Parker v. Burt
| Decision Date | 15 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:11-CV-11622 |
| Parties | SYLVESTER PARKER, #234406, Petitioner, v. SHERRY BURT, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Sylvester Parker ("Petitioner") was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, second offense, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227b, following a bench trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. He was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.11, to consecutive terms of 14 months to 10 years imprisonment and five years imprisonment in 2007. In his pleadings, Petitioner raises claims concerning the effectiveness of trial counsel, double jeopardy, and the sufficiency of the evidence. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that the claims lack merit. For the reasons set forth, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Petitioner's convictions arise from a dispute and shooting that occurred in a Detroit neighborhood on October 1, 2006. The Court adopts the facts set forth by the Michigan Court of Appeals on direct appeal, which are presumed correct on federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009). Those facts are as follows:
This case arises from the non-fatal shooting of Tyrone Turner outside of his house on Winston in Detroit, Michigan. Tyrone testified that he lives on Winston next door to Angelina Clark. Tyrone testified that he knew defendant from seeing him next door with Clark. On October 1, 2006, Tyrone was in his backyard around 3:00 p.m. and had on his person his .380 handgun, for which he had a concealed weapons permit, in its holster covered by his shirt. Tyrone heard his wife arguing with Clark in the front yard. At trial, Tyrone testified that he saw defendant come out of the side door of Clark's house with two revolvers, one black, one silver. Tyrone testified that he told defendant that it was not necessary to have his guns out and then Tyrone pulled his own .380 handgun out of its holster. At that point, according to Tyrone, defendant approached Tyrone and shot him in the chest. Tyrone then tried to grab defendant's other gun. As defendant wrestled Tyrone to the ground, Tyrone momentarily passed out. When Tyrone woke up, he saw defendant pick up the .380 handgun and run toward Clark's backyard. Tyrone also did not regain possession of his .380 handgun because it was never found. Tyrone testified that he spent a week in the hospital and did not have the bullet removed.
People v. Parker, No. 287202, 2009 WL 4981184 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (unpublished). At trial, the prosecution presented additional witnesses, including the victims' wife, who said that they saw Petitioner with a gun that day. One neighbor, Charles Kauppi, was unable to identify Petitioner at trial but testified that he saw a stocky black male in a white shirt fire a gun. Petitioner arguably fit that description. A police officer testified that a silver .38 revolver was recovered from Angelina Clark's driveway and several spent casings were found at the scene. Casings from a .380 handgun were foundin Clark's house. In his police statement, Petitioner said, "I went for mine," when describing his confrontation with the armed victim.
Petitioner presented defense witnesses at trial, including his girlfriend, who testified that he did not possess any guns on the day of the shooting and that the victim, who was armed, confronted Petitioner with a gun. Petitioner also testified on his own behalf at trial. He claimed that the victim came at him with a gun, they struggled, and the gun fired several times. Petitioner denied possessing any guns and denied pulling the trigger. As for his statement, "I went for mine," Petitioner testified that he mis-spoke and used the wrong terminology, and that he really meant that he was just fighting for his life.
At the close of trial, the trial court acknowledged the conflicting testimony presented at trial, but found Petitioner guilty of the charged offenses of felon in possession and felony firearm. The court subsequently sentenced him as a third habitual offender to consecutive terms of 14 months to 10 years imprisonment and five years imprisonment.
Following sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals, essentially raising the same claims presented on habeas review. The court denied relief on those claims and affirmed his convictions. Id. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Parker, 486 Mich. 903, 780 N.W.2d 791 (2010).
Petitioner thereafter filed his federal habeas petition raising the following claims:
Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied. Petitioner has filed a reply to that answer.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., provides the standard of review for federal habeas cases brought by state prisoners. The AEDPA provides:
"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
"[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner'scase." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
The United States Supreme Court has held that "a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) () (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Section 2254(d) "does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been ...
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