Parish v. Lloyd

• Decision Date: 13 July 1978
• Citation: 147 Cal.Rptr. 431,82 Cal. App. 3d 785
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Larry E. PARISH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Donald W. LLOYD et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 16092.

Page 431

147 Cal.Rptr. 431

82 Cal.App.3d 785

Larry E. PARISH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Donald W. LLOYD et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 16092.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

July 13, 1978.

John M. Urquhart, A.P.C. by John M. Urquhart and Michael F. Boyle, San Diego, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Higgs, Fletcher & Mack by Donald H. Glaser, San Diego, for defendants and respondents.

GERALD BROWN, Presiding Justice.

Larry E. Parish, his wife and daughter, appeal the summary judgment terminating their wrongful death action against Donald W. Lloyd, owner of the land where Lawrence Ray Parish rode and wrecked his motorcycle and died.

Lloyd owns unimproved land in the county which is used by motorcyclists for riding. Its topography includes numerous hazardous ravines. Although Lloyd knew of these conditions, he did not post any warning signs. Lawrence, while riding his motorcycle, plunged 12 feet into a concealed ravine and died from the injuries; his father, Larry, was close by at the time of the accident and suffered emotional distress. Summary judgment was granted under Civil Code section 846 ¹ which exempts a property owner for liability to motorcycle riders who are trespassers or non-paying licenses. Larry claims the statute denies him equal protection under the United States and California Constitutions.

The standard for reviewing statutes which allegedly violate equal protection guarantees is: does the distinction drawn by the challenged statute have some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose? (Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal.3d 514, 517-518, 128 Cal.Rptr. 321, 546 P.2d 1033.) Larry says the classifications set out in section 846 are arbitrary. There is no reason, he argues: to treat trespassers and non-paying invitees differently than those paying consideration, to treat recreational users differently than non-recreational users, to deny liability to certain enumerated recreational users and not to all. In support of his contention Larry cites Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212, which struck down the guest statute as unconstitutional because the differing treatment of guests and paying riders, automobile guests and other guests was arbitrary and violated equal protection. However, in Brown the court found the differing treatment of different classes of persons did not further the purposes of the guest statute, that is, to protect hospitality and to prevent collusive lawsuits.

Here, exempting property owners from liability to users encourages them to allow the general public to recreate free of charge on privately owned property. In light of the growing tendency of landowners to ban trespassers from their property because of the threat of tort liability, such an exemption bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Where a user pays to use the property the owner remains liable; but, where the user is a trespasser he must assume the risk of tort liability. This is a valid distinction directly related to the state's purpose of encouraging private landowners to grant recreational access. Since the state's purpose is to encourage recreational use, it is rational to protect the landowner from suits stemming from those kinds...