Parents, Alumni, Taylor School v. City of Norfolk
| Decision Date | 12 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 2:98cv284.,Civ.A. 2:98cv284. |
| Citation | 37 F.Supp.2d 435 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | The PARENTS, ALUMNI, and FRIENDS OF TAYLOR SCHOOL, an unincorporated Virginia association, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NORFOLK, a municipal corporation, and The Norfolk City School Board, Defendants. |
Andrew M. Sacks, Stanley E. Sacks, Sacks & Sacks, Norfolk, VA, Harrison B. Wilson, III, Richmond, VA, for plaintiff.
Frank A. Edgar, Jr., Conrad M. Shumadine, Wilcox & Savage, Norfolk, VA, for defendants.
This matter is before the Court on the City of Norfolk's and the Norfolk City School Board's (hereinafter collectively the defendants) motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A hearing was held on January 29, 1999, at which time the Court took the defendants' motion under advisement. As set forth fully below, after reviewing the briefs submitted and the applicable law, and considering the oral argument of the parties, and finding good cause, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiff's Counts I and II. Additionally, because the remainder of the claims are state law claims they are best left, if at all, to the state courts, and therefore, dismissed without prejudice.
As described in the Court's previous Order concerning the defendants' motion to dismiss (decided August 1998), the federal questions remaining in this case concern whether the defendants' February 1997, decision to demolish the W.H. Taylor Elementary School (Taylor School) violated the plaintiff's, The Parents, Alumni and Friends of Taylor School (Parents), constitutional right to free speech under the First Amendment, and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to protection against racial discrimination. Additionally, at issue in this case are two state law claims alleging violations of a 1923 Norfolk Ordinance and the Norfolk General Plan.
The Taylor School was built in 1917, and is located in the West Ghent section of Norfolk. Pl's Cmplt. ¶ 28. On December 12, 1996, the School Administration announced its plan to demolish the old Taylor School, and to construct a new elementary school on the adjacent land. Pl's Cmplt. at ¶ 50. On February 27, 1997, after public meetings and debates, the School Board approved the School Administration's proposal to demolish and replace the Taylor School. Pl's Cmplt. at ¶¶ 47-85, and specifically 59; Defs' Ex. 9D (minutes from Feb. 27, 1997, School Board Meeting). Parents is an unincorporated Virginia association opposed to the School Board and City's decision to demolish the School and rebuild on adjacent ground. The members of Parents steadfastly advocated for the option of renovating the existing structure.
On December 22, 1997, Parents filed suit in Norfolk Circuit Court, and immediately sought emergency relief to prevent the removal of trees on the land proposed for the new school. The emergency motion was denied, the trees were removed, and the matter proceeded in state court with briefing on dispositive motions. On March 9, the plaintiff nonsuited its case in Norfolk Circuit Court, and on March 11, it filed the instant complaint. On April 6, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims under the National Historic Preservation Act and the Virginia Procurement Act.
The defendants seek summary judgment on all remaining claims and filed their motion along with statement of undisputed facts on January 4, 1999. The plaintiff filed an opposition and a supplemental pleading with attached affidavits. During the pendency of the litigation process, the construction of the new Taylor School proceeded and the Court has been advised that the new structure is near completion. Nonetheless, this case is set for a jury trial to commence April 6, 1999.
The standard for granting summary judgment is met if after a review of all of the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and other documents submitted by the parties, the court finds that there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Roe v. Doe, 28 F.3d 404, 406 (4th Cir.1994). In this case, the defendants have moved for summary judgment as to each of plaintiff's claims and contend that there are no genuine disputes as to material facts, and that the law favors disposition of this case in its favor as a matter of law.
To find against the movants (the defendants), the Court must find both that the facts in dispute are material, and that the disputed issues are genuine. As for materiality, the factual dispute must be dispositive of the claim. See Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Advertising, L.P., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir.1995). Similarly, the genuineness of the factual dispute must be more than a dispute based on speculation or inference. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (); Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 164 (4th Cir.1997).
In the Court's August 1998 Order on defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court considered defendants' argument that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this suit. The Court denied the defendants' motion as to standing finding that the plaintiff had met the minimal burdens to withstand the motion to dismiss. However, the Court cautioned the plaintiff regarding the requirements for standing at the summary judgment stage. Because this Court only has jurisdiction to review "cases and controversies," before considering the merits of the claims, the Court must determine whether the plaintiff has standing to bring this suit. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1015, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (citations omitted); Burke v. City of Charleston, 139 F.3d 401 (4th Cir.1998).
As set forth fully in the Court's Opinion on the defendants' motion to dismiss, an association or organization, such as the Parents, can sue as a representative of its members provided that certain conditions are met. See generally, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); National Motor Freight Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246, 247, 83 S.Ct. 688, 9 L.Ed.2d 709 (1963). In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977), the Court held that for an organization to establish standing it must show (1) that its individual members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) that the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested require the participation of the individual members of the organization in the lawsuit. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197); Tower South Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Summey Building Systems, Inc., 47 F.3d 1165 (4th Cir.1995) (unpublished); Waterford Citizens' Ass'n v. Reilly, 970 F.2d 1287, 1288 n. 1, 1290 (4th Cir.1992) () (citations omitted).
To determine whether the individual members of Parents would have standing in their own right, the Court must look to the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Defenders involved whether an environmental plaintiff's group had standing to sue over the legality of the Department of the Interior's regulation regarding the Secretary's authority on the high seas. A central issue to the case was whether the plaintiff's organization had suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to create an Article III "case and controversy." Resolving the case in favor of the Department of the Interior, the Supreme Court set forth a succinct three part test that a party attempting to invoke federal jurisdiction must establish for constitutional standing. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
First, the party must establish that it has suffered an injury to a "legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Defenders, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury suffered and the conduct complained of. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted). Third, it must be likely, rather than speculative, that the injury alleged by the plaintiff will be redressed if the Court enters a decision in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted); see also Burke, 139 F.3d at 404 ().
The party invoking the Court's jurisdiction bears the burden to prove the elements of standing. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Since this case is pending on defendants' motion for summary judgment, before the Court are all of the pleadings, depositions, answers, affidavits, etc., submitted by both the defendants and the plaintiff. Id. At summary judgment, the plaintiff can no longer rely on mere allegations. Id. As such, this Court has closely examined and relied on, among other things, the excerpts of Deposition of Alisa Landrum (attached as Defs' Ex. 12) and the plaintiff's supplemental exhibits (S-Ex.) in making its decision.
The defendants' primary argument on standing is that Parents, the plaintiff organization, can prove no particularized injury to itself or its constituent members....
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