Parham v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana

• Decision Date: 17 September 1921
• Citation: 275 F. 1007
• Parties: PARHAM v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF LOUISIANA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

275 F. 1007

PARHAM v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF LOUISIANA.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division.

September 17, 1921

W. D. &amp J. R. Anderson, of Tupelo, Miss., for plaintiff.

Green &amp Green, of Jackson, Miss., and Leftwich & Tubb, of Aberdeen Miss., for defendant.

HOLMES District Judge.

The Workmen's Compensation Law of the state of Louisiana (Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended by Act No. 243 of 1916 and Act No 38 of 1918) is constitutional. Paragraph 3 of section 3 of this law is broad and sweeping enough in its terms to embrace a minor under the age of 18 years, and consequently the plaintiff in this case, who entered the employment of the defendant without expressly stipulating against the application of said section 3, is bound by its provisions unless he relieves himself from the presumption of section 3 as provided by paragraphs 4 and 6. Admittedly no such election to terminate the provisions of paragraph 3 was exercised by the plaintiff in the manner provided by paragraph 6 prior to the injury. Paragraph 4 of section 3 provides that any agreement or election for the operation of the provisions of the act may be terminated by either party to the contract of hiring giving written notice to the other party not less than 30 days prior to the accident that the provisions of the act shall not apply.

It seems very clear, under said paragraph 3, that when an employe begins work without expressly stipulating against the provisions of the act, it becomes effective by operation of a legal presumption. After the act takes effect as to any employment, it can only be terminated by 'written notice given not less than 30 days prior to the accident to the other party. ' Of course the act cannot be 'terminated' unless its operation has previously begun. The right to terminate the operation of the act is 'a right, privilege or election' which accrues to the employe under the act, but by paragraph 4 of section 3 this termination must take place by written notice not less than 30 days prior to the accident. This is a limitation of time provided in the act within which the right to terminate the operation of the act shall expire. It applies to all persons over the age of 18 years mentally competent to act for themselves and to all minors and persons non compos mentis who have a curator or tutor, but, under section 16, 'in case an injured employe is mentally incompetent or a minor' at the time when the right to terminate the operation of the act accrues to him, 'no limitation of time' shall run so long as such incompetent has no curator or tutor.

The plaintiff in this case is an injured employe and a minor under the age of 18 years without a curator or tutor. It is therefore, difficult to see why, under said paragraph 6, his father cannot elect, even after the injury, to terminate the provisions of the act with reference to his injury when section 16 provides that in case an injured employe is a minor at the time when any right, privilege, or election accrues to him under the act, his duly qualified curator or tutor may, in his behalf, claim and...