Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton

Decision Date10 June 2019
Docket NumberNo. 18-389,18-389
Citation139 S.Ct. 1881
Parties PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD., Petitioner v. Brian NEWTON
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, for the petitioner.

Christopher G. Michel, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, in support of the petitioner.

David C. Frederick, Washington, DC, for the respondent.

Ronald J. Holland, Ellen M. Bronchetti, McDermott Will &, Emery LLP, Menlo Park, CA, Paul D. Clement, George W. Hicks, Jr., Michael D. Lieberman, Laura Wolk, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Michael A. Strauss, Aris E. Karakalos, Strauss & Strauss APC, Ventura, CA, Erin Glenn Busby, Lisa R. Eskow, Michael F. Sturley, Austin, TX, David C. Frederick, Ana Nikolic, Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, for respondent.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. , extends federal law to the subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf and all attachments thereon (OCS). Under the OCSLA, all law on the OCS is federal law, administered by federal officials. The OCSLA denies States any interest in or jurisdiction over the OCS, and it deems the adjacent State’s laws to be federal law "[t]o the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with" other federal law. § 1333(a)(2)(A). The question before us is how to determine which state laws meet this requirement and therefore should be adopted as federal law. Applying familiar tools of statutory interpretation, we hold that where federal law addresses the relevant issue, state law is not adopted as surrogate federal law on the OCS.

I

Respondent Brian Newton worked for petitioner Parker Drilling Management Services on drilling platforms off the coast of California. Newton’s 14-day shifts involved 12 hours per day on duty and 12 hours per day on standby, during which he could not leave the platform. He was paid well above the California and federal minimum wages for his time on duty, but he was not paid for his standby time.

Newton filed a class action in California state court alleging violations of several California wage-and-hour laws and related state-law claims. Among other things, Newton claimed that California’s minimum-wage and overtime laws required Parker to compensate him for the time he spent on standby. Parker removed the action to Federal District Court. The parties agreed that Parker’s platforms were subject to the OCSLA. Their disagreement centered on whether the relevant California laws were "applicable and not inconsistent" with existing federal law and thus deemed to be the applicable federal law under the OCSLA. § 1333(a)(2)(A).

The District Court applied Fifth Circuit precedent providing that under the OCSLA, "state law only applies to the extent it is necessary ‘to fill a significant void or gap’ in federal law." App. to Pet. for Cert. 51 (quoting Continental Oil Co. v. London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mut. Ins. Assn. , 417 F. 2d 1030, 1036 (1969) ). It determined that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , constitutes a comprehensive federal wage-and-hour scheme and thus left no significant gap for state law to fill. Because all of Newton’s claims relied on state law, the court granted Parker judgment on the pleadings.

The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. It first held that state law is " ‘applicable’ " under the OCSLA whenever it "pertain[s] to the subject matter at hand." 881 F. 3d 1078, 1090, amended and reh’g en banc denied, 888 F. 3d 1085 (2018). The court found that California wage-and-hour laws satisfied this standard and turned to "the determinative question in Newton’s case": "whether California wage and hour laws are ‘inconsistent with’ existing federal law." 881 F. 3d at 1093. According to the Ninth Circuit, state laws are "inconsistent" with federal law under the OCSLA only "if they are mutually incompatible, incongruous, [or] inharmonious." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard, the court determined that no inconsistency exists between the FLSA and California wage-and-hour law because the FLSA saving clause "explicitly permits more protective state wage and hour laws." Id. , at 1097 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) ). Given the disagreement between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, we granted certiorari. 586 U. S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 914, 202 L.Ed.2d 641 (2019).

II

Before the OCSLA, coastal States and the Federal Government disputed who had the right to lease submerged lands on the continental shelf. Some coastal States even asserted jurisdiction all the way to the outer edge of the shelf. See Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue , 488 U. S. 19, 26, 109 S.Ct. 278, 102 L.Ed.2d 186 (1988). The disputes eventually reached this Court, which held in a series of decisions that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the entire continental shelf. See United States v. California , 332 U. S. 19, 38–39, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947) ; United States v. Louisiana , 339 U. S. 699, 705, 70 S.Ct. 914, 94 L.Ed. 1216 (1950) ; United States v. Texas , 339 U. S. 707, 717–718, 70 S.Ct. 918, 94 L.Ed. 1221 (1950).

After these decisions, Congress divided jurisdiction over the shelf. In 1953, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. , which ceded to the coastal States offshore lands within a specified distance of their coasts. A few months later, Congress passed the OCSLA, which affirmed that the Federal Government exercised exclusive control over the OCS, defined as "all submerged lands" beyond the lands reserved to the States up to the edge of the United States’ jurisdiction and control. § 1331(a). Specifically, the OCSLA declares that "the subsoil and seabed of the [OCS] appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition." § 1332(1). The OCSLA then sets forth "detailed provisions for the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction in the area and for the leasing and development of the resources of the seabed." United States v. Maine , 420 U. S. 515, 527, 95 S.Ct. 1155, 43 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975) ; see §§ 1334–1354.

Of primary relevance here, the OCSLA defines the body of law that governs the OCS. First, in § 1333(a)(1), the OCSLA extends "[t]he Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States" to the OCS. Section 1333(a)(1) provides that federal law applies "to the same extent as if the [OCS] were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State." Then, § 1333(a)(2)(A) provides:

"To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State, now in effect or hereafter adopted, amended, or repealed are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf ...."

Section 1333(a)(2)(A) also states that "[a]ll of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States." Finally, § 1333(a)(3) emphasizes that "[t]he provisions of this section for adoption of State law as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over" the OCS.

III
A

The question in this case is how to interpret the OCSLA’s command that state laws be adopted as federal law on the OCS "[t]o the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent" with other federal law. § 1333(a)(2)(A). Echoing the Ninth Circuit, Newton argues that state law is "applicable" on the OCS whenever it pertains to the subject matter at issue. Newton further argues that state law is only "inconsistent" with federal law if it is incompatible with the federal scheme. In essence, Newton’s argument is that state law is "inconsistent" only if it would be pre-empted under our ordinary pre-emption principles.

Parker, on the other hand, argues that state law is not "applicable" on the OCS in the absence of a gap in federal law that needs to be filled. Moreover, Parker argues that state law can be "inconsistent" with federal law even if it is possible for a party to satisfy both sets of laws. Specifically, Parker contends that, although the FLSA normally accommodates more protective state wage-and-hour laws, such laws are inconsistent with the FLSA when adopting state law as surrogate federal law because federal law would then contain two different standards.

B

Although this is a close question of statutory interpretation, on the whole we find Parker’s approach more persuasive because " ‘the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’ " Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc. , 566 U. S. 93, 101, 132 S.Ct. 1350, 182 L.Ed.2d 341 (2012). That rule is particularly relevant here, as the terms "applicable" and "not inconsistent" are susceptible of interpretations that would deprive one term or the other of meaning. If Newton is right that "applicable" merely means relevant to the subject matter, then the word adds nothing to the statute, for an irrelevant law would never be "applicable" in that sense. Cf. Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N. A. , 562 U. S. 61, 70, 131 S.Ct. 716, 178 L.Ed.2d 603 (2011) (declining to interpret the word "applicable" in such a way that Congress "could have omitted the term ... altogether"). And if Parker is right that "applicable" means "necessary to fill a gap in federal law," it is hard to imagine circumstances in which "not...

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