Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, No. 08-5155.
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
| Citation | 601 F.3d 599 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-5155. |
| Parties | Jose PARDO-KRONEMANN, Appellant v. Shaun L.S. DONOVAN, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Appellee. |
| Decision Date | 16 April 2010 |
601 F.3d 599
Jose PARDO-KRONEMANN, Appellant
v.
Shaun L.S. DONOVAN, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Appellee.
No. 08-5155.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued February 4, 2010.
Decided April 16, 2010.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
John F. Karl Jr. argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant. Kristen G. Hughes entered an appearance.
Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
Before: ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.
TATEL, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, an attorney at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, alleges that HUD retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by transferring him to a non-legal position and by declaring him absent without leave (AWOL) when he failed to report to his new job. After partially denying appellant's Rule 56(f) motion, the district court granted summary judgment to HUD on both claims. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse as to the transfer claim, affirm as to the AWOL claim, and find no abuse of discretion in the district court's resolution of the Rule 56(f) motion.
Appellant Jose Pardo-Kronemann first worked at HUD as a graduate student intern in the Office of International Affairs
Around this time, Pardo-Kronemann filed several Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints alleging retaliation for prior EEO activity and discrimination on the basis of his Cuban origin. He also asked Howard Glaser, counselor to HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo, about a possible detail away from HUD. In a subsequent letter, Glaser noted that Pardo-Kronemann had requested a one-year detail and that, upon his return, he sought reinstatement "preferably to the ... Office of International Affairs or the ... Finance Division of OGC." Letter from Howard Glaser, Counselor to the Secretary, HUD, to Jose Pardo-Kronemann (July 21, 1999). The letter stated that "the Department is agreeable to a detail ... renewable to the permissible extent," and that "at the conclusion of the detail, Pardo-Kronemann would return to his position at HUD or a mutually agreeable position, including consideration for reassignment to the Finance Division." Id.
In accordance with Glaser's letter, HUD approved a one-year detail to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) from November 1999 to November 2000. At the conclusion of that detail, Pardo-Kronemann sought a second detail, this time to the Inter-American Investment Corporation. When HUD said no, Pardo-Kronemann took approved leave without pay from December 2000 to February 2001. During that time, he continued working on a handbook for fostering mortgage markets in developing nations that he had begun while on detail at IDB.
Returning to HUD in March 2001, Pardo-Kronemann met with Matthew Hunter, Assistant HUD Secretary and White House Liaison, and asked him for either a second detail or a political appointment in the new administration. During that meeting, Pardo-Kronemann gave Hunter copies of his previously filed EEO complaints. Hunter Aff. ¶ 4, Nov. 11, 2002. Hunter "saw no reason to spend additional HUD money on detailing" Pardo-Kronemann away from the Department and concluded that "a political appointment would not be appropriate." Id. ¶ 7.
HUD then returned Pardo-Kronemann to OGC, though with the Department's permission, he continued working on the IDB handbook from March through October. During this time, OGC assigned Pardo-Kronemann no legal work, nor did he request any, though he did receive a small number of assignments from the Office of the Secretary. In particular, Hunter asked Pardo-Kronemann to prepare a memorandum on the history of OIA, where he had worked as an intern during graduate school. Hunter found the final product disappointing, but Pardo-Kronemann contends that another employee actually completed the memorandum. Id. ¶ 6; Pardo-Kronemann Dep. 152-55 (undated).
HUD officials soon became concerned that Pardo-Kronemann "was not doing any work, was keeping sporadic work hours, and was generally not living up to his obligation as a Federal employee." Hunter Aff. ¶ 8. Sometime between June (according to Pardo-Kronemann) and September 2001 (according to HUD), HUD officials began to consider transferring Pardo-Kronemann out of OGC. On October 15, with the decision nearly final, Deputy General Counsel George Weidenfeller sent an email to several OGC employees stating "Per Matthew Hunter, please prepare papers to reassign Jose Pardo-Kronemann
Pardo-Kronemann learned nothing of the impending transfer until December. Although his position description was still being drafted, he was instructed to report to OIA on January 7, 2002. He then met with Sorzano, who informed him that OIA focused on research and had no legal work. When Pardo-Kronemann indicated that he wanted to decline the "offer," Sorzano responded that she did not know whether he could. Id. ¶ 11. Pardo-Kronemann then sought leave for his first week at OIA, but he followed the wrong procedures. Id. ¶ 12-13. When Pardo-Kronemann failed to report for work, Sorzano placed him on AWOL status, resulting in a two-day suspension. He began work at OIA two days later. Pardo-Kronemann's title, grade, pay, and benefits remained unchanged.
After exhausting his administrative remedies before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pardo-Kronemann sued the HUD Secretary in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. He alleged that HUD violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by transferring him to a non-legal position and by placing him on AWOL status, both in retaliation for his prior EEO activity and advocacy "on behalf of IMAGE," "an organization whose mission is to promote and increase hiring, promotion, and retention of Hispanics in the federal government." Compl. ¶ 34, 16. Following discovery and the partial denial of Pardo-Kronemann's Rule 56(f) motion for additional discovery, the district court granted HUD's motion for summary judgment on both claims. Pardo-Kronemann v. Jackson, 541 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C.2008). Pardo-Kronemann appeals.
We begin with Pardo-Kronemann's claim of retaliatory transfer. Examining the evidence in accordance with McDonnell Douglas's burden-shifting framework, the district court found that Pardo-Kronemann probably established the first two elements of a prima facie case of retaliation: HUD concedes that his EEO complaints qualified as statutorily protected activity, and the record reflects a "genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he suffered an adverse personnel action based upon the reassignment" to a non-legal position. Pardo-Kronemann, 541 F.Supp.2d at 215-18; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The district court expressed some doubt that Pardo-Kronemann could satisfy the third requirement-a causal connection between his 1999 EEO complaints and his late 2001 transfer. But because HUD had already offered a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the reassignment—a desire to place Pardo-Kronemann in an office where he would be happier and more productive—the district court properly ruled that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework "effectively evaporated." Pardo-Kronemann, 541 F.Supp.2d at 215; see, e.g., Carter v. George Wash. Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 878 (D.C.Cir.2004). Thus, "the
We review the district court's decision de novo. See, e.g., Carter, 387 F.3d at 878. "Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits filed pursuant to discovery show that, first, `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and, second, `the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—here, Pardo-Kronemann—and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of...
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Craig v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No.: 11–1200 RC
...reassignment constituted a materially adverse action. See Geleta v. Gray, 645 F.3d 408, 412 (D.C.Cir.2011) ; Pardo–Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 607 (D.C.Cir.2010) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude from the job descriptions that attorneys in the plaintiff's old position h......
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Dudley v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., Civil No. 11–1447 (RCL).
...the evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that [the] proffered reason ... was pretext for retaliation.” Pardo–Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 603–04 (D.C.Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1380 n. 3 (“[T]he only question is whe......
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Olatunji v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil No. 10–1693 (RCL).
...S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); or “retaliation vel non,” Pardo–Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 603–04 (D.C.Cir.2010). In other words, after the employer has articulated a non-discriminatory or nonretaliatory justification, the only i......
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Dormu v. Dist. of D.C.,
Civil Action No.08–00309 (HHK).
...the truth of the matter,’ but instead decide[s] only ‘whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Pardo–Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 604 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that......
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Craig v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No.: 11–1200 RC
...reassignment constituted a materially adverse action. See Geleta v. Gray, 645 F.3d 408, 412 (D.C.Cir.2011) ; Pardo–Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 607 (D.C.Cir.2010) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude from the job descriptions that attorneys in the plaintiff's old position h......
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Olatunji v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil No. 10–1693 (RCL).
...S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); or “retaliation vel non,” Pardo–Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 603–04 (D.C.Cir.2010). In other words, after the employer has articulated a non-discriminatory or nonretaliatory justification, the only i......
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Dormu v. Dist. of D.C.,
Civil Action No.08–00309 (HHK).
...the truth of the matter,’ but instead decide[s] only ‘whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Pardo–Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 604 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that......
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Loya v. Sebelius, Civil Action No. 08–01710 (RCL).
...it ‘well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” Pardo–Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 607 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)). Unlike discri......