Parker v. Jones

• Decision Date: 27 September 1966
• Citation: 423 Pa. 15,223 A.2d 229
• Parties: John PARKER v. Amella JONES, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 229

223 A.2d 229

423 Pa. 15

John PARKER v. Amella JONES, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Sept. 27, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 28, 1966.

Ralph B. D'Iorio, Cramp & D'Iorio, Media, for appellant.

James C. Brennan, Hinkson & Cantlin, Chester, for appellee.

Before MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION

JONES, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County entered in a trespass action wherein the court granted a new trial to John Parker (Parker) subsequent to a jury verdict in favor of Amelia Jones (Mrs. Jones).

Briefly, the factual background of this litigation is as follows: on March 4, 1964, at approximately 11:45 a.m., Mrs. Jones was operating her automobile in an easterly direction on Route 1 in Concord Township, Delaware County; at the point of accident, Route 1--52 feet wide and running generally, east-west--consists of two westbound and two eastbound lanes--each lane being 12 feet wide--separated by a four feet wide medial strip ¹; Parker, a pedestrian was engaged in crossing the highway, at a point between the intersections of Routes 322 and 202 with Route 1, from the northerly to the southerly side of the highway; Parker had successfully negotiated passage over the two westbound lanes and had crossed over the two eastbound lanes to a point approximately a foot from the southerly edge of the highway when he was struck by Mrs. Jones' automobile then traveling in that eastbound lane nearest the southerly edge of the highway.

Parker instituted a trespass action against Mrs. Jones in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County and, after a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Jones and against Parker. On Parker's motion, the court below granted a new trial upon three particular grounds: (1) that the trial court should have submitted to the jury the issue of wanton misconduct on Mrs. Jones' part so that the jury could have considered whether Parker was entitled to recover, regardless of any contributory negligence on his part; (2) that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on the duty of a pedestrian crossing a highway between intersections since, under the instant factual situation, Parker was upon the highway a sufficient period of time for Mrs. Jones to have seen him ²; (3) that additional instructions to the jury were given, in the presence of counsel but in the absence of the court reporter. From the order granting a new trial this appeal was taken.

An examination of this record indicates beyond question that Parker was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. As a pedestrian about to cross this heavily trafficked highway, Parker was under a duty not only to look when he reached the medial strip but To continue to look as he crossed the two eastbound lanes. Parker when he reached the medial strip looked to his right or toward the west--in the direction from which he could anticipate vehicular traffic--and, at that point, saw two automobiles ³ 'a block and a half away' and 'figured (he) had a chance to get across'; Parker then stated that he 'went on as fast as (he) could run; it may not have been so very fast, but (he ran) as hard as (he) could to get on the outline like that'. The testimony further reveals that Parker did not again look to the west until his 'heel was on the white mark', the southern edge of the highway:

'Q. After you started to run from some point near the center, after you saw the two cars coming from your right, you have told us, have you not, that you never looked to your right again?

A. Never looked until just about a half second before this here car hit me, when I made my jump.

Q. And how close were you to the edge of the road then when you looked to your right again?

A. My heel was on the white mark.'

'Q. What I am asking you is, even though you did not see any other cars coming from your right, was the visibility such that you could see further on down the road behind the two cars that were coming toward you?

A. I did not look, I tell you, I did not look. I never looked, not until I got across and put my, this right foot, the left foot I mean, on the white line; and then I looked and here was a car right up on me, and I made my jump and it got me in the right side.

Q. When you stood there for that one-half second somewhere near the white line or the center line, you knew, did you not, that there were two lanes for cars coming from Wilmington towards Media, from your right to your left?

A. That is right.'

Thus, it is clear that Parker traversed approximately 24 feet of the highway without looking in the direction from which traffic would be anticipated or seeking to ascertain the position of the eastbound automobiles.

In Shuman v. Nolfi, 399 Pa. 211, 214, 159 A.2d 716, 719, Mr. Justice Eagen, speaking for this Court, said: 'In the instant case, the plaintiff looked before he started to cross the roadway but it is crystal clear that he did not continue to look as he proceeded to cross the busy thoroughfare. This in itself convicted him of contributory negligence. It was a clear violation of his definite obligation, even if no approaching traffic were visible before he undertook to cross. But, it was even more incumbent upon him to continue to look as a reasonably prudent man interested in his own safety would do, in view of the fact that, before he started to cross, he saw the automobile of the defendant approaching from a comparatively short distance away. His own foolhardiness in blindly jay-walking across a busy street at least contributed to this unfortunate occurrence. This renders recovery impossible under a long line of Pennsylvania authorities.' See also: Sweigert v. Mazer, 410 Pa. 71, 74, 188 A.2d 472; Gatens v. Vrabel, 393 Pa. 155, 159, 142 A.2d 287; Auel v. White, 389 Pa. 208, 213, 132 A.2d 350.

We recognize and adhere to the rule that contributory negligence should not be declared as a matter of law save where such negligence is so clearly revealed that fair and reasonable individuals cannot disagree as to its existence: Sweigert v. Mazer, 410 Pa. 71, 188 A.2d 472. However, a study of the instant record convinces us that Parker's negligence is so obvious and clear as to require that we declare him guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Parker, after stopping at the medial strip and observing two eastbound vehicles approaching, committed himself to crossing this 24 feet of highway without continuing to look to the west to observe the position of these or any other eastbound vehicles. Having failed to...