Parker Hannifin Corp. v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc.
Decision Date | 23 October 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:19cv00617 |
Parties | Parker Hannifin Corp., Plaintiff, v. Standard Motor Products, Inc., Defendant |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Currently pending is Defendant Standard Motor Products, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint or, in the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings. (Doc. No. 12.) Plaintiff Parker Hannifin Corporation filed a Brief in Opposition on August 19, 2019, to which Defendant replied on September 9, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 17, 18.) Plaintiff was later granted leave to file a sur-reply on September 16, 2019. (Doc. No. 20.) For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth below.
On March 20, 2019, Plaintiff Parker Hannifin Corporation (hereinafter "Parker Hannifin" or "Parker") filed a Complaint in this Court against Defendant Standard Motor Products, Inc. on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, asserting claims for breach of contract (Counts I and II), breach of the duty to defend and settle (Count III), breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (Count IV), breach of duty imposed by law (Count V), and declaratory judgment (Count VI). (Doc. No. 1.)
Defendant Standard Motor Products, Inc. (hereinafter "Standard Motor" or "SMP") filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion to Stay Proceedings on June 5, 2019. (Doc. No. 12.) Therein, Standard Motor argued that the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon relief could be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with respect to all six of Parker Hannifin's claims. (Id.) In the alternative, Standard Motor requested the Court stay the instant proceedings. (Id.) Parker Hannifin filed a Brief in Opposition on August 19, 2019, to which Standard Motor replied on September 9, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 17, 18.) Parker Hannifin was later granted leave to file a sur-reply on September 16, 2019. (Doc. No. 20.)
On October 2, 2019, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding Parker Hannifin's Declaratory Judgment claim. (Doc. No. 21.) The parties timely complied on October 16, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 22, 23.)
Thus, this matter is now ripe and ready for resolution.
The Complaint contains the following factual allegations.1 On August 4, 1986, Parker Hannifin and Standard Motor entered into an agreement for the sale of Parker Hannifin's EIS Division to Standard Motor (hereinafter "the 1986 Agreement"). (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 7.) This Division was engaged in the business of manufacturing and remanufacturing brake parts for vehicle brake systems. (Id.) Specifically, during the time period that Parker Hannifin owned the EIS Division, that Division manufactured and sold automotive friction products (i.e., brake shoes), some of which were made using asbestos-containing friction lining from outside vendors. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
For a number of years prior to the 1986 Agreement, civil lawsuits were filed against Parker Hannifin alleging bodily injury as a result of alleged exposure to asbestos contained in the EIS frictionproducts. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Parker Hannifin disclosed the existence of these asbestos claims to Standard Motor during the due diligence that preceded the 1986 Agreement, and the parties expressly accounted for these types of actions in allocating liabilities arising out of post-Closing product liability claims. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 17.)
The 1986 Agreement contains the following provisions relevant to this issue. Section 2.1 provides, in relevant part, that "at the Closing, Purchaser [i.e., Standard Motor] will assume and become directly and solely responsible for the payment or discharge of all of the Assumed Liabilities." (Id. at ¶ 12). See also Doc. No. 12-2 at PageID# 104. The term "Assumed Liabilities" is defined in Section 2.4 as "all liabilities and obligations of the Seller as of the Closing arising solely out of Seller's conduct of the Business . . . but excluding the Excluded Liabilities."2 (Id. at ¶ 14.) See also Doc. No. 12-2 at PageID# 107. Section 2.4 further explains:
See Doc. No. 12-2 at PageID# 107-108 (emphasis added).
Section 7.4 then goes on to specifically allocate liability relating to asbestos claims, as follows:
7.4 Asbestos Claims. Notwithstanding the allocation in Sections 2.4(d) and 2.5(c) between the parties of responsibility for claims whether founded upon negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability in tort, and/or other similar legal theory, seeking compensation or recovery for or relating to injury to persons arising out of a defect or alleged defect of a Product, the parties hereto agree that claims alleging any illness, disease, injury or other physical damage arising out of or relating in any way to alleged exposure to asbestos-containing Products asserted, in writing, on or prior to the fifteenth (15th) annual anniversary of the Closing Date shall be deemed Excluded Liabilities. Claims alleging any illness, disease, injury or other physical damage arising out of or relating in any way to alleged exposure to asbestos-containing Products asserted, in writing, after the fifteenth (15th) anniversary of the Closing Date shall be deemed Assumed Liabilities
. The special allocation provisions established in this Section 7.4 relate only to personal injury claims arising out of alleged exposure to asbestos-contained Products, are based on the parties recognition of the difficulties in establishing liability between the parties hereto as to any one Product for such claims, and shall not apply to any other type of claims, including, but not limited to, alleged asbestos-related property damages. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Purchaser shall be responsible for all claims alleging any illness, disease, injury or other physical damage arising out of or relating in any way to alleged exposure to asbestos-containing Products asserted, in writing, after the Closing Date, if claimant's first alleged exposure to asbestos-containing Products occurred after the Closing Date.
(Doc. No. 12-2 at PageID# 148) (emphasis added).
Thus, Parker Hannifin alleges that, in allocating liability arising out of post-Closing product liability claims, the 1986 Agreement expressly anticipated and accounted for potential liabilities arising from asbestos claims and distinguished those claims from other product liability claims that did not involve asbestos.3 (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 16.) With respect to asbestos claims, Parker Hannifinalleges the Agreement is clear and unambiguous that Parker "agreed to assume 100% responsibility for any Asbestos Claim asserted in writing during the 15-year period following the Closing [i.e., from August 31, 1986 to August 31, 2001] (unless the claimant's first exposure to asbestos occurred after the Closing Date), and Standard Motor agreed, using the language in Section 2.1 of the 1986 Agreement, to 'assume and become directly and solely responsible for the payment or discharge of any Asbestos Claims asserted in writing thereafter." (Id. at ¶ 18.)
The 1986 Agreement also contains the following indemnification and duty to defend provisions relevant to this dispute:
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