Parisi v. Davidson 8212 91

Decision Date23 February 1972
Docket NumberNo. 70,70
Citation405 U.S. 34,92 S.Ct. 815,31 L.Ed.2d 17
PartiesJoseph PARISI, Petitioner, v. Philip B. DAVIDSON, etc., et al. —91
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

Petitioner, a member of the armed forces, applied unsuccessfully for discharge as a conscientious objector. After he had exhausted all his administrative remedies, he filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court, claiming that the Army's denial of his application was without basis in fact. Thereafter court-martial charges were brought against him, and the District Court ordered consideration of the petition deferred until final determination of the court-martial proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The District Court should not have stayed its hand in this case. Pp. 37—45.

(a) All alterative administrative remedies have been exhausted by petitioner. Pp. 37—39.

(b) Since the military judicial system in its processing of the court-martial charge could not provide the discharge sought by petitioner with promptness and certainty, the District Court should proceed to determine the habeas corpus claim despite the pendency of the court-martial proceedings. Pp. 39—45.

435 F.2d 299, reversed.

Richard L. Goff, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.

William Terry Bray, Austin, Tex., for respondents.

Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

When a member of the armed forces has applied for a discharge as a conscientious objector and has exhausted all avenues of administrative relief, it is now settled that he may seek habeas corpus relief in a federal district court on the ground that the denial of his application had no basis in fact. The question in this case is whether the district court must stay its hand when court-martial proceedings are pending against the serviceman.

The petitioner, Joseph Parisi, was inducted into the Army as a draftee in August 1968. Nine months later he applied for a discharge as a conscientious objector, claiming that earlier doubts about military service had crystallized into a firm conviction that any form of military activity conflicted irreconcilably with his religious beliefs. He was interviewed by the base chaplain, the base psychiatrist, and a special hearing officer. They all attested to the petitioner's sincerity and to the religious content of his professed beliefs. In addition, the commanding general of the petitioner's Army training center and the commander of the Army hospital recommended that the petitioner be discharged as a conscientious objector. His immediate commanding officer, an Army captain, disagreed, recommending disapproval of the application on the ground that the petitioner's beliefs were based on essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or on a merely personal moral code.

In November 1969, the Department of the Army denied the petitioner conscientious objector status, on the grounds that his professed beliefs had become fixed prior to entering the service and that his opposition to war was not truly based upon his religious beliefs. On November 24, 1969, the petitioner applied to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (hereafter sometimes ABCMR) for administrative review of that determination.

Four days later the petitioner commenced the present habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming that the Army's denial of his conscientious objector application was without basis in fact. He sought discharge from the Army and requested a preliminary injunction to prevent his transfer out of the jurisdiction of the District Court and to prohibit further training preparatory to being transferred to Vietnam. The District Court declined at that time to consider the merits of the habeas corpus petition, but it retained jurisdiction pending a decision by the ABCMR, and in the meantime enjoined Army authorities from requiring the petitioner to participate in activity or training beyond his current noncombatant duties.

Shortly thereafter the petitioner received orders to report to Fort Lewis, Washington, for deployment to Vietnam, where he was to perform noncombatant duties similar to those that had been assigned to him in this country. He sought a stay of this redeployment order pending appeal of the denial of habeas corpus, but his application was denied by the Court of Appeals, on the condition that the Army would produce him if the appeal should result in his favor. A similar stay application was subsequently denied by Mr. Justice Douglas as Ninth Circuit Justice, Parisi v. Davidson, 396 U.S. 1233, 90 S.Ct. 497, 24 L.Ed.2d 482. The petitioner then reported to Fort Lewis. He refused, however, to obey a military order to board a plane for Vietnam. As a result, he was charged with violating Art. 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 890, and, on April 8, 1970, a court-martial convicted him of that military offense.1 While the court-martial charges were pending, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records notified the petitioner that it had rejected his application for relief from the Army's denial of his conscientious objector application. The District Court then ordered the Army to show cause why the pending writ of habeas corpus should not issue. On the Government's motion, the District Court, on March 31, 1970, entered an order deferring consideration of the habeas corpus petition until final determination of the criminal charge then pending in the military court system. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this order, concluding that 'habeas proceedings were properly stayed pending the final conclusion of Parisi's military trial and his appeals therefrom,' 435 F.2d 299, 302. We granted certiorari, 402 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 1619, 29 L.Ed.2d 110.

In affirming the stay of the petitioner's federal habeas corpus proceeding until completion of the military courts' action, the Court of Appeals relied on the related doctrines of exhaustion of alternative remedies and comity between the federal civilian courts and the military system of justice. We hold today that neither of these doctrines required a stay of the habeas corpus proceedings in this case.

With respect to available administrative remedies, there can be no doubt that the petitioner has fully met the demands of the doctrine of exhaustion—a doctrine that must be applied in each case with an 'understanding of its purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved.' McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 23 L.Ed.2d 194. The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence—to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies. Id., at 194—195, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662—1663, 23 L.Ed.2d 194; McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 485, 91 S.Ct. 1565, 1569, 29 L.Ed.2d 47; K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.01 et seq. (Supp.1970).

In this case the petitioner fully complied with Army Regulation 635—20, which dictates the procedures to be followed by a serviceman seeking classification as a conscientious objector on the basis of beliefs that develop after induction.2 Moreover, following a rule of the Ninth Circuit then in effect,3 he went further and appealed to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records.4 The procedures and corrective opportunities of the military administrative apparatus had thus been wholly utilized at the time the District Court entered its order deferring consideration of the petitioner's habeas corpus application.

It is clear, therefore, that, if the court-martial charge had not intervened, the District Court would have been wrong in not proceeding to an expeditious consideration of the merits of the petitioner's claim. For the writ of habeas corpus has long been recognized as the appropriate remedy for servicemen who claim to be unlawfully retained in the armed forces. See, e.g., Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 312, 67 S.Ct. 313, 317, 91 L.Ed. 308; Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board, 393 U.S. 233, 235, 89 S.Ct. 414, 415, 21 L.Ed.2d 402; Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 489, 91 S.Ct. 995, 997, 28 L.Ed.2d 251. And, as stated at the outset, that writ is available to consider the plea of an in-service applicant for discharge as a conscientious objector who claims that exhaustion of military administrative procedures has led only to a factually baseless denial of his application. In re Kelly, 401 F.2d 211 (CA5); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (CA2).5

But since a court-martial charge was pending against the petitioner when he sought habeas corpus in March 1970, the respondents submit that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the District Court must await the final outcome of those charges in the military judicial system before it may consider the merits of the petitioner's habeas corpus claim. Although this argument, too, is framed in terms of 'exhaustion,' it may more accurately be understood as based upon the appropriate demands of comity between two separate judicial systems.6 Requiring the District Court to defer to the military courts in these circumstances serves the interests of comity, the respondents argue, by aiding the military judiciary in its task of maintaining order and discipline in the armed services and by eliminating 'needless friction' between the federal civilian and military judicial systems. The respondents note that the military constitutes a 'specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian,' Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94, 73 S.Ct. 534, 540, 97 L.Ed. 842; Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 71 S.Ct. 149, 95 L.Ed. 146, and that in recognition of the special nature of the military community, Congress has created an autonomous military judicial system,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
284 cases
  • Doster v. Kendall
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 29 Noviembre 2022
    ...the military if Congress has "provided" for that review. Egan , 484 U.S. at 530, 108 S.Ct. 818 ; e.g. , Parisi v. Davidson , 405 U.S. 34, 39, 44–46, 92 S.Ct. 815, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972).When overseeing judge-made claims, the Court has also refused to apply novel causes of action against the m......
  • Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 31 Mayo 1977
    ...is no reason to doubt that appellant would have received a fair hearing before the Board. 5. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 40 n. 6, 92 S.Ct. 815, 819, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972); Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio v. United Fuel Co., 317 U.S. 456, 63 S.Ct. 369, 87 L.Ed. 396 (1943); Natura......
  • Woodford v. Ngo, No. 05–416.
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 22 Junio 2006
    ...proceedings before the agency convince the losing party not to pursue the matter in federal court. See ibid.;Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972); McKart, supra, at 195, 89 S.Ct. 1657. “And even where a controversy survives administrative review, exhaustio......
  • Lee v. Reno, Civ.A. 97-2308(JHG).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 27 Julio 1998
    ...any court would be, intentionally, closed to [applicants for a writ of habeas corpus]"); Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 48, 92 S.Ct. 815, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring in the result) (Suspension Clause "must mean that its issuance, in a proper case or controversy, is an im......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT