Parker v. Butterfield
| Decision Date | 01 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:18-cv-175-30CPT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | SHAQUAN W. PARKER, Plaintiff, v. STACY M. BUTTERFIELD, POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA CLERK OF COURT AND COMPTROLLER, and THE HONORABLE JUDGE MICHAEL E. RAIDEN OF 10TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, Defendants. |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before me on referral for a Report and Recommendation on the Plaintiff's [Amended] Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Amended Complaint) (Doc. 11) and his [Renewed] Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Renewed Application) (Doc. 12).
For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that the Plaintiff's Renewed Application be denied and that his Amended Complaint be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff initiated this action in January 2018 against Stacy M. Butterfield, Polk County's Clerk of Court and Comptroller (Clerk Butterfield), and the Honorable Michael E. Raiden, a Circuit Court Judge in Florida's Tenth Judicial Circuit (Judge Raiden), both in their official capacities. (Doc. 1 at 2). In his initial Complaint, the Plaintiff sought relief against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985; 18 U.S.C. § 1001; and the Fourteenth Amendment for "illegal and malice [sic] conduct and activities" occurring from 2013 to 2015 during criminal and civil proceedings in the state courthouse in Bartow, Florida. (Doc. 1 at 3-4). He alleged in conclusory fashion that the Defendants' "illegal alterations caused undue hardship, false incarcerations, false convictions and violations of due process, pain and suffering[,] and punitive losses all with Michael E. Raiden [as] presiding judge." Id. at 4. He also charged the Defendants with spoliation of evidence as well as hiding and altering public records. Id. Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff requested $12 million in damages and the implementation of "strict checks and balances . . . to enforce accountability amongst court house officials to ensure public safety." Id. at 5.
On his first construed motion to proceed in forma pauperis, I recommended that the Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed without prejudice because he did not demonstrate an entitlement to indigent status, and because his Complaint suffered from several fatal defects. (Doc. 9). Of relevance here, those defects included that the Plaintiff's allegations were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity and failed to state a viable claim for relief. Id. at 4-10.
The Plaintiff did not object to my Report and Recommendation, which the Court thereafter adopted. (Doc. 10). In doing so, the Court directed the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint as well as a renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Id. The Plaintiff complied with this directive on May 17, 2018. (Docs. 11, 12).
In his Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff now sues the Defendants in their individual—not official—capacities. (Doc. 11 at 2). He also expands somewhat upon the factual material underlying his claims. Id. at 4. In particular, the Plaintiff alleges that Judge Raiden "coax[ed] the Clerks" to take illegal action against him at the time Plaintiff was a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Id. He asserts in this regard that Judge Raiden and Clerk Butterfield "altered public records to commence usual punishment that set [him] up for failure within the Criminal Division by willfully [placing him] as a falsely convicted Felon" and by "willfully failing to fix the altered record." Id.
While not entirely clear, the Plaintiff additionally appears to claim that such misconduct had collateral consequences in a civil proceeding to which he was a party. Id. The Plaintiff also seems to contend that the Defendants conspired with other individuals to ensure that the alteration of public records would not be acknowledged or fixed, and that their actions were inspired by "personal retaliation." Id. As before, he states that the events giving rise to his claims occurred at the Tenth Judicial Circuit Courthouse in Bartow, Florida, although he narrows the time frame to 2014 to 2015. Id.
In addition to these changes, the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint modifies the rights he claims were violated. While he maintains his original references to the Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the Plaintiff no longer includes a reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Id. at 3. Instead, he attempts to add claims under the Eighth Amendment, the Florida Constitution, the Florida Statutes, as well as two criminal provisions—namely 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. Id.
To redress the alleged harms, the Plaintiff again seeks compensation of $12 million, along with the imposition of "strict checks and balances" in the Tenth Judicial Circuit to deter future transgressions of this nature and to benefit the public trust. Id. at 5.
DISCUSSION
Although set forth in my prior Report and Recommendation, the law governing requests to proceed in forma pauperis bears repeating here.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a district court "may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor" upon a showing of indigency by affidavit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The court has "wide discretion" to grant or deny an application to proceed in forma pauperis, and, in civil cases for damages, the privilege should be granted "sparingly." Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). While such an application "need not show that the litigant is absolutely destitute," it must indicate "that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs,and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents." Id. (citing Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338-40 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
When an application to proceed in forma pauperis is filed, the district court must also review the case and dismiss the complaint sua sponte if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim in this context is governed by the same standard as dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bravo v. Loor-Tuarez, 727 F. App'x 572, 575 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).1 As such, "[t]o avoid dismissal, the 'complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 18, 2018) (No. 18-511) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A complaint is plausible on its face when it contains sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In evaluating a plaintiff's complaint under this standard, the court must accept all well-pleaded factualallegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jara v. Nunez, 878 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The court, however, "afford[s] no presumption of truth to legal conclusions and recitations of the basic elements of a cause of action." Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1248 n.1 (citations omitted).
Finally, while pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, the courts are not to serve as de facto counsel for pro se litigants, nor are they to "rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
For the reasons discussed below, I am unable to find that the Plaintiff's allegations of poverty entitle him to proceed in forma pauperis. In addition, I find that his Amended Complaint suffers from some of the same infirmities articulated in my prior Report and Recommendation.
While the Plaintiff has attempted to remedy the deficiencies of his initial Application, he still has not shown an entitlement to proceed in forma pauperis under section 1915(a)(1). According to his Renewed Application, the Plaintiff remains employed at Max Pak and grosses $1,800 to $1,900 per month, with monthly expenses totaling $1,390.2 (Doc. 12 at 2-5). Thus, a comparison of the Plaintiff's income versushis monthly expenses indicates he is able to make prepayment of the fees and costs required to commence this action and does not qualify as indigent.
The fact the Plaintiff now alleges that his dependents and cost of living also contribute to his inability to pay the expenses associated with the instant litigation does not alter my conclusion. Id. at 5. The only "dependent" the Plaintiff identifies is his twenty-seven-year-old girlfriend, and he does not expand upon this claimed dependency or describe his additional "costs of living." Id. at 3-5.
As stated above, the Court must dismiss a complaint that seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief or that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint against Judge Raiden and Clerk Butterfield does not survive this scrutiny.
The doctrine of judicial immunity affords judges "absolute . . . immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity...
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