Parker v. Burt
Decision Date | 15 December 2014 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:11-cv-1297 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Parties | LONNIE L. PARKER, Petitioner, v. SHERRY BURT, Respondent. |
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Following a jury trial in the Muskegon County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.84, and unarmed robbery, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.530. On January 30, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced as a fourth felony offender, MICH. COMP. LAWS §769.12, to respective prison terms of 9 to 25 years and 15 to 25 years. In his pro se petition, Petitioner raises fifteen grounds for relief, as follows:
(Pet., docket #1, Page ID##4-31.) Respondent has filed an answer to the petition (docket #11) stating that the grounds should be denied because they are non-cognizable, procedurally defaulted, and/or without merit. Upon review and applying the AEDPA standards, I find that all of the grounds are either procedurally defaulted, non-cognizable, or without merit. Accordingly, I recommend that the petition be denied.
The state prosecution arose from Petitioner striking his cousin, Darin Sargent, with sufficient force to break Sargent's jaw and to cause him to fall to the pavement, resulting in a headinjury. Petitioner was charged with assault with intent to cause great bodily harm less than murder. A preliminary examination was held on July 2, 2008, at which time Petitioner dismissed his retained attorney, Joseph Fisher, and represented himself. After the evidence was introduced, the prosecutor moved to add a count of unarmed robbery. (Id. at 37.) Petitioner was bound over on both charges. (Id. at 42.)
On July 25, 2008, Christopher Wilson was appointed to represent Petitioner. (Case Register, docket #13 at 2.) Four days later, on July 29, 2008, Petitioner's family retained Al E. Swanson as Petitioner's attorney to replace Mr. Wilson. (Id.) On August 18, 2008, the court held a Cobbs hearing1 on a possible plea agreement, but no plea ultimately was entered. On September 30, 2008, attorney Swanson moved to withdraw as counsel, due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and Petitioner's desire to hire a different attorney. The motion was heard on October 2, 2008, two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin. Under the circumstances and with the prosecutor's consent, the motion was granted. (10/2/08 Mot. Hr'g Tr., docket #17.) Petitioner then retained attorney Steven Corwin on October 20, 2008. (Id.) On December 22, 2008, just over two weeks before trial, the Court held a hearing on attorney Corwin's request to withdraw as counsel and to permit Petitioner to represent himself. (12/22/08 Mot. Hr'g Tr., docket #16.) The motion was denied on the grounds that Petitioner had not expressed an unequivocal intention to withdraw within the standard established in People v. Anderson, 247 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 1976).
Petitioner was tried before a jury beginning January 6, 2009 and ending January 8, 2009.2 On the morning of first day of trial, the court also heard the prosecutor's motion in limine to bar testimony concerning the victim's prior behavior leading up to the assault, contending that it was irrelevant to the charges and amounted to a request for jury nullification. (Tr. I at 3-4.) Defense counsel responded that the evidence concerning the background and relationship between Petitioner and the victim was critical to show that Petitioner did not have the intent to do great bodily harm and did not commit the robbery. Instead, the evidence would show that Petitioner and the victim were cousins and friends who had previously had other altercations and that Petitioner intended only to teach his cousin a lesson. Absent evidence of the background, the defense would be left without an ability to offer an explanation for Petitioner's behavior that allowed the jury to understand how Petitioner had hit the victim so hard as to cause major injury without intending the consequences. Counsel believed that, in context, the jury reasonably could find Petitioner guilty of a lesser assault offense. (Id. at 6-8.)
The court also addressed a defense motion to preclude the introduction of evidence of the head injury and a motion to dismiss the unarmed-robbery charge added at the preliminary examination, both of which the court denied. (Id. at 15-22.) In addition, the trial court fully described...
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