Parker v. Champion

• Decision Date: 27 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-6291,96-6291
• Citation: 148 F.3d 1219
• Parties: 98 CJ C.A.R. 4060 Alvin PARKER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ron CHAMPION, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1219

148 F.3d 1219

98 CJ C.A.R. 4060

Alvin PARKER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ron CHAMPION, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 96-6291.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

July 27, 1998.

Gloyd L. McCoy, Coyle & McCoy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Sandra D. Howard, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before ANDERSON, MAGILL, ^* and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

During Alvin Parker's second trial in Oklahoma state court on the sole charge of first degree malice-aforethought murder, he requested jury instructions on second degree murder. The trial court granted Parker's request, and he was ultimately convicted of second degree murder. After the state courts denied postconviction relief, he filed this pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus. He contends that his direct appeal counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the second trial jury instructions on second degree murder violated his due process rights in that he was convicted of a crime of which he had no notice in the charge. The district court denied Parker's petition, and also denied Parker's subsequent motion to file an amended petition to include an improper witness identification claim. We affirm.

I.

On February 2, 1985, Parker, a convicted felon, shot and killed Gary Ward, an off-duty police officer working as a motel security guard. Parker was attempting to steal a television set from a motel room when Officer Ward, wearing his police uniform, approached him. A fracas ensued, during which Parker secured Officer Ward's gun and killed him.

Parker was charged by amended information in Oklahoma state court with first degree malice-aforethought murder and first degree felony murder. At the first trial, Parker requested the court to submit jury instructions not only on both theories of first degree murder, but also on second degree felony murder, second degree depraved-mind murder, and first degree manslaughter. At the conclusion of trial, Parker was convicted of first degree malice-aforethought murder and sentenced to life.

This conviction was reversed on direct appeal and a new second trial followed. The state trial court held that jeopardy had attached on the first degree felony murder charge. Thus, the second trial involved only the first degree malice-aforethought murder charge. Parker again requested jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of second degree depraved-mind murder and first degree manslaughter. He also requested a jury instruction on second degree felony murder, arguing incorrectly that it also was a lesser included offense. The trial court gave all of Parker's requested instructions. The jury then convicted Parker of second degree murder, but did not specify whether the conviction was for second degree depraved-mind murder or second degree felony murder. Parker was then sentenced to 199 years imprisonment.

After his conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal in 1994, Parker initiated a state postconviction collateral challenge to his conviction. Parker argued that his direct appeal counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the argument that he was convicted of a crime for which he did not have notice--second degree murder. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this claim and found that Parker was convicted of second degree depraved-mind murder, which was a lesser included offense. Parker did not raise any claims concerning ineffectiveness of trial counsel on state collateral review.

Between 1994 and 1996, Parker filed three separate federal petitions for habeas corpus. Parker's first and second habeas petitions were dismissed for including unexhausted claims. ¹ In this third habeas petition, Parker again seeks relief only on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct criminal appeal. He contends that his appellate counsel should have argued that Parker's due process rights were violated because the trial court instructed the jury on second degree murder when he was charged only with first degree murder. The magistrate judge recommended denying Parker's petition, finding that any appeal on this ground would have failed. The district court agreed, and denied Parker's petition. Parker subsequently sought leave to amend his habeas petition to include a claim based on an allegedly improper witness identification during Parker's criminal trial. The district court denied Parker's motion, ² finding that this new claim was untimely and could have been included in his previous petitions. Parker now appeals both the denial of his habeas petition and the denial of his motion to amend.

II.

Although he concedes that the second degree depraved-mind murder instruction was proper, Parker argues that his due process right to notice was violated when the state trial court gave the second degree felony murder instruction to the jury, and that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise this due process argument on direct appeal. We disagree.

"[A] claim of ineffective counsel is a mixed question of fact and law which a federal habeas court reviews de novo." Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). "When a [petitioner] alleges his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise an issue on appeal, we examine the merits of the omitted issue. If the omitted issue is without merit, counsel's failure to raise it does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel." United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392-93 (10th Cir.1995) (quotations and citation omitted). Particularly, a habeas petitioner bears the burden of showing that his appellate counsel omitted a "dead-bang winner" issue--"an issue which was obvious from the trial record, and one which would have resulted in a reversal on appeal." Id. at 395 (citation omitted).

Any appeal based on this alleged due process violation would clearly have failed. Oklahoma abides by the "well established principle that a defendant may not complain of error which he has invited, and that reversal cannot be predicated upon such error." Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1259 (Okla.Crim.App.1990); accord Mayes v. State, 887 P.2d 1288, 1311 (Okla.Crim.App.1994) (applying doctrine of invited error); see also Gundy v. United States, 728 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir.1984) ("an appellant may not complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or invited"). Accordingly, "a defendant will not be permitted to request a particular instruction and then contend that the giving of said instruction was error." West v. State, 617 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Okla.Crim.App.1980). Even if the trial court erred in giving the second degree felony murder instruction, Parker invited the error by requesting this instruction at trial. This invited error precludes the reversal of Parker's conviction, as well as the grant of any habeas relief, on the basis of the alleged improper instruction. See United States v. Herrera, 23 F.3d 74, 75-76 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that doctrine of invited error precludes grant of habeas relief to petitioner convicted of unindicted offense where petitioner's counsel requested the instruction on that offense); Wilson v. Lindler, 8 F.3d 173, 175 (4th Cir.1993) (en banc) (per curiam) (same) (adopting reasoning of dissent in Wilson v. Lindler, 995 F.2d 1256, 1265-67 (4th Cir.1993)). Because Parker's trial counsel specifically requested the second degree murder instructions, any appeal based on their alleged impropriety would have been unsuccessful. ³

On appeal, Parker attempts to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim arising from his trial counsel's request for the second degree murder instructions and an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failing to argue on direct appeal that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for requesting the instructions. Careful review of Parker's habeas petition, however, shows that Parker focused solely on the alleged ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel for failing to raise a due process notice argument. Although we construe pro se pleadings liberally, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991), we will not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented. Moreover, Parker has not...