Parker v. Dugger

• Decision Date: 19 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-3189,88-3189
• Parties: Robert Lacy PARKER, Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, and Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondents-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1470

876 F.2d 1470

Robert Lacy PARKER, Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Secretary, Florida Department of

Corrections, and Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney

General, State of Florida,

Respondents-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.

No. 88-3189.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 19, 1989.

Henri Cawthon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Mark C. Menser, Tallahassee, Fla., respondents-appellants, cross-appellees.

Robert J. Link, Jacksonville, Fla., for petitioner-appellee, cross-appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT, FAY and VANCE, Circuit Judges.

VANCE, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from the district court's judgment granting Robert Lacy Parker's petition for habeas corpus relief. We reverse.

I. FACTS

This case involves three murders committed in Duval County, Florida on February 6-7, 1982. ¹ Parker, then a drug dealer, was known to have a violent temper and to possess several firearms. The day the murders began, Parker became irritated because many of his customers were not paying their accounts. He decided to reinforce his reputation as a tough dealer and began by throwing a rope over a tree limb and threatening to hang Tommy Groover, one of his distributors, if the debts were not paid. The next day Parker again threatened to kill Groover if he did not recover the money. Taking Parker at his word, Groover set out with Billy Long, another of Parker's acquaintances, to collect some of the debts. They first stopped at a local nightclub. There they found Richard Padgett, who was behind in his drug debts, with his girlfriend, Nancy Sheppard. The two men persuaded Padgett and Sheppard to accompany them to Parker's trailer, where Parker and his ex-wife, Elaine Parker, were waiting.

When the group arrived at the trailer, Parker took Padgett outside for a "discussion." A shot was fired. When the two came back inside, Parker had a pistol in his belt. Sheppard became alarmed and offered her necklace and ring to Parker as payment for Padgett's debt. Parker refused Sheppard's offer; instead, Long drove her home. The rest of the group accompanied Padgett as he tried to collect money to pay his debt. When he was unsuccessful, Padgett was taken to a junkyard owned by Parker's father. At the junkyard, Groover beat Padgett. Thereafter, the group drove to a secluded rural area. The three men exited the car and Padgett fell to his knees and begged for mercy. With Parker's aid, Groover shot Padgett to death and Parker and Groover threw his body in a ditch.

Parker, Groover, and Elaine cleaned up at the junkyard and drove to a bar where they met Jody Dalton, Groover's former girlfriend. Ms. Dalton decided to accompany them. The group first stopped to throw the murder weapon into a river. Dalton witnessed this act. Next, they returned to Parker's trailer and dropped Dalton off while the rest of the group drove to the residence of Joan Bennett. When they returned with Ms. Bennett, Parker became angry because Dalton had used some of his drugs without his permission. Parker and Groover decided to "get rid" of Dalton and drove the entire group to an area known as Donut Lake. There Dalton was stripped, taunted, beaten, and kicked as she begged for mercy. Groover, again with Parker's aid, shot Dalton to death. The two men tied up her body with rope and concrete blocks and threw it into the lake.

During the trip back, Parker and Groover discussed killing Bennett because she had witnessed the Dalton murder. Elaine convinced the two men that Bennett could be trusted and they drove Bennett home. The three concluded, however, that Sheppard could link them to Padgett's murder and decided to kill her. They first found Long, who directed them to Sheppard's home. Elaine then tricked Sheppard into accompanying the group by telling her that Padgett was "high" and wanted to see her.

The group soon arrived at the scene of the Padgett murder. Parker took Long to the ditch and asked him if he knew what was going on. When he replied that he did not, Parker told him that "either you kill Nancy or I will kill you." ² Next, Parker took Sheppard to the ditch. Upon seeing Padgett's body, she fell to the ground and exclaimed "Oh, my God!" Elaine handed Long a pistol and said, "You better do it or he'll kill you too." Long took the pistol and shot Sheppard in the head. Parker and Groover screamed, "Shoot her again, she's still breathing." Long shot her twice more. Parker then cut her throat with a knife and took her necklace and ring.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State of Florida charged Parker by amended indictment with three counts of first degree murder. Count one charged Parker for the murder of Padgett, count two for the murder of Sheppard, and count three for the murder of Dalton. Parker and Groover were tried separately. Parker's trial began on February 28, 1983. Long and Bennett, among others, testified against Parker. Parker also testified, claiming that Groover orchestrated the murders and had threatened to harm Parker's family if he did not cooperate. The jury rejected this version of the facts and on March 9, 1983, found Parker guilty of first degree murder for the deaths of Padgett and Sheppard and third degree murder for the death of Dalton.

During the sentencing phase the state presented evidence of statutory aggravating circumstances, see Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 921.141(5) (West 1985), and Parker presented evidence of both statutory mitigating circumstances, see id. Sec. 921.141(6), and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. The evidence presented by Parker included the testimony of six witnesses (his mother, grandmother, neighbor, cousin, sister, and minister), each testifying to some redeeming qualities in Parker's character.

The jury recommended that Parker receive life sentences for the murders of Padgett and Sheppard. The trial judge overrode the jury's recommendation as to count two, the murder of Sheppard, and sentenced Parker to death. The judge wrote detailed findings as to the statutory mitigating and aggravating circumstances present during the murder. He found no statutory mitigating circumstances ³ and six statutory aggravating circumstances. ⁴

Parker appealed and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Parker v. State, 458 So.2d 750 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088, 105 S.Ct. 1855, 85 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985) [hereinafter Parker I ]. The court held that the trial judge had erred in finding that two of the statutory aggravating circumstances were present. ⁵ The court nevertheless held that the remaining four statutory aggravating circumstances sufficiently outweighed the mitigating circumstances to justify the trial court's decision to override the jury's recommendation. The court specifically held that the trial judge's override complied with the standard announced in Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla.1975), which mandates that a trial judge may override a jury's recommendation of life only when "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Id. at 910, cited in Parker I, 458 So.2d at 754.

Parker thereafter moved under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 to vacate the judgment and sentence. The trial judge denied the motion and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Parker v. State, 491 So.2d 532 (Fla.1986) [hereinafter Parker II ]. Parker then filed a federal habeas petition. The court considered and rejected twelve grounds for relief, ⁶ but granted relief on one ground. Respondents appeal and Parker cross appeals.

III. RESPONDENTS' APPEAL

The district court granted relief on the following ground raised in Parker's habeas petition The Florida Supreme Court has adopted such a broad and vague construction of the Tedder standard of review of jury overrides as to result in the arbitrary, capricious, and disproportionate application of the death penalty.

Respondents contend that the district court erred. We agree.

In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), the Supreme Court exhaustively examined the constitutionality of Florida's override scheme. The Court first examined the constitutionality of schemes in which a trial judge may impose the death penalty alone, without any input from a jury. Id. at 457-65, 104 S.Ct. at 3160-65. After concluding that such schemes are not per se unconstitutional, the Court likewise concluded that schemes in which the trial judge may impose the death penalty after receiving an advisory verdict of life from a jury are not per se unconstitutional. Id. at 465, 104 S.Ct. at 3165.

The Court then examined the particular override scheme used by the State of Florida and concluded that, in general, Florida's scheme is constitutional. The Court was persuaded by two aspects of the scheme that render it unlikely that the Florida courts will impose the death penalty in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. First, several Florida procedural rules, of both statutory and case law origin, constrain trial judges from imposing the death penalty in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Among these significant safeguards is Sec. 921.141(3) of the Florida Statutes, which requires trial judges to independently review the evidence and make detailed written findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing the death penalty. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 466, 104 S.Ct. at 3165. Another significant safeguard accorded capital defendants is the Tedder standard. Id. at 465, 104 S.Ct. at 3165. Second, the meaningful appellate review by the Florida Supreme Court in every capital case further reduces the likelihood that the death penalty will be imposed in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. That court is required by law to review every death sentence to ensure that it has not been imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 466, 104 S.Ct. at 3165 (citing Fla.Stat. Sec. 921.141(4))...