Parker v. Kijakazi

• Docket Number: 2:21-cv-1972-AC
• Decision Date: 18 September 2023
• Parties: APRIL ANN PARKER, Plaintiff, v. KILILO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

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APRIL ANN PARKER, Plaintiff, v. KILILO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 2:21-cv-1972-AC

United States District Court, E.D. California

September 18, 2023

ORDER

ALLISON CLAIRE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34.^[1] For the reasons that follow the court will DENY plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and GRANT the Commissioner's crossmotion for summary judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 17, 2018, ALJ Timothy Snelling issued a decision finding plaintiff “not disabled” based on a prior application for benefits, which alleged disability beginning on January 30, 2015. AR 282-89. That decision is not at issue in this action. Following the January 17, 2018 denial, plaintiff submitted new applications for disability insurance benefits (Title II, DIB) and for supplemental security income (Title XVI, SSI) on January 24, 2020, alleging disability beginning on January 18, 2018, the day after the prior denial. Administrative Record (“AR”) 386-88, 393-402.^[2] The Title II application was disapproved initially and on reconsideration. AR 265, 299-310. The Title XVI application was approved on May 14, 2020, and is not at issue here. AR 262. On January 13, 2021, ALJ Melissa Hammock presided over the hearing on plaintiff's challenge to the disapproval of her Title II benefits. AR 198229 (transcript). Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified at the hearing. AR 198-99. Vocational Expert Suman Srinivasan also testified. Id.

On February 3, 2021, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding plaintiff “not disabled” under Sections 216(i) and 223(d) of Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d). AR 17-29 (decision), 30-34 (exhibit list). On August 30, 2021, after receiving a Request for Review of Hearing as an additional exhibit, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. AR 1-5 (decision). Plaintiff filed this action on October 23, 2021 challenging the denial of her Title II application. ECF No. 1; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383c(3). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. ECF No. 9. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, based upon the Administrative Record filed by the Commissioner, have been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 13 (plaintiff's summary judgment motion), 14 (Commissioner's summary judgment motion).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in 1961, and accordingly was 59 years old on the alleged disability onset date, making her a “person of advanced age” under the regulations. AR 389; see 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1563(e), 416.963(e) (same). Plaintiff has an eleventh-grade education. AR 423. Plaintiff alleged disability due to chronic lower back pain, chronic neck pain, degenerative disc disease, and right-hand neuropathy pain. AR 422.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Commissioner's decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld “if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.” Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “‘The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . ..'” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” but “may be less than a preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). “It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably drawn from the record' will suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Although this court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the court nonetheless must review the record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Secretary of HHS, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion; it may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”).

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It was error for the district court to affirm the ALJ's credibility decision based on evidence that the ALJ did not discuss”).

The court will not reverse the Commissioner's decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ's error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.'” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stout v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

IV. RELEVANT LAW

Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income are available for every eligible individual who is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E) (DIB), 1381a (SSI). Plaintiff is “disabled” if she is “‘unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . ..'” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) (quoting identically worded provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A)).

The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an applicant is disabled and entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (setting forth the “five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability” under Title II and Title XVI). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b) and 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b).

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled.

Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c) and 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c).

Step three: Does the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d) and 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d).

Step four: Does the claimant's residual functional capacity make him capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f) and 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f).

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g) and 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a) (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or disabled”), 416.912(a) (same); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. However, “[a]t the fifth step of the sequential analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant is not disabled and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5.

V. THE ALJ's DECISION

The ALJ made the following findings:

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on September 30, 2019.

2. [Step 1] The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of January 18, 2018 through her date last insured of September 30, 2019 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

3. [Step 2] Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairment: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. [Step 3 Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).

5. [Preparation for Step 4] After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for six hours, and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. She can occasionally stoop kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps, stairs, ladders ropes, or scaffolds.

6. [Step 4] Through the date last

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