Parker v. Esposito

• Decision Date: 28 June 1996
• Citation: Parker v. Esposito, 291 N.J.Super. 560, 677 A.2d 1159 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996)
• Parties: Christopher PARKER and Elise Parker, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Vincent J. ESPOSITO and Frungillo Food Service, Inc. t/a Frungillo Caterers; Frungillo Caterers, Inc., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 560

291 N.J.Super. 560

677 A.2d 1159

Christopher PARKER and Elise Parker, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.Vincent J. ESPOSITO and Frungillo Food Service, Inc. t/a Frungillo Caterers; Frungillo Caterers, Inc.Defendants-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued June 10, 1996.

Decided June 28, 1996.

John M. Blume, Newark, for appellants(Blume, Vazquez, Goldfaden, Berkowitz & Donnelly, attorneys; Mr. Blume, of counsel; Linda G. O'Connell, on the brief).

Sara A. Friedman, Basking Ridge, for respondents(Minichino & Mautone, attorneys; Anthony R. Mautone, West Orange, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges D'ANNUNZIO, CONLEY and BRAITHWAITE.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

D'ANNUNZIO, J.A.D.

The mirror of defendants' van struck plaintiff, ¹Christopher Parker, while plaintiff was standing at a bus stop.Plaintiff sustained serious injuries and commenced this action for damages.His wife, plaintiffElise Parker, sued for loss of consortium.

Defendants conceded liability.After a trial solely on the issue of damages, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the sums of $1,500,000 for his pain, suffering, disability, and impairment of enjoyment of life, $167,000 for past lost income, and $550,000 for future lost income.The jury awarded no damages to Elise.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court: (1) erred in denying their motion for a new trial or additur regarding the failure of the jury to make any award to Elise for loss of consortium; (2) erred in denying their motion for a new trial or additur regarding the inadequacy of the jury's award for plaintiff's future lost income; (3) misinterpreted and misapplied N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, the collateral source statute; and (4) improperly charged the jury on the manner in which it should treat testimony about plaintiff's receipt of Social Security and disability payments.

[At the request of the Appellate Division, a lengthy discussion of the evidence regarding damages contained in the filed opinion has been omitted from the published opinion.]

Regarding the collateral source statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, the judge granted defendants' request for a credit against future income for the disability benefits plaintiff would be receiving for the next three years and for the Social Security benefits which he was presently receiving.The court ordered that the sum of $133,920, representing $3720 per month from December 1994, through December 1997, that plaintiff was guaranteed from CIGNA Group Insurance, alone or in conjunction with Social Security, be deducted from the $550,000 award, and that the balance, $416,080, be placed into an interest-bearing court account.After December 1997, upon motion by either party, the court would conduct a hearing to determine whether or not plaintiff was entitled to any portion of the $416,080 under the collateral source statute.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court misapplied the collateral source statute.It provides:

In any civil action brought for personal injury or death, except actions brought pursuant to the provisions of P.L. 1972, c. 70 (C.39:6A-1 et seq.), if a plaintiff receives or is entitled to receive benefits for injuries allegedly incurred from any other source other than a joint tortfeasor, the benefits, other than workers' compensation benefits or the proceeds from a life insurance policy, shall be disclosed to the court and the amount thereof which duplicates any benefit contained in the award shall be deducted from any award recovered by the plaintiff, less any premium paid to an insurer directly by the plaintiff or by any member of the plaintiff's family on behalf of the plaintiff for the policy period during which the benefits are payable.Any party to the action shall be permitted to introduce evidence regarding any of the matters described in this act.

[ N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97.]

Our Supreme Court addressed this statute in Kiss v. Jacob, 138 N.J. 278, 650 A.2d 336(1994).There, the Court held that the statute did not apply to the proceeds of a settlement with a defendant determined not to have been a tortfeasor.Id. at 282, 650 A.2d 336.The Court ruled that the statute focused on the types of benefits contemplated by the common-law collateral source rule which the statute eliminated.Those common-law collateral sources included "life- or health-insurance policies, [benefits] from employment contracts, from statutes such as workers' compensation acts and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, from gratuities, from social legislation such as social security and welfare, and from pensions under special retirement acts."Ibid.The Court observed that the statute's legislative history "suggests strongly that the Legislature's essential concern was with insurance-type benefits."Ibid.Moreover, the Court concluded that the Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute was "to control spiralling automobile-insurance costs."Ibid.

We addressed the statute in Thomas v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 282 N.J.Super. 569, 660 A.2d 1236(App.Div.), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 574, 667 A.2d 191(1995)andLusby v. Hitchner, 273 N.J.Super. 578, 642 A.2d 1055(App.Div.1994).In Thomas, this court affirmed the deduction of social security benefits from an award for future loss of income, thereby reducing the award to zero.Id. at 588, 660 A.2d 1236.In Lusby, we held Medicaid benefits may not be deducted because Medicaid had a right of reimbursement required by federal law.

The issue in the present case is whether the statute applies to benefits to be received post-judgment and, if so, when and under what standard is the deduction to be made.To resolve these issues we must apply principles of statutory construction which require a determination of legislative intent.SeeColetti v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 217 N.J.Super. 31, 35, 524 A.2d 1270(App.Div.1987).Sources of legislative intent are the language of a statute, the policy behind a statute, concepts of reasonableness, and legislative history.Shapiro v. Essex County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 177 N.J.Super. 87, 424 A.2d 1203(Law Div.1980), aff'd.183 N.J.Super. 24, 443 A.2d 219(App.Div.1982), aff'd., 91 N.J. 430, 453 A.2d 158(1982).It is a general principle of statutory construction that "statutes are to be read sensibly rather than literally and the controlling legislative intent is to be presumed as 'consonant to reason and good discretion.' "Schierstead v. Brigantine, 29 N.J. 220, 230, 148 A.2d 591(1959)(citations omitted).And "where a literal reading of the statute leads to absurd consequences 'the court must restrain the words' and seek the true legislative intent."Id. at 231, 148 A.2d 591(quotingIn re Merrill, 88 N.J.Eq. 261, 102 A. 400(Prerog.Ct.1917)).In construing a statutewe assume that the Legislature intended a reasonable approach, and the statute should be construed to effect a reasonable approach.Roman v. Sharper, 53 N.J. 338, 341, 250 A.2d 745(1969).

Applying these principles we conclude that the statute requires deduction of benefits to be received by a plaintiff after judgment.The statute by its terms requires deduction of benefits a plaintiff"is entitled to receive."The statute's purpose is to prevent double recovery, thereby giving some relief from the increasing costs of liability insurance.This purpose is furthered by requiring deduction of future benefits.SeeThomas, supra, 282 N.J.Super. at 569, 660 A.2d 1236;accordBuchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist., 73 Ohio St.3d 260, 652 N.E.2d 952, 958, reconsideration denied, 74 Ohio St.3d 1410, 655 N.E.2d 188(1995).

We are persuaded, however, that plaintiff's entitlement to future benefits must be determined and fixed when judgment is entered on the verdict.In the present case, the trial court reduced the award for future loss of income by the amount plaintiff is to receive through December 31, 1997 from his former employer's disability policy.The balance of the...