Parker v. Bowron
| Decision Date | 06 March 1953 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | PARKER et al. v. BOWRON, Mayor, et al. L. A. 22294. |
David Sokol, Los Angeles, and Clarence E. Todd, San Francisco, for appellants.
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Los Angeles, Bourke Jones, Asst. City Attorney, George William Adams, Alan G. Campbell and John F. Feldmeier, Deputy City Attorneys Los Angeles, for respondents.
The purpose of this mandate proceeding is to compel the respondent city officials to fix a salary or wage for all of the city's employees in certain classifications at least equal to the prevailing scale for similar employment in private industry. The appeal from the judgment of dismissal primarily presents for decision the question as to whether the proceeding is brought by a person or persons having the requisite beneficial interest.
According to the caption of the petition, the proceeding is brought by 'Lester A. Parker, individually and as a member of, and Secretary Treasurer of, the Council of Federated Municipal Crafts of Los Angeles, California, a voluntary unincorporated association, and for and on behalf of the following members of said association, all of which are unincorporated labor organizations: United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local Union No. 2231; United Association of Plumbers and Steam Fitters, Local Union No. 78; Southern California District Council of Laborers; and Carpenters District Council of Los Angeles County, Petitioners.'
The petition is signed by Parker as 'Petitioner' and by the 'Attorney for Petitioners'. It is alleged that the '(p)etitioner, Council of Federated Municipal Crafts' is an unincorporated association, Parker is its secretary treasurer, certain designated unions which are unincorporated associations are members of the council, and 'the petitioner brings this action for and on behalf of himself individually and as Secretary Treasurer' of the council 'and for and on behalf of' its affiliated unions 'and the members thereof'.
The council, it is alleged, is 'devoted to the improvement of the working conditions of the members of its affiliated unions, and to the stabilization of labor relations between the City of and County of Los Angeles, and the employees of said political subdivisions, and has as one of its aims and objectives the establishment and maintenance of reasonable standards for wages, hours, and working conditions of said employees, and the maintenance of industrial peace'. According to the pleading, the labor council represents those members of the affiliated unions who are working for the city and the county. It is stated that of 2,631 members of the United Association of Plumbers and Steam Fitters, 26 are employed by the city; of approximately 35,000 members of the Carpenters District Council the city employs over 250; and more than 110 of about 11,000 members of the District Council of Laborers are municipal employees.
'Your petitioners are the real parties in interest herein', it is said, 'since they represent a substantial part of the employees of the City of Los Angeles; that petitioner, the Council of Federated Municipal Crafts * * * is the collective bargaining representative of practically every craft of employee of the City * * * as well as' 28 listed unions. According to the petition, 'the sole purpose of the activities of the petitioner, Council of Federated Municipal Crafts * * * is to foster, promote, and develop the welfare of wage earners employed by the City * * * to improve their working conditions and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment'.
Section 425 of the city charter provides: 'In fixing the compensation to be paid to persons in the City's employ, the Council and every other authority authorized to fix salaries or wages, shall, in every instance, provide a salary or wage at least equal to the prevailing salary or wage for the same quality of service rendered to private persons, firms or corporations, under similar employment, in case such prevailing salary or wage can be ascertained.'
According to the petition, 'the respondents in fixing the compensation paid to the members of the 'affiliated Unions", made a survey of salaries and wages paid by private industry in the Los Angeles area. This survey, it is alleged, disclosed that the rates of pay in private industry were higher than those paid by the city, 'in violation of Section 425'. The 'respondents', it is said, 'had available data from which it could ascertain the prevailing salary or wage paid to persons under similar employment for the same quality of services rendered to private persons, firms or corporations, but respondents failed, neglected and refused to pay such prevailing salary or wages and refused to consider, or to take into consideration, such prevailing salary or wages in fixing the salaries or wages of the carpenters, laborers and plumbers'. It is alleged that 'demand was made on respondents that in fixing the compensation to be paid to the members of the 'affiliated Unions' respondents provide for a salary or wage at least equal to the prevailing salary or wage for the same quality of service rendered to private persons, firms or corporations under similar employment; that at all times since * * * respondents have failed and refused to do so'.
'Petitioners have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law', the pleading continues, 'to compel the respondents * * * to perform the public duty which they have under Section 425 of the City Charter * * * and there is no method except by means of this petition whereby the petitioners can question the * * * acts of respondents and secure complete adjudication of their rights and adequate and complete relief.' The 'petitioners pray' that a writ of mandate issue commanding the respondents to provide a salary or wage 'for all of its employees classified as laborers, carpenters and plumbers' at least equal to the scale prevailing in private industry.
By answer, the respondents 'deny that the petitioner brings this action for or on behalf of himself either individually or as Secretary-Treasurer of the Council * * * and deny that the petitioner brings this action for or on behalf of the affiliated unions * * * or on behalf of any members thereof or for or on behalf of anyone whomsoever'. It is also denied that the council 'represents or can represent any members of the said affiliated unions as to their wages, hours and working conditions, or as to the settlement of grievances in connection with the employment of any of them by' the city, county, or various city agencies. The respondents also deny that the council 'represents anyone collectively or otherwise either in bargaining for wages, hours or working conditions or otherwise in respect to his employment by any of the said governmental entities.'
Other allegations of the answer are that a survey was made of salaries and wages paid in private industry. The information so obtained, it is said, together with other information, was considered by the members of the city council in reaching the decision that the salaries and wages paid to city employees are at least equal to those prevailing in private industry. According to the pleading, 'none of the petitioners is a real party in interest herein, or is employed by the City of Los Angeles, or has any claim herein, nor is any of the petitioners the collective bargaining representative of any employee of' the city or its agencies.
By supplement to the answer, it is alleged that, since the commencement of the proceeding, the city council has amended the salary standardization ordinance. As now in effect, the ordinance fixes increased rates of compensation.
Upon the commencement of the trial, the respondents objected to the introduction of any evidence upon he grounds 'that the petitioner, Lester A. Parker, is neither a real party in interest nor a party beneficially interested' and that the petition failed to state a cause of action. The court sustained the objection upon both grounds. Judgment was entered discharging the alternative writ, denying the petition, and ordering that 'the petitioners' take nothing. The notice of appeal recites that the 'petitioners', designated in the same manner as in the caption of the petition, appeal from the judgment.
In the briefs upon appeal, the use of the plural designation 'petitioners' is, for the most part, abandoned, reference being made to the 'petitioner and appellant' in most instances. However, sometimes the labor council is referred to specifically as the petitioner and at other times the reference to 'petitioner' appears to mean Parker. It is contended that the 'petitioner', apparently irrespective of whether Parker, or the council, or the affiliated unions be so designated, has the requisite beneficial interest and representative standing to maintain the proceeding and that the petition states a cause of action. It is also argued that the trial court erred in denying the 'petitioner' the right to inspect the city's survey records and to take the deposition of one Howard E. Earl.
The respondents contend that neither the unions nor Parker, whichever be deemed the 'petitioner', is a proper party to bring the proceeding and the petition fails to state a cause of action. According to them, the only reasonable interpretation of the petition is that Parker is the sole petitioner. They also argue that the orders claimed to be erroneous are not reviewable upon this appeal.
It is impossible, either from the caption or the body of the petition, to determine with certainty who is intended to be the 'petitioner' or 'petitioners'. Apparently, it was Parker's belief that, as an individual, he could bring a representative suit upon behalf of all city employees and, as an officer of the labor council sue on its behalf. There is some indication that the named affiliated unions were not intended to be petitioners,...
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