Parish v. Morris, No. DA 11–0488.

• Docket Nº: No. DA 11–0488.
• Citation: 365 Mont. 171, 2012 MT 116, 278 P.3d 1015
• Case Date: May 29, 2012
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

365 Mont. 171
278 P.3d 1015
2012 MT 116

Cassadie PARISH and Chris Parish, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Emily Ann MORRIS; United Financial Casualty Insurance Company and John Does 1–6, Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 11–0488.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs April 17, 2012.
Decided May 29, 2012.

[278 P.3d 1016]

For Appellants: Michael A. Bliven, Alex K. Evans, Anderson & Bliven, P.C., Kalispell, Montana.

For Appellees: Robert J. Phillips, Amy O. Duerk, Phillips Haffey PC, Missoula, Montana.

Justice PATRICIA O. COTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[365 Mont. 172]¶ 1 Cassadie and Chris Parish were injured in a motor vehicle accident on December 31, 2007, when their vehicle was struck by uninsured driver Emily Ann Morris. United Financial Casualty Insurance Company (UFC) provided insurance coverage to the Parishes, including uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. The Parishes, who had two vehicles insured on their UFC policy at the time of the accident, argued they should be permitted to stack the UM benefits provided in their policy. UFC refused, stating the Parishes' policy did not allow stacking. The Parishes sued seeking declaratory judgment. UFC filed a motion for summary judgment. The Eleventh Judicial District Court in Kalispell, Montana, granted UFC's motion. Parishes appeal. We affirm.

ISSUE

¶ 2 A restatement of the dispositive issue on appeal is:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err in granting UFC's motion for summary judgment?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The Parishes obtained motor vehicle insurance coverage from UFC on May 8, 2007, and remained insured by UFC until September 18, 2008. Throughout this time, the Parishes' policy alternatively covered one or two vehicles per the Parishes' instruction to UFC. Specifically, from May 8, 2007, through January 8, 2008, the policy covered two vehicles. From January 9 through February 22, 2008, the policy covered a single vehicle. From February 23 until July 2008, the policy again covered two vehicles. For a few days in July 2008, the Parishes insured one car. At the time of cancellation, two cars were covered by the policy.

¶ 5 From May 8, 2007, through May 7, 2008, irrespective of the number of vehicles protected by the policy, the premium for UM coverage was $73. Upon renewal of the policy on May 8, 2008, the UM premium increased to $82. The Declarations page of the policy stated that for the UM premium—whether $73 or $82—the insured received a “$50,000 each person/$100,000 each accident” coverage benefit. The policy further stated “The policy limits shown for an auto may not

[278 P.3d 1017]

be combined with the limits for the same coverage on another auto, unless the policy contract allows the stacking of limits.” The Parishes' policy [365 Mont. 173]did not contain a provision allowing stacking. ¹ Rather, the applicable endorsement form stated “The limit of liability shown on the Declarations Page for the coverages under this endorsement is the most we will pay regardless of the number of claims made, or insureds, or lawsuits brought, or vehicles involved in the accident.” The Parishes' policy also provided medical payment (MP) benefits of $5,000 per person. The policy provided that MP benefits could not be stacked; however, UFC acknowledges that the Parishes paid a separate premium for MP for each insured vehicle.

¶ 6 Following the accident, UFC paid Chris and Cassadie $60,000 each—$10,000 for MP benefits and $50,000 for UM benefits. It is undisputed that the damages Chris sustained did not exceed the $60,000 UFC paid to him. However, Cassadie's damages at the time this action was filed exceeded the $60,000 in benefits paid to her.

¶ 7 The Parishes made a claim with UFC for $100,000 per person/$200,000 per accident in UM benefits, claiming a right to stack coverages for each vehicle insured. When UFC refused to stack the UM coverage of their policy, the Parishes sought declaratory judgment.² UFC moved for summary judgment asserting that no material facts were in dispute. It argued that the issue before the District Court was purely the interpretation of the insurance contract and the applicable statute. The insurer submitted that (1) it was in compliance with Montana's anti-stacking statute, § 33–23–203, MCA; (2) its insurance forms clearly stated that stacking is not allowed; and (3) the Parishes did not pay separate premiums for UM coverage on separate vehicles and therefore, in accordance with applicable case law, UFC was not required to stack UM benefits.

¶ 8 Parishes challenged UFC's claim of compliance with § 33–23–203, MCA. They argued that UFC did not file its premium rates with the Montana Commissioner of Insurance until October 2007— after the Parishes had purchased their policy—and because such filing cannot be applied retroactively, UFC did not meet the requirements of the statute. [365 Mont. 174]The Parishes further asserted that the insurance policy was ambiguous and should be construed against UFC and that they had a reasonable expectation that they could receive stacked UM coverage.

¶ 9 Noting the evidence presented by UFC to the effect that it had submitted its premium rates to the Insurance Commissioner in November 2006 and that the Parishes paid one premium, not two, for UM coverage on both cars, the District Court granted UFC's motion for summary judgment. Parishes appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same M.R. Civ. P. 56 criteria used by the district court. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates both the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Kichnet v. Butte–Silver Bow County & Mont., 2012 MT 68, ¶ 11, 364 Mont. 347, 274 P.3d 740. The district court's conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law is a conclusion of law which we review for correctness. Krajacich v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2012 MT 82, ¶ 8, 364 Mont. 455, 276 P.3d 922. (Citations omitted.)

DISCUSSION

¶ 11 Did the District Court err in granting UFC's motion for summary judgment?

[278 P.3d 1018]

¶ 12 The relevant statute in this case, § 33–23–203(1), MCA, was revised by the Montana Legislature in 2007 and became effective on April 17, 2007. The amended statute provides the following limitation of liability under a motor vehicle liability policy:

(1) Unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides otherwise, the limits of insurance coverage available under each part of the policy must be determined as follows, regardless of the number of motor vehicles insured under the policy, the number of policies issued by the same company covering the insured, or the number of separate premiums paid:

...

(c) the limits of the coverages specified under one policy or under more than...