Parker v. Com.

Decision Date21 May 2009
Docket NumberNo. 2006-SC-000102-MR.,2006-SC-000102-MR.
Citation291 S.W.3d 647
PartiesKenneth Wayne PARKER, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice MINTON.
I. INTRODUCTION.

After a jury trial, Kenneth Parker was sentenced to, along with lesser sentences, two terms of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Parker, the alleged leader of the Victory Park Crips gang in Louisville, also known as the Rat Pace, appeals the judgment as a matter of right,1 raising numerous issues. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

The facts underlying Parker's conviction are long, sordid, and difficult to recite chronologically. The indictment against Parker is twenty-eight pages long. So we will outline here only the most basic facts underlying Parker's convictions and present more detailed facts where necessary in our analysis of Parker's individual issues.

A. The Levolia Baker Shooting.

In 1998, Parker and fellow gang members or acquaintances Dominique Coffey and JaJuan Stephenson went looking for Parker's missing sister, who allegedly had been spending time with Levolia "Squirrel" Baker. When Parker and his companions saw Baker, they shot him. Stephenson was charged with the shooting. But Stephenson taped conversations, allegedly with Parker, in which Parker implicated himself in the Baker shooting. Stephenson was acquitted by a jury, and Parker was indicted for the Baker shooting.

B. The Laknogony McCurley Murder.

In July 2000, at an intersection near Jewish Hospital in Louisville, a car carrying four African-American males pulled next to Laknogony McCurley's car. Three members of the Bloods gang, a rival gang to the Victory Park Crips, were in McCurley's car. Gunfire broke out, and McCurley's car was riddled with bullets. McCurley died; one of her passengers, Chicoby Moore, was injured; two other passengers, Kerry Williams and DeLeon "Keoni" Burks, were uninjured. Parker was eventually indicted for McCurley's murder, the attempted murder of Williams and Burks, assault in the second degree as to Moore, and tampering with physical evidence for allegedly disposing of the guns used in the shooting.

C. The Tao Parker Shooting.

Tao Parker is Kenneth Parker's cousin. According to Coffey, Kenneth had an argument with Tao in March 2001 over the fact that Tao owed Kenneth money for drugs. Tao was shot; and, as a result, Kenneth was charged with assault in the first degree and attempted murder.

D. Murder of JaJuan Stephenson.

In April 2001, a masked gunman killed JaJuan Stephenson in broad daylight. According to Dominique Coffey, he lent Parker a gun and a thousand dollars; and Parker gave the gun and the money to Clifford Warfield to kill Stephenson, who had implicated Parker in the Levolia Baker shooting. A witness, Sheldon Wright, identified Warfield as someone he saw fleeing the murder scene. Parker, along with Warfield and Coffey, was ultimately charged with Stephenson's murder.

E. Murder of William Barnes.

In March 2002, a deal had been set up between Coffey and his acquaintance, Rommell Taylor, in which Coffey was to buy cocaine from Taylor. When the deal was to be commenced, Taylor was accompanied by William Barnes. Shots rang out as those three men (Coffey, Taylor, and Barnes), accompanied by a fourth man, walked down an alley. Coffey shot and wounded Taylor; Barnes was shot and killed. Taylor contended that Parker was the fourth man present. Parker, Warfield, and Coffey were charged with murdering and robbing Barnes, and attempting to murder Taylor.

F. Procedural History.

In July 2002, the grand jury issued a twenty-five count indictment against Parker and others named and un-named. The charges against Parker proceeded to a jury trial. The jury convicted Parker of (1) assault in the first degree of Baker, (2) the attempted murder of Burks, (3) the attempted murder of Williams, (4) assault in the second degree of Moore, (5) tampering with physical evidence, (6) the attempted murder of Taylor, (7) robbery in the first degree, (8) conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance, (9) criminal syndication, (10) the murder of Barnes, and (11) the murder of McCurley.

The trial court ultimately sentenced Parker in accordance with the jury's recommendations. The trial court's judgment imposed (1) ten years for assaulting Baker, (2) twenty years each for the attempted murders of Burks and Williams, (3) five years for the assault of Moore, (4) five years for tampering with physical evidence, (5) fifteen years for the attempted murder of Taylor, (6) ten years for the robbery of Barnes, (7) twenty years for conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance, and (8) twenty years for criminal syndication. The trial court ordered all those sentences to be served concurrently, except the robbery sentence, which the trial court ordered to be served consecutively to the other offenses. In total, the effective sentence was for thirty years' imprisonment. Also, the trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Parker to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years each for the murders of Barnes and McCurley.

III. ANALYSIS.

Parker raises a host of issues in this appeal. We shall address each separately, although not in the order he argued them in his brief.

A. The Criminal Syndication Count of the Indictment Did Sufficiently State an Offense.

Parker contends the criminal syndication count of the indictment fails to state an offense. We disagree.

The criminal syndication charge is contained in count one of the indictment. Count one reads in its entirety as follows:

That between the 1st day of January, 1996, and the 17th day of July, 2002, in Jefferson County, Kentucky, the above named defendants, Kenneth Parker, DeShawn Parker, Wilbert Bethel, Marcus Stallard, Clifford Warfield and Dominique Coffey, and others known and unknown, committed the offense of Criminal Syndication by doing one or more of the following: (a) organizing or participating in organizing a criminal syndicate; (b) providing material aid to a criminal syndicate; (c) managing, supervising or directing any of the activities of a criminal syndicate; (d) conspiring or attempting to commit, or acting as an accomplice in the commission of a criminal syndicate; (e) conspiring or attempting to commit or act as an accomplice in the commission of[] any offense of violence.

According to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 506.120(1), there are seven actions a person may take to commit criminal syndication. Specifically, KRS 506.120(1) provides that:

(1) A person, with the purpose to establish or maintain a criminal syndicate or to facilitate any of its activities, shall not do any of the following:

(a) Organize or participate in organizing a criminal syndicate or any of its activities;

(b) Provide material aid to a criminal syndicate or any of its activities, whether such aid is in the form of money or other property, or credit;

(c) Manage, supervise, or direct any of the activities of a criminal syndicate, at any level of responsibility;

(d) Knowingly furnish legal, accounting, or other managerial services to a criminal syndicate;

(e) Commit, or conspire or attempt to commit, or act as an accomplice in the commission of, any offense of a type in which a criminal syndicate engages on a continuing basis;

(f) Commit, or conspire or attempt to commit or act as an accomplice in the commission of, any offense of violence; or

(g) Commit, or conspire or attempt to commit, or act as an accomplice in the commission of bribery in violation of KRS Chapters 518 or 521, or KRS 119.205, 121.025, 121.055, 524.070, 156.465, 45A.340, 63.090, 6.080, 18A.145, or 244.600.

Similarly, a criminal syndicate is defined in KRS 506.120(3) as:

(3) As used in this section "criminal syndicate" means five (5) or more persons collaborating to promote or engage in any of the following on a continuing basis:

(a) Extortion or coercion in violation of KRS 514.080 or 521.020;

(b) Engaging in, promoting, or permitting prostitution or human trafficking in violation of KRS Chapter 529;

(c) Any theft offense as defined in KRS Chapter 514;

(d) Any gambling offense as defined in KRS 411.090, KRS Chapter 528, or Section 226 of the Constitution; (e) Illegal trafficking in controlled substances as prohibited by KRS Chapter 218A, in intoxicating or spirituous liquor as defined in KRS Chapters 242 or 244, or in destructive devices or booby traps as defined in KRS Chapter 237; or

(f) Lending at usurious interest, and enforcing repayment by illegal means in violation of KRS Chapter 360.

Parker acknowledges that our precedent holds that all that is necessary for an indictment properly to charge an offense "is to name the offense."2 And the indictment at issue sufficiently names the offense of criminal syndication. But Parker contends that we should adopt a specificity requirement for criminal syndication charges. Toward that end, Parker contends that a criminal syndication indictment must allege at least one of the seven methods of committing the crime set forth in KRS 506.120(1) and one of the six forbidden activities set forth in KRS 506.120(3). We disagree.

Parker has not cited any specific authority that would move us to except criminal syndication from our general pronouncement that an indictment sufficiently charges an offense simply by naming the offense. Holding in Parker's favor on this issue would be a de facto return to the old Code of Criminal Practice, which our predecessor Court stated "requir[ed]...

To continue reading

Request your trial
83 cases
  • Goncalves v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • August 29, 2013
    ...nevertheless believe that the page limit afforded Goncalves adequate opportunity to address all meritorious issues. See Parker v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 647 (Ky.2009). As for the denial of the motion requesting leave to file pro se supplemental briefing, Goncalves has failed to present an......
  • Peacher v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • February 21, 2013
    ...v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 181 (Ky.1996), or multiple murders and assaults as parts of an ongoing criminal syndicate, Parker v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 647 (Ky.2009). In these cases, the required nexus does not arise simply from the proximity of the alleged crimes in time and space, altho......
  • State v. Thompson
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 19, 2012
    ...State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 355–56 (Iowa 2000); State v. Jones, 287 Kan. 559, 567–68, 197 P.3d 815 (2008); Parker v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 647, 669–70 (Ky.2009), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1293, 175 L.Ed.2d 1084 (2010); State v. Magouirk, 539 So.2d 50, 65 (La.App.1989); ......
  • State v. Thompson
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 19, 2012
    ...State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 355-56 (Iowa 2000); State v. Jones, 287 Kan. 559, 567-68, 197 P.3d 815 (2008); Parker v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 647, 669-70 (Ky. 2009), cert. denied, U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 1293, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1084 (2010); State v. Magouirk, 539 So. 2d 50, 65 (La. App. 1989); C......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • Hearsay
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2015 Contents
    • July 31, 2015
    ...a finding that defendant was motivated, at least in part, by an intention to prevent the victim’s testimony. Parker v. Commonwealth , 291 S.W.3d 647 (Ky. 2009). Under Giles , it is no longer sufficient to show simply that a defendant caused the declarant’s absence from trial. Rather, the fo......
  • Hearsay
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2016 Contents
    • July 31, 2016
    ...a finding that defendant was motivated, at least in part, by an intention to prevent the victim’s testimony. Parker v. Commonwealth , 291 S.W.3d 647 (Ky. 2009). Under Giles , it is no longer sufficient to show simply that a defendant caused the declarant’s absence from trial. Rather, the fo......
  • Hearsay
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2017 Contents
    • July 31, 2017
    ...a inding that defendant was motivated, at least in part, by an intention to prevent the victim’s testimony. Parker v. Commonwealth , 291 S.W.3d 647 (Ky. 2009). Under Giles , it is no longer su൶cient to show simply that a defendant caused the declarant’s absence from trial. Rather, the forfe......
  • Hearsay
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2018 Contents
    • July 31, 2018
    ...a inding that defendant was motivated, at least in part, by an intention to prevent the victim’s testimony. Parker v. Commonwealth , 291 S.W.3d 647 (Ky. 2009). Under Giles , it is no longer su൶cient to show simply that a defendant caused the declarant’s absence from trial. Rather, the forfe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT