Park West Galleries, Inc. v. Global Fine Art Registry, LLC

• Decision Date: 12 August 2010
• Docket Number: Case Nos. 08-12247,Case Nos. 08-12274
• Citation: 732 F.Supp.2d 727
• Parties: PARK WEST GALLERIES, INC., Plaintiff, v. GLOBAL FINE ART REGISTRY, LLC, Theresa Franks, and Bruce Hochman, Defendants. Park West Galleries, Inc., Plaintiff, v. David Charles Phillips, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

732 F.Supp.2d 727

PARK WEST GALLERIES, INC., Plaintiff,

v.GLOBAL FINE ART REGISTRY, LLC, Theresa Franks, and Bruce Hochman, Defendants.

Park West Galleries, Inc., Plaintiff,

v.David Charles Phillips, Defendant.

Case Nos. 08-12247, 08-12274.

United States District Court,

E.D. Michigan,

Southern Division.

Aug. 12, 2010.

Rodger D. Young, Jason D. Killips, Jaye Quadrozzi, Young & Susser, Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for a Judgment as a Matter of Law and/or For New Trial ("JMOL Motion") (Docket # 338). All Defendants have filed responses, to which Plaintiff has replied. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments pertinent to the JMOL Motion are thoroughly presented in the parties' papers, and the decision process will not be aided by oral arguments. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. Local R. 7.1(e)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the JMOL Motion be resolved on the briefs submitted, without this Court entertaining oral arguments. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's JMOL Motion is DENIED insofar as Plaintiff seeks a judgment as a matter of law and GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART insofar as Plaintiff seeks a new trial.

II. BACKGROUND

On March 15, 2010, the parties commenced a jury trial in this matter. Approximately six weeks later, on April 21, 2010, the jury returned a verdict on each of the 19 separate claims in this matter. The jury found in favor of Defendants Fine Art Registry, LLC ("FAR"), Bruce Hochman ("Hochman"), Theresa Franks ("Franks") and David Charles Phillips ("Phillips") with respect to each of the 12 claims of defamation, tortious interference with business expectancies and conspiracy to tortiously interfere with business expectancies asserted by Plaintiff. In addition, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff with respect to the six counter-claims filed against Plaintiff by FAR and Phillips for defamation, tortious interference with business expectancies and conspiracy to tortiously interfere with business expectancies. Finally, the jury found in favor of FAR, and awarded FAR $500,000 in damages, on FAR's counter-claim against Plaintiff for violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

Plaintiff timely filed the instant motion seeking the following post-trial relief:

1. Plaintiff asks this Court to set aside the jury's verdict and enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its defamation claims against Franks and FAR premised on statements asserting that Park West was a "criminal" or was "involved in organized crime."

2. Plaintiff requests that this Court enter judgment in its favor on FAR's counter-claim for violation of the Lanham Act.

2. In addition (and in the alternative, should this Court not enter judgment as requested above), Plaintiffasks for a new trial on each of the following 13 claims: (a) Plaintiff's defamation claims against Franks, FAR, Phillips, and Hochman; (b) Plaintiff's claims of tortious interference with business expectancies against Franks, FAR, Phillips, and Hochman; (c) Plaintiff's claims for conspiracy to tortiously interfere with business expectancies against Franks, FAR, Phillips, and Hochman; and (d) FAR's counter-claim against Plaintiff for violation of the Lanham Act.

Plaintiff specifically states that it does not seek a new trial as to the remaining six counter-claims against Plaintiff filed by FAR and Phillips. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff on each of those six counter-claims, and no post-trial motion has been filed with respect to those six counter-claims.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where, after a party has been fully heard on an issue, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a); Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224, 236 (6th Cir.2003). When reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law based on insufficiency of the evidence, the court should not "weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury." Arban v. West Publ'g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 400 (6th Cir.2003). Rather, the court "views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Id. The motion should be granted "only if a complete absence of proof exists on a material issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact exists upon which reasonable minds could differ." Karam v. Sagemark Consulting, Inc., 383 F.3d 421, 426-27 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting LaPerriere v. Int'l Union UAW, 348 F.3d 127, 132 (6th Cir.2003)). Judgment as a matter of law must be entered for the moving party, however, "if in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for the jury, and reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, in the favor of the moving party." Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 263 F.3d 595, 598 (6th Cir.2001).

B. New Trial

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), a new trial may be granted "in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). The Sixth Circuit interprets this to mean that a new trial is warranted when a jury has reached a "seriously erroneous result" as evidenced by (1) the verdict being against the weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in some fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias. Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (6th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). However, a Court cannot grant a new trial simply because it would have reached a different conclusion than the jury. Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 820-21 (6th Cir.2000).

IV. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on: (1) certain of the allegedly defamatory statements that formed the basis of Plaintiff's defamation claims against FAR and Franks, and (2) FAR's Lanham Act counter-claim.Plaintiff relies on two separate legal theories:

(a) the absence of evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the defamatory statements were true, and (b) the "contumacious conduct" of Franks and counsel for FAR, Franks and Phillips (collectively, "the FAR Defendants").

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

As the FAR Defendants and Hochman argue, however, Plaintiff is procedurally barred from pursuing a judgment as a matter of law. In this case, Plaintiff failed to move for judgment as a matter of law before the case was submitted to the jury, as Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2) requires: "a party who has failed to move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence[ ] can neither ask the district court to rule on the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a verdict for his opponent nor raise the question on appeal." Portage II v. Bryant Petroleum Corp., 899 F.2d 1514, 1522 (6th Cir.1990) (citing Southern Ry. Co. v. Miller, 285 F.2d 202, 206 (6th Cir.1960)). The rule applies whether the basis for challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence is a motion for a new trial or a motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Southern Ry. Co., 285 F.2d at 206 (finding that "[n]o motion for directed verdict having been made, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict is not available as a ground for a motion for new trial").

Plaintiff argues that it did not have to move for judgment as a matter of law prior to submission of the case to the jury because its "decision not to file a written JMOL motion during trial was made in reliance on the Court's March 29, 2010 statement that it was considering striking the Defendants' pleadings and entering a default judgment, as well as on the Court's April 9, 2010 reiteration that it was considering entering judgment against the defendants." Plaintiff thus "believed that these statements by the Court preserved its right to file a post-trial Rule 50(b) motion challenging the failure of proof on these claims." In support of that contention, Plaintiff relies on a number of non-binding, non-analogous and otherwise unpersuasive cases.¹ To the extent that Plaintiff relied on the Court's statements that "the Court" might enter judgment against Defendants as a basis to relieve Plaintiff of its procedural obligations, Plaintiff's reliance was misguided. Each party is responsible for trying its own case. And, although this Court is the appropriate medium in which to try the case, the statements of the undersigned are not a voice or advocate for either party. In other words, each party must try her/his/its own case in accordance with established rules of civil procedure and evidence, as well as in compliance with the orders of the Court. In this instance, Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 50(b) and, as a result, Plaintiff is procedurally barred from obtaining a post-trial judgment as a matter of law with respect to any of its claims (or part thereof) and any counter-claims filed against it.²

B. Contumacious Conduct

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "[t]he inherent powers of federal courts are those which 'are necessary to the exercise of all others.' " Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34, 7 Cranch 32, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812)). The exercise of such powers is critical to the Court's ability to "protect ... the due and orderly administration of justice and ... maintain[ ] the authority and dignity of the court." Id. (citation omitted). Importantly, however, "[b]ecause inherent powers are shielded...