Parker v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 09 December 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action ELH-20-3523
• Citation: Parker v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., Civil Action ELH-20-3523 (D. Md. Dec 09, 2021)
• Parties: SHARISE PARKER, Plaintiff, v. CHILDREN'S NATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

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SHARISE PARKER, Plaintiff,
v.
CHILDREN'S NATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. Defendant.

Civil Action No. ELH-20-3523

United States District Court, D. Maryland

December 9, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLEN L. HOLLANDER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this employment discrimination action, plaintiff Sharise Parker filed suit against her former employer, defendant Children's National Medical Center, Inc. ("CNMC"). ECF 1. In the Amended Complaint (ECF 12), ^[1] Parker alleges that after she disclosed her "high risk" pregnancy to her supervisor, she was subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex, pregnancy, and pregnancy-related disabilities, as well as retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 10-13. Moreover, plaintiff contends that she was terminated following her request for reasonable accommodations. Id. ¶¶ 30-36.

The Amended Complaint contains three counts and seeks both legal and equitable relief. See Id. at 6-9. In Count I, Parker alleges sex discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (the "PDA"). ECF 12, ¶¶ 37-42. In Count II, she alleges discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the "ADA"). ECF 12, ¶¶ 43-45. And in Count III, she alleges sex and disability discrimination, interference with statutory rights, and

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retaliation, in violation of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), Md. Code (2021 Repl. Vol.), § 20-601 et seq. of the State Government Article ("S.G.")• ECF 12, ¶¶ second 43-45.^[2]

CNMC has moved to dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ECF 13. The motion is supported by a memorandum of law. ECF 13-1 (collectively, the "Motion"). Parker opposes the Motion (ECF 16, the "Opposition"), and has submitted several exhibits (ECF 16-1-16-5), including the Charge of Discrimination ("Charge") that she submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). See ECF 16-4 (the "Charge").^[3] CNMC's reply is docketed at ECF 17 (the "Reply") and is accompanied by one exhibit (ECF 17-1).

No hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the Motion in part and deny it in part.

I. Factual Background^[4]

Between September 2018 and February 2019, Parker was employed by CNMC as a "Training Specialist." ECF 12, ¶¶ 3, 5. Her immediate supervisor was Itina Viaud, the "Operations & Process Improvement Manager for Ambulatory Services." Id. ¶ 9.

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Plaintiffs employment at CNMC fell within the company's six-month "introductory period." ECF 12, ¶¶ 16, 27, 28, 35, 36. The introductory period concludes with a "performance evaluation" of the employee, for the purpose of advising the employee of his or her strengths, weaknesses, and the expectations for the position. Id. ¶¶ 35, 36.

In November 2018, Parker learned that she was pregnant, with a due date of July 8, 2019. Id. ¶ 10. Because of Parker's "age and a preexisting medical condition that could cause complications with her pregnancy, the pregnancy was considered 'high risk.'" Id. ¶ 11.^[5] In late November 2018, Parker disclosed her pregnancy to Viaud, her supervisor. Id. ¶ 12.

Thereafter, Parker alleges that Viaud "began treating Ms. Parker differently and less favorably, subjected her to heightened scrutiny and exaggerated criticisms, pressured her to specify when and how much time she planned to take off for the birth of her child, made statements demonstrating pregnancy-based animus and/or bias, [and] denied her informal requests for accommodations she needed as a result of pregnancy-related impairments . . . ." Id. ¶ 13. Parker alleges several specific incidents, which are described below.

In early December 2018, Parker was placed on '"bed rest'" for three days "due to indications that she might be having a miscarriage." Id. ¶ 14. In response, Viaud "expressed concern about having to temporarily redistribute" work that Parker was unable to perform, denied Parker's request to telework, and "required her to use leave during her absence." Id. Initially, Viaud stated that Parker was not allowed to work from home based on the doctor's note Parker provided to Viaud. Id. ¶ 15. But, after Parker responded that the note did not preclude telework, Viaud claimed that telework was not permitted during Parker's introductory period. Id. ¶ 16.

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According to plaintiff, CNMC's written policy as to the introductory period "does not state that employees may not work from home during the introductory period." ECF 12, ¶ 29. Moreover, according to Parker, Viaud had previously permitted Parker to work from home. Id. ¶ 25. In addition, "Viaud allowed other employees who were not affected by pregnancy to work from home." Id. ¶ 26. Parker's Charge specifically mentions JaDonna Harris, a Program Associate, "another Female coworker not affected by pregnancy who reported to Ms. Viaud." ECF 16-4 at 2. And, Viaud "routinely worked from home." ECF 12, ¶ 26.

In mid January 2019, Parker's doctor recommended that Parker work no more than an eight-hour work day. Id. ¶ 17. Parker informed Viaud of the restriction, and Viaud responded that the recommendation "did not matter" because Parker was "'still a salaried employee' and her pregnancy was 'no excuse.'" Id. ¶ 18.

After Parker took a fall on or about February 12, 2019, she made an emergency visit to her doctor. Id. ¶ 19. At around 7:00 a.m. that day, Parker sent Viaud a text message to inform her of what happened. Id. ¶ 20. Later, she contacted Viaud by phone. Id. ¶ 21. The next day, when Parker came to work, Viaud "complained" that Parker had initially texted, rather than called, regarding the situation. Id. ¶ 22.

On or about February 20, 2019, Parker requested that she be allowed to telework, because "the National Weather Service had issued a winter storm warning and she feared another fall might cause her to have a miscarriage." Id. ¶ 23. Viaud denied the request, telling Parker she needed to report to work in person because it was not snowing yet, and because she was still within her introductory period. Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.

In view of what Parker saw as Viaud's "obvious hostility and persistent refusal to accommodate Ms. Parker's informal requests for reasonable accommodations relating to her

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pregnancy," Parker submitted a formal request for reasonable accommodations to CNMC's third-party benefits administrator, The Hartford. ECF 12, ¶ 30. The Complaint does not allege when Parker submitted this request, although she apparently did so before February 22, 2019. On or about that date, The Hartford notified CNMC and Parker that Parker was "eligible to apply for reasonable accommodations under the ADA." Id. ¶ 31. The Hartford gave Parker until March 15, 2019, to submit the necessary paperwork from her doctor. Id. Viaud was also made aware of this information, and knew that Parker had requested leave on March 4, 2019, to see her doctor. Id. ¶¶ 31, 32.

At the end of the day on February 28, 2019, Viaud called Parker to her office and "summarily" informed her that "her employment was terminated effective immediately." Id. ¶ 33. Viaud told Parker the termination was due to her "poor performance based on Ms. Viaud's 'introductory period review.'" Id. ¶ 34. Yet, Viaud did not identify "any particular deficiencies" in Parker's performance, and the end of her six-month introductory period was still one month away. Id. ¶ 36. Parker alleges that Viaud "terminated her within days of learning that she had submitted a formal request for reasonable accommodations related to her pregnancy." Id. ¶ 13.

Viaud filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on August 27, 2019. Id. ¶ 6; ECF 16-4. The EEOC mailed to Parker a "Notice of Rights related to her Charge" on September 1, 2020. ECF 12, ¶ 7. This suit followed on November 12, 2020. See ECF 1.

Additional facts are included, infra.

II. Standard of Review

A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd,

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822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nam., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' . . . ." (citation omitted)); see also Paradise Wire & Cable, 918 F.3d at 317; Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). To be sure, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal...