Parker v. Gerace
| Decision Date | 30 January 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 60203,60203 |
| Parties | Claims of James D. PARKER et al. v. Joseph R. GERACE et al. Claims of Sherman BRUMFIELD et al. v. Joseph R. GERACE et al. Claims of Joseph BAGENT et al. v. Joseph R. GERACE et al. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Louis L. Robein, Jr., Jerry L. Gardner, Jr., Dodd, Barker, Boudreaux, Lamy & Gardner, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-applicants.
James A. Piper, James A. McGraw, Baton Rouge, E. B. Dittmer, II, Talley, Anthony, Hughes & Knight, Bogalusa, for defendants-respondents.
Under the collective bargaining agreement between Locals 189 and 1362 of United Paperworkers International Union and Crown Zellerbach Corporation, plaintiff-relators, who are employees of Crown Zellerbach at its Bogalusa, Louisiana paper mill are paid for certain designated "holidays," notwithstanding they are generally off work on those days.
Shortly before Christmas of 1974 claimants were placed on lay-off status, that is, they were temporarily laid off because of curtailment of production at the mill. They apparently remained out of work for several weeks during which time they applied for unemployment compensation. Under the law they are entitled to that compensation if they meet certain requirements, including that they be "unemployed." The act provides that "Any individual shall be deemed to be 'unemployed' in any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to him . . . ." R.S. 23:1472(19).
During the lay-off period, however, claimants had received holiday pay as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement, for December 24th, 25th and 26th. For each of these three days they received eight hours pay at their respective straight time rates.
Apparently because payment of unemployment compensation claims affects the employer's experience rating and may contribute to precluding a reduction in the company's payroll tax, 1 the company opposed the applications. It contended that applicants had received holiday pay for the 24th, 25th and 26th of December and were thus not entitled to unemployment compensation for the week ending December 28, 1974.
Claimants prevailed, in two of the three cases, before the agency (actually an appeals referee for the Department of Employment Security), lost before the Board of Review, succeeded in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of Washington, and lost again in the Court of Appeal. Parker v. Gerace, 346 So.2d 853 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977).
We granted writs on application of claimants to review that decision of the Court of Appeal, and to consider whether under the appropriate statutes claimants were "unemployed" during the week ending December 28, 1974. 2 349 So.2d 333 (La.1977).
Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1472, briefly alluded to above, defines unemployment and wages as follows:
Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1593 provides in pertinent part:
"An eligible individual who is employed in any week shall be paid with respect to such week a benefit equal to his weekly benefit amount less that part of his wages, if any, payable to him with respect to such week in excess of fifty percent of his current weekly benefit amount."
The Local 189-Crown Zellerbach contract provides:
The Section XIV overtime to which the employee who works on the holiday is additionally entitled is time and a half for each hour worked. The Local 1362 contract has similar provisions to these.
The pertinent inquiry here is whether under the statute claimants were "unemployed" on the days when they had been laid off but received holiday pay. If so, they are entitled to unemployment compensation notwithstanding receipt of holiday pay. If not, any weekly benefit amount to which they would otherwise be entitled must be reduced in accordance with a prescribed formula by wages payable to them with respect to such week. R.S. 23:1593. Thus the definition of unemployment in R.S. 23:1472, its proper construction, and its application to the facts of this case is dispositive of this litigation.
Since wages as defined by R.S. 23:1472(20)(A) means all remuneration for services, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium other than cash, we are inclined to believe that holiday pay, like salary and other fringe benefits (together sometimes referred to as the "wage package"), comprises wages in this broad sense under the statute. That, however, does not end our inquiry. We must further construe the definition of unemployment in R.S. 23:1472(19). It encompasses, as we interpret it, any week during which an individual performs no services and with respect to which such week no remuneration for services performed that week is payable to him.
Admittedly, this construction of the statutory language is not the only reasonable one possible. Defendant contends, and not frivolously, that the language should be construed to mean that the individual is unemployed who performs no services in a given week and receives in that week (or ascribable to that week) no remuneration for services whenever performed.
Because either construction of the statutory language seems equally plausible, we hold that this portion of the statute is ambiguous. The Louisiana Employment Security law is remedial social legislation. It is to be construed liberally and in the interest of the statute's beneficiaries. National Gypsum Company v. Administrator, 313 So.2d 230 (La.1975); Lambert v. Brown, 169 So.2d 4 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1964). For this reason we resolve the ambiguity by construing the statute as contended by the claimants, that is, that to be unemployed there must be no remuneration for services performed that week.
Applying the construction we have chosen, we must determine whether these claimants received remuneration for services which were performed the week ending December 28, 1974. We conclude that the holiday pay was not remuneration for services performed on the holidays or during the week when the holidays fell. Bearing heavily upon our conclusion is the fact that were claimants to have in fact performed services on the prescribed holidays, because scheduled to work or otherwise, they would have received, in addition to the holiday pay, time and one-half pay for each hour worked. It is thus apparent that they received holiday pay not in relation to services performed that day, nor that week, but rather as a fringe benefit of their employment simply by virtue of being a company employee during the contract period and meeting the contract eligibility requirements referred to hereinabove. Their holiday pay was a fringe benefit just like insurance or annuities, retirement, sickness or accident disability, medical and hospitalization expenses which, incidentally, are specifically excluded from wages by R.S. 23:1472(20)(C). 3
The noninclusion of holiday pay in R.S. 23:1472(20)(C) neither helps nor hinders claimants in their legal position. The sole inquiry as we see it is not whether the legislature has said holiday pay is or is not included in wages but rather, in the absence of a legislative expression, whether this Court should construe holiday pay as described in this contract as remuneration for services performed during the week in question.
Defendants argue that the contractual requirements for eligibility for holiday pay indicate the holiday pay is remuneration for the services impliedly stated therein. They point out that, under the relevant contractual provisions, to be eligible for holiday pay an employee must have been on the payroll for thirty days or more and must have worked his scheduled work day immediately before and immediately following the holiday unless absent for a justifiable cause and must have worked on the holiday if scheduled to work unless absent for justifiable cause. They cite Geremia v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 146 Conn. 264, 150 A.2d 203 (1959) in support of the contention that the employee helps maintain continuity of production by working on the day before and the day after the holiday and that such is a condition to receipt of the holiday pay. Of course in this case plaintiffs did not work on the holiday(s) nor on the day before or after the holiday(s). Rather they were absent for apparently justifiable cause (lay-off) and were not paid...
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