count of felony resisting law enforcement. Paquette v. State , 79 N.E.3d 932, 935–36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

The State sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

Matters of statutory interpretation, which inherently present pure questions of law, are reviewed de novo. Jackson v. State , 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016).

Discussion and Decision

The question we address today is identical to the one raised before our Court of Appeals: whether multiple convictions and sentences are permissible under Indiana Code section 35–44.1–3–1, where the defendant operated a vehicle in a manner that caused death to multiple people. The defendant, Paquette, was charged with several offenses, but only three felony resisting law enforcement counts are at issue here.

In relevant part, Indiana Code section 35–44.1–3–1 states that a person commits the crime of resisting law enforcement when he "knowingly or intentionally ... flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer's siren or emergency lights, identified himself ... and ordered the person to stop." Ind. Code § 35–44.1–3–1(a)(3).

Resisting law enforcement is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, but subsection (b) provides several exceptions. Notably, under paragraph (b)(3), the offense becomes a Level 3 felony if, while resisting law enforcement as described in subsection (a), "the person operates a vehicle in a manner that causes the death of another person ..." Ind. Code § 35–44.1–3–1(b)(3). Paquette's three counts for Level 3 felony resisting law enforcement relate to three victims killed as a result of his flight.

Whether Paquette resisted law enforcement was not the basis for the Court of Appeals' reversal and is not in dispute today. Paquette fled from an officer who was driving a marked police vehicle with the emergency lights and siren activated, and Paquette ignored the officer's signal to pull over. Likewise, whether Paquette operated the vehicle in a manner that caused death is clear; drug-induced hallucinations led Paquette to drive his vehicle on the wrong side of the interstate, which directly caused the death of three motorists who had the misfortune of crossing paths with Paquette. Instead, the Court of Appeals' reversal hinged on its interpretation of the relevant statute. It held that Indiana Code section 35–44.1–3–1 authorizes only one conviction where the offense stems from a single act of resisting law enforcement. "Because Paquette engaged in only one act of resisting," the Court of Appeals found that "he [could] be convicted and sentenced on only one count of resisting law enforcement." Paquette , 79 N.E.3d at 936.

The State challenges the Court of Appeals' holding, proposing a different interpretation of the statute. It argues that the trial court was correct in entering judgment on three counts of resisting law enforcement while operating a vehicle in a manner that caused death—one count for each deceased victim—because the legislature intended multiple convictions for multiple deaths resulting from the same act of resisting. Recognizing that our Court of Appeals is split on this issue, we granted transfer.

I. The Court of Appeals' reliance on its own precedent in Armstead v. State was not misplaced.

Our Court of Appeals relied heavily on Armstead , 549 N.E.2d at 400 to find that Paquette could not be convicted of multiple felony resisting law enforcement charges where a single act of resisting law enforcement led to multiple deaths. While Paquette urges us to adopt the Court of Appeals' holding in Armstead , the State argues that reliance on Armstead was entirely misplaced because Armstead dealt only with offenses against multiple officers. We begin by first addressing whether Armstead is inapplicable.

The Court of Appeals' reliance on Armstead was not misplaced because ...