Park-In-Theatres v. Perkins
Decision Date | 22 June 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 12627.,12627. |
Citation | 190 F.2d 137 |
Parties | PARK-IN-THEATRES, Inc. v. PERKINS et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Reginald E. Caughey, Lyon & Lyon, all of Los Angeles, Cal., Leonard L. Kalish, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
C. A. Miketta, Los Angeles, Cal., (Johnson & Ladenberger, Robert G. Johnson, Don A. Ladenberger, all of Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel), for appellees.
Before DENMAN, Chief Judge, and ORR and HASTIE,1 Circuit Judges.
The matter in question here is the validity of a patent on a drive-in theatre. United States Letters Patent No. 1,909,537 was issued on May 16, 1933 to R. M. Hollingshead, Jr. It was subsequently assigned to plaintiff, Park-In Theatres, a New Jersey corporation which brought this suit against two individual and two corporate defendants, all citizens of California, charging infringement of certain claims of the patent and praying for damages and an injunction. On defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court held the patent claims invalid, and entered judgment for the defendants. It also awarded them attorney's fees.
The district court held that the patent claims in suit were invalid and void for lack of invention. There were additional grounds of decision but in our view it is not necessary to consider them.2
Preliminarily, although there is no dispute as to the text of the Letters Patent, it has been pointed out by plaintiff, appellant on this appeal, that it does not now appear that the document itself was formally introduced into the record in the district court. Aside from the anomaly of such argument from the party suing on the patent, we note that appellant's own complaint states that the "patent is hereby proffered".3 And in its formal objections to certain proposed findings of fact which appear in the record appellant averred "that the claims in issue are in the patent and before the court". Repeated references to particular language of the patent in the proceedings and filings in the district court lend support to the contention made at bar by the appellees that the patent in formal text was introduced into the record and examined and relied upon by the district court although, in some manner not apparent, the document subsequently became separated from the record. The entire course of the proceedings in the district court is consistent only with the conclusion that the patent was before the court. Therefore, rather than to require some formal correction or supplementation of the record at this time, we treat the text of the patent as having been before the district court and consider it on this appeal as it plainly was considered below.
The patent has twenty-one claims. Plaintiff's suit alleges infringement of eight of them.4 Quotation of three of these will supply a sufficient basis for discussion of considerations common to all of the claims in controversy.
Claim 4 reads:
Claim 10 reads:
Claim 16 reads:
There is no invention in the theatre thus described. Any satisfactory theatre must be so constructed that none of the audience will obstruct the view of any other while all observe a single small center of attention. Therefore, from the amphitheatre of antiquity to the modern movie palace, the architectural design of spectator space in large theatres has characteristically exhibited progressive variations in elevation and the inclination of planes from the horizontal.
A quarter century ago, the family automobile was rapidly passing from the category of a novelty in the law of torts to a commonplace in American family life. At the same time, the addition of sound to the commercial motion picture was making that already established divertisement an even more popular form of mass entertainment. This new combination of circumstances undoubtedly made it appear worthwhile in commercial contemplation to attempt to design theatres in which persons seated in automobiles within an out door area could view a motion picture screen. For the solution of this problem of latter day commerce, the patentee here rather promptly and cleverly adapted classical theatre design.
Curvilinear and progressively more elevated rows of stall-ways for the accommodation of automobiles in front of a stage are in conception and basic design as old and familiar as the classical amphitheatres. The inclination of individual rows from the horizontal is essentially segmentation of the inclined plane which constitutes the floor of almost every large theatre. The deeply recessed drive ways which alternate with rows of stall-ways are but exaggerations of the recessed passage ways which separate the rows of seats in many theatre galleries and balconies. In brief the patent in suit utilizes and adapts long practiced basic general principles of theatre construction to a special theatre in which patrons' automobiles are substituted for fixed seats.
Such devising lies in the field of mechanics. The patent which covers it is a combination patent. It is not contended that any of the individual elements described and claimed is novel. It is only the ingenious combination and adaptation of familiar mechanical expedients and architectural conceptions which is said to give the totality of arrangement which constitutes the drive-in theatre patentable quality.5 We think the ingenuity thus exhibited and applied falls short of invention within the requirements of present day patent law.
Language and analysis in the very recent Supreme Court Opinion in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Co., 1950, 340 U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct. 127, are pertinent here. That case dealt with a patent on a cashier's counter equipped with a three-sided frame, or rack, with no top or bottom, which, when pushed or pulled, would move groceries deposited within it by a customer to a checking clerk and leave them there when pushed back to repeat the operation. The Supreme Court reversed a holding that the patent was valid, reasoning: 340 U.S. at pages 152-153, 71 S.Ct. at page 130.
The applicability of this language to the problem before us is clear. Not a single element of plaintiff's claim performs a function in the drive-in theatre significantly different from the function it has always performed: not the means of aiming cars, not the inclination of the ground, not the devices for tilting the cars to various angles so as to insure visibility from back seats. The assembly of the elements of a successful...
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