Parker v. City of Vandalia
| Decision Date | 18 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:18 CV 13 JMB,2:18 CV 13 JMB |
| Parties | WILLIAM PARKER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF VANDALIA, MISSOURI, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Pending before the Court is Defendant Chase Waggoner's ("Waggoner") Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 69) Plaintiffs William Parker ("Parker") and William Jones ("Jones") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed an opposition (ECF No. 84) and Waggoner filed a reply (ECF No. 94). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. All matters are pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge with the consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Based upon a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated, the Court grants Waggoner's motion for summary judgment.
According to the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (ECF No. 41), Plaintiffs were police officers employed by Defendant City of Vandalia, Missouri ("Vandalia"), a fourth-class city located in Audrain County, Missouri. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 22-23) Jones also served asinterim police chief. (Id. at ¶ 23) At the time of the events giving rise to the instant action, Waggoner was the city administrator of Vandalia.2 (Id. at ¶ 5)
Plaintiffs assert claims against Waggoner in Counts IV and VI, and Parker asserts a claim against Wagoner in Count III. In Count III, Parker argues that Waggoner discriminated and retaliated against him based on his national origin, in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). (ECF No. 41, SAC at ¶¶ 132-34) In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege a § 1983 claim, arguing that Waggoner violated their liberty interest and constitutional rights by terminating them, failed to protect their good names, and denied them due process by depriving them a meaningful opportunity to be heard at their termination hearing. (Id. at ¶¶ 139-44). In Count VI, Plaintiffs allege that Waggoner made false and defamatory statements about Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 158-63).
The facts are taken from the SAC, Waggoner's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (ECF No. 71), Plaintiffs' Response thereto and Additional Facts in Dispute (ECF No. 85), and Waggoner's Reply and Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Additional Facts (ECF No. 95). To resolve the motion for summary judgment, the Court has considered only those facts that are material and relevant, and the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the nonmoving parties.
Plaintiffs filed a Response to only one of the twenty-six paragraphs of Waggoner's Statements of Uncontroverted Facts. See ¶ 13.3 Local Rule 4.01(E)4 provides with respect to summary judgment motions:
A memorandum in support of a motion for summary judgment shall have attached a statement of uncontroverted material facts, set forth in a separately numbered paragraph for each fact, indicating whether each fact is established by the record, and, if so, the appropriate citations. Every memorandum in opposition shall include a statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine dispute exists. Those matters in dispute shall be set forth with specific references to portions of the record, where available, upon which the opposing party relies. The opposing party also shall note for all the disputed facts the paragraph number from movant's listing of facts. All matters set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party.
E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(E). As a result of Plaintiffs' failure to submit responses to ¶¶ 1-12 and 14-26, Plaintiffs have not met the requirements of Local Rule 4.01(E), and are deemed to have admitted the facts set forth in those paragraphs in Waggoner's statements of uncontroverted facts. Turner v. Shinseki, 2010 WL 2555114, at *2 (E.D.Mo. June 22,2010)(citing Deichmann v. Boeing Co., 36 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1168 (E.D.Mo. 1999), aff'd 232 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877 (2000).
Plaintiffs have attempted to create a genuine dispute of material facts by supplementing the record with a statement of twelve additional facts in dispute (ECF No. 85), most of those facts are controverted and one is admitted by Waggoner (ECF No. 95). Specifically, Local Rule 4.01(E) requires that the opposing party cite the paragraph number from the movant's listing of facts for all disputed facts. E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(E). Plaintiffs have not cited authority for submitting additional facts as opposition to a summary judgment motion nor has this Court's research found any authority. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor this Court's Local Rules, make any provision for the submission of additional facts by a party opposing a motion for summary judgment. Here, the parties are in general agreement about the critical factual events, differing in how they characterize those events.
The Court will, however, addresses the parties' disagreements as to the Additional Facts in Dispute outlined in Plaintiffs' Response (ECF No. 85). In ¶ 1, Plaintiffs assert that Waggoner knew about the filing of the EEOC complaints based on his comments about persons with Polish heritage. Waggoner's deposition testimony cited in support of this assertion does not support this proffered fact. With respect to ¶¶ 2-5 and 7-8, Plaintiffs purport to summarize documents in the record, including the January 22, 2017, EEOC complaint, the EEOC charge of discrimination received on January 24, 2017, the January 20, 2017, EEOC charge, lack of conciliation process during the administrative proceedings, and Vandalia's response to the charge of discrimination. Plaintiffs' characterization of facts derived from these documents reflects Plaintiffs' subjective interpretation of thedocuments. The Court understands these documents speak for themselves. With respect to ¶ 6,5 the Court finds this fact is immaterial and is ineffective for purposes of establishing a genuine factual dispute. In ¶ 9, Plaintiffs assert that Waggoner spoke to newspaper publications after leaving his employment with Vandalia, and they seek to use his quoted statements to support their defamation claim. The Court finds that, because Plaintiffs failed to plead allegations in their SAC regarding Waggoner allegedly making defamatory statements about them in the April 2, 2017, Hannibal Courier-Post article, Plaintiffs cannot use this factual allegation to establish their defamation claim. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (). In ¶ 10, Plaintiffs assert that "Waggoner still believes the tickets were issued to make the dismissals look suspicious. " (ECF No. 85) Plaintiffs point to Waggoner's deposition in support of this assertion. Waggoner's testimony, however, was not that stark. Rather, when asked to speculate, Waggoner testified that it was "plausible" that the tickets were issued to make any subsequent termination look like retaliation instead of administrative. (ECF No. 85-1 at 78) Accordingly, this factual allegation is not fully supported by the record. With respect to ¶ 11, Waggoner admits that he has no knowledge regarding whether Plaintiffs knew they were being dismissed at the time they issued the tickets. In ¶ 12, Plaintiffs once again assert that Waggoner's employment with Vandalia continued after March 1, 2017, due to his receipt of a four-month severance package. Asoutlined in footnote 3 above, Plaintiffs' allegations in ¶ 12 do not create a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment.
With the foregoing in mind, the Court accepts the following facts as true for purposes of resolving the motion for summary judgment. Waggoner served as the City Administrator for Vandalia from July 25, 2016, to March 1, 2017. (ECF No. 41, SAC at ¶ 5; Exh. A, Depo. of Waggoner at 11, 13-14) Plaintiffs were previously employed by Vandalia as police officers with the Vandalia Police Department.6 (SAC at ¶¶ 42-43) At the time of his termination, Jones was Parker's supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 72)
Parker is of Polish ancestry and heritage, and Waggoner "regularly told Polish jokes on numerous occasions" in front of Parker and other employees. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 25, 58) Parker reported to his supervisors, including Jones, that Waggoner's conduct was offensive, derisive, and unprofessional and created a hostile work environment. (Id. at ¶ 71)
On December 15, 2016, Jones had a meeting with Waggoner and Defendant Mayor Ralph Kuda ("Kuda") to discuss Waggoner's offensive conduct and informed them that Parker had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.7 (Id. at ¶ 72) During that meeting, Jones indicated that he also would be filing an EEOC claim out of fear of retribution by Vandalia, Waggoner, and some other defendants. (Id. at ¶ 72) On December 16, 2017, Waggoner started retaliating againstPlaintiffs by changing their work shifts, denying Plaintiffs pay raises that other officers received, and replacing the locks on their office doors and not giving them the keys. (Id. at ¶ 73)
On January 16, 2017, Waggoner and Defendant Chris Hammann ("Hammann") terminated Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 75-76) On January 23, 2017, the Board of Alderman voted to rescind Plaintiffs' terminations and placed Plaintiffs on administrative suspension pending an investigation. (Id. at ¶ 78)
On January 22, 2017, Parker submitted an EEOC intake questionnaire and complaint via facsimile with Waggoner identified as the person responsible for discriminating against him by giving him no pay raise and terminating him based on race, national origin, and retaliation and in response to "Name and Title of Person(s) Responsible: City Administrator, Chase Waggoner. " (ECF No. 85-2)
On March 1, 2017, Plaintiffs were cleared of any wrongdoing pursuant to...
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