Parisi v. Parisi

• Decision Date: 27 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 19123.,19123.
• Citation: 107 A.3d 920,315 Conn. 370
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert J. PARISI, v. Kathleen M. PARISI.

315 Conn. 370

107 A.3d 920

Robert J. PARISI

v.Kathleen M. PARISI.

No. 19123.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 21, 2014.

Decided Jan. 27, 2015.

Kenneth J. Bartschi, Hartford, with whom were Dana M. Hrelic and, on the brief, M. Caitlin S. Anderson, for the appellant (defendant).

H. Daniel Murphy, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD and ESPINOSA, Js.

Opinion

ROGERS, C.J.

This case addresses whether a provision in a separation agreement is clear and unambiguous and, relatedly, whether a party may be held in contempt for violating that agreement. The defendant, Kathleen M. Parisi,¹ appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's denial of her postjudgment motion for contempt, order and clarification, by which she had sought to compel the plaintiff, Robert J. Parisi, to satisfy, in a particular manner, a financial obligation set forth in the parties' separation agreement. The trial court denied the defendant's request to hold the plaintiff in contempt, citing the lack of evidence of his wilful noncompliance. It further denied her requests to clarify the agreement or to issue an order of compliance, after concluding that the agreement was “clear and concise....” Thereafter, the Appellate Court upheld both aspects of the trial court's ruling.² Parisi v. Parisi, 140 Conn.App. 81, 83, 58 A.3d 327 (2013). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied her motion because the plaintiff's proposed satisfaction of the financial obligation was impermissible under the terms of the agreement and, therefore, his proposal constituted a wilful failure to comply with the agreement. We conclude that the trial court properly refused to hold the plaintiff in contempt. We disagree with the trial court, however, that the agreement is clear. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing at which the intent of the parties and the meaning of the term in question must be determined, after which a concomitant order of compliance should be entered.

The following procedural history is relevant to the appeal. The parties' marriage was dissolved on November 19, 2010. The trial court incorporated into the judgment of dissolution the parties' November 11, 2010 separation agreement, which the parties had negotiated over the course of several months with the assistance of counsel. Under the heading of “Alimony and Child Support,” the agreement provided, in relevant part, that “[t]here shall be no periodic alimony payable or requested from the [plaintiff] to the [defendant] or from the [defendant] to the [plaintiff]. In lieu of periodic alimony the [plaintiff] shall pay the [defendant] nontaxable and nondeductible alimony (an ‘alimony buyout’) of $300,000 from his share of the marital estate on or before the date [that] [j]udgment for dissolution of the marriage is entered.”³ In an asset spreadsheet prepared by the plaintiff and attached to his financial affidavit, which together were provided to the defendant and filed with the court on the day of the dissolution, three 401(k) accounts belonging to the plaintiff with balances totaling $300,000 are listed under the caption, “Buy-out Amount (in Asset–Property) in Lieu of Alimony.”

The separation agreement also includes a merger clause stating that the parties “have incorporated in this agreement their entire understanding, and no oral agreement or prior written matter extrinsic to this agreement shall have any force or effect. The parties agree that each is not relying upon any representations other than those expressly set forth herein.” Other parts of the agreement, however, make reference to the plaintiff's “financial affidavit filed with the court when judgment is entered,” although the alimony buyout provision does not.

On December 14, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for contempt, order and clarification.⁴ Therein, she quoted the alimony buyout provision from the separation agreement and stated that the plaintiff had failed to comply with it “in wilful violation of [the trial] court's orders.” The defendant raised several other claims in the motion regarding the plaintiff's alleged noncompliance with different and unrelated terms of the separation agreement. She requested, inter alia, that the court clarify the agreement, find the plaintiff in contempt and sanction him monetarily for his wilful violation of the agreement, and order the plaintiff to comply with the agreement by paying the defendant “$300,000, nontaxable and nondeductible,” within fourteen days.

The plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion, claiming, in relevant part, that he had been “working assiduously to complete the [alimony] buyout” contemplated by the agreement. He noted that the “separation agreement [did] not specify from which assets” the buyout should be effected, but “merely indicates that [it] will be nontaxable to the defendant and nondeductible to the plaintiff, as alimony otherwise would be treated pursuant to the laws of federal taxation.” The plaintiff contended that the transfer he had proposed, itself, would be nontaxable to the defendant, but allowed that “there may be tax consequences following said transfer depending on the type of asset exchanged (e.g., stocks and bonds).” He claimed further that the agreement did not require him to liquidate assets prior to transferring them to the defendant.

A hearing on the defendant's motion was held on January 13, 2011. At the hearing, when questioned by her attorney, the defendant testified⁵ that she had not received the $300,000 payment contemplated by the separation agreement, and that she had not heard anything from the plaintiff about it. On cross-examination, she acknowledged that she had heard, through counsel, that the plaintiff intended to pay the $300,000 through a transfer of his retirement assets, but indicated that she considered that approach unsatisfactory and contrary to the agreement. In the defendant's view, although the agreement did not require payment to be made in cash, that was how she had interpreted it, by implication, because of the specification that it be nontaxable. The defendant agreed that the plaintiff did not have $300,000 in cash available to him, but contended that he should have liquidated his investments in order to obtain the required cash and borne the tax consequences of that liquidation himself.

The defendant agreed further that she had received a copy of the plaintiff's financial affidavit and the attached spreadsheet on November 19, 2010, before the parties' marriage was dissolved, that the spreadsheet indicated that payment of the $300,000 would be made from retirement assets and that she had had a chance to read those documents. She claimed, however, that the spreadsheet differed from the one that was available to her when she had signed the separation agreement on November 11, 2010.⁶ The defendant also testified that she had no idea what the tax consequences of the transfer of a retirement asset might be, but that she would not have agreed to any transfer that would result in her having to bear any such consequences.⁷

On January 14, 2011, the trial court issued an order summarily denying the defendant's motion for contempt, order and clarification. On February 3, 2011, the defendant appealed from the denial to the Appellate Court. The trial court, in response to the Appellate Court's order; see Practice Book § 64–1 ; produced a brief memorandum of decision dated August 8, 2011, explicating the January 14, 2011 order. After noting that the parties, at the time of the dissolution, were well represented by counsel and, after being canvassed, had expressed no reservations about the terms of the separation agreement, the court stated the following: “The plaintiff did not have $300,000 in cash available to him and [the defendant] was aware of it.... The court finds that the [defendant] was aware of all aspects of the agreement and that she was thoroughly canvassed. At the contempt hearing all aspects of the agreement were explored and there was no evidence of any wilful conduct that would warrant a finding of contempt. The agreement is clear and concise and needs no clarification.”⁸

In a unanimous decision, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for contempt. Parisi v. Parisi, supra, 140 Conn.App. at 86–87, 58 A.3d 327. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold the plaintiff in contempt, because the evidence presented did not compel a finding that the plaintiff wilfully had violated the parties' agreement.⁹ Id., at 86, 58 A.3d 327.

The Appellate Court also rejected the defendant's contention that the trial court had misconstrued the separation agreement as clearly and concisely permitting the plaintiff's proposed satisfaction of the alimony buyout provision at issue through a transfer of his retirement assets.¹⁰ Id., at 87, 58 A.3d 327. According to the Appellate Court, the defendant had not provided “a reasoned analysis ... of the wording of the separation agreement,” but merely had expressed dissatisfaction with the trial court's interpretation of it.¹¹ Id. The Appellate Court concluded further that, although the trial court had the authority to order the plaintiff to comply with the terms of the separation agreement, it did not abuse its discretion in failing to do so because it reasonably could have determined that an order of compliance was not necessary. Id., at 88–89, 58 A.3d 327. Finally, the Appellate Court declined to issue any order of compliance itself. Id., at 89, 58 A.3d 327. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the Appellate Court, like the trial court, improperly failed to consider the meaning and requirements of the alimony buyout provision of the parties' separation agreement. According to the defendant, that inquiry was a necessary...