Parente v. Southworth
| Decision Date | 23 July 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-481-A,80-481-A |
| Citation | 448 A.2d 769 |
| Parties | Joseph PARENTE et al. v. Bradford E. SOUTHWORTH et al. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case comes before us on appeal from an entry of judgment for the defendants in the Superior Court pursuant to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. We reverse. The facts alleged in the complaint are as follows.
The plaintiffs are employees of the State of Rhode Island who are employed within the classified civil service system. The action was brought as a class action on behalf of the named plaintiffs and on behalf of all other employees in the classified service of the State of Rhode Island. The defendant, Bradford Southworth (Southworth), is the Personnel Administrator of the State of Rhode Island and is charged by law with the responsibility of conducting employment and promotional examinations within the classified civil service. The defendant, Donald Rohrer (Rohrer), is the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Administration and is charged by law with the responsibility of providing the personnel administrator with the necessary funds and personnel to examine temporary employees within the classified service within the time prescribed by law.
The plaintiffs allege in count 1 of the complaint that examinations for employees within the classified service should be conducted pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 36-3-5(5) and §§ 36-4-10, -25, and -31 either before appointments are made or within one year of an employee's appointment. The plaintiffs assert that Southworth has failed for more than one year to conduct examinations for large numbers of positions in the classified service. They assert that defendants have a ministerial legal duty to conduct entrance and promotional examinations in the classified civil service within one year of an appointment thereto.
In count 2 of the complaint plaintiffs allege that Southworth has failed to conduct examinations for certain classes of positions "for many years" and has thereby both deprived plaintiffs of the opportunity to compete for promotional positions and also denied them the opportunity to gain permanent civil service status while serving in temporary positions. Also in count 2 plaintiffs set forth references to the various statutory provisions upon which they rely and recite the terms of personnel Rule 3.081, which relates to compliance with federal standards in respect to positions in which temporary employees are serving in federally grant-aided agencies subject to the Federal Merit System Standards.
In count 1 of the complaint plaintiffs seek relief against Southworth and Rohrer by issuance of a writ of mandamus directing Rohrer to provide to Southworth the funds and employees required to conduct examinations for all occupied classes of positions in the classified civil service for which examinations have not been conducted within the twelve-month period preceding the date of the writ; directing that sufficient funds and employees be provided to enable Southworth to conduct examinations within the one year for all positions hereafter created in the classified civil service; and directing that Southworth conduct examinations forthwith for all occupied positions in the classified civil service for which examinations have not been conducted within the twelve-month period preceding the date of the writ and that hereafter Southworth conduct examinations within one year for all positions later created in the classified civil service. In count 2 plaintiffs also request declaratory relief and injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from violating statutes and personnel rules and from refusing or failing to conduct examinations within one year of an appointment to any classified position and such other and further relief which the court may deem appropriate.
In response to this complaint defendants filed an answer in which defendant Southworth admitted that he was the Personnel Administrator of the State of Rhode Island and that his powers and duties have been set forth in G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 36-3-5. 1 Generally the answers of defendants asserted that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in that the statutes that describe the testing procedure for the state civil service are directory and not mandatory insofar as they set out a one-year period for the administration of civil service examinations.
Ultimately, defendants moved for entry of judgment on the pleadings in accordance with Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After consideration of memoranda filed by counsel, the trial justice granted the motion and entered judgment for defendants.
Initially, entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure under these circumstances is tantamount to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). See 1 Kent, R.I. Civ. Prac. § 12.13 at 118 (1969). We have frequently stated that such a motion cannot be granted unless it is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that under no set of facts which might be proven in support of the complaint might a claim be made out upon which relief could be granted. See Roch v. Garrahy, R.I., 419 A.2d 827, 831 (1980); Redmond v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 120 R.I. 182, 187, 386 A.2d 1090, 1092 (1978); Rosen v. Restrepo, 119 R.I. 398, 402, 380 A.2d 960, 962 (1977); Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 102 R.I. 8, 12, 227 A.2d 582, 584 (1967). Applying this stringent standard to the facts of the case at bar, we are constrained to conclude that the trial justice was in error in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).
We recognize that relief will be granted under a complaint for mandamus "only where the [plaintiffs] have a clear legal right to have the act done which is sought * * * and where [defendants] have a ministerial legal duty to perform such act without discretion to refuse." Warwick School Committee v. Gibbons, R.I., 410 A.2d 1354, 1357 (1980); Gormally v. Cannon, 119 R.I. 771, 776, 383 A.2d 582, 585 (1978); Demers v. Adamson, 102 R.I. 453, 456, 231 A.2d 484, 485 (1967); Aniello v. Marcello, 91 R.I. 198, 202-03, 162 A.2d 270, 272 (1960).
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