Parker v. Ky. Dep't of Corr.
Decision Date | 07 March 2017 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-00644-TBR |
Parties | JYRONNA PARKER, PETITIONER v. KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jyronna Parker's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [DN 1.] Respondent Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC)1 filed a response. [DN 10.] Parker replied. [DN 12.] The Magistrate Judge filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. [DN 20.] Parker filed objections thereto. [DN 22.] Respondent did not file a response, and this matter is now ripe for adjudication. Having conducted a de novo review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge's report to which Parker objected, the Court ADOPTS IN PART the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the report submitted by the Magistrate Judge. The Court additionally ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Recommendations that both the petition and a certificate of appealability be denied. For the reasons stated herein, Parker's objections are OVERRULED. The Court will enter a separate Order and Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
Jyronna Parker ("Petitioner" or "Parker") was convicted of the intentional murder of George Campbell after a trial by jury in Jefferson County, Kentucky state court in 1997. [DN 1-2at 1-2 ( ).]2 He was sentenced to sixty-five years imprisonment. [Id. at 2.] The facts leading to the prosecution of Parker, as summarized by Supreme Court of Kentucky in its 1999 decision affirming the conviction, are as follows:
[DN 1-2 at 3 ( ).] Parker appealed his 1997 conviction as a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, whichaffirmed the conviction in a ruling issued on June 17, 1999. [Id.] Parker subsequently filed a pro se post-conviction motion to vacate judgment and conviction under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42 ("RCr 11.42") on May 31, 2000. [DN 1-2 at 20 ( ).] Appointed counsel later filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the RCr 11.42 motion on June 1, 2001. [Id.] The trial court denied the RCr 11.42 motion on April 15, 2003. [Id. at 17.] However, upon reconsideration, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on September 23, 2005 and December 6, 2006 to consider a single claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Id.] Approximately five years later, the trial court denied the RCr 11.42 motion on October 25, 2011. [DN 1-2 at 16 ( ).]
Parker appealed the trial court's denial of his RCr 11.42 motion to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court in a decision issued August 23, 2013. [DN 1-2 at 20.] Parker then sought discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' decision, which the Supreme Court of Kentucky denied on August 13, 2014. [DN 1-2 at 28.]
Parker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky on September 22, 2014. [DN 1 at 1.] In his petition, Parker raises four grounds on which he alleges he is being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. [Id. at 5-11.] First, Parker contends that two jury instructions given at his 1997 trial were erroneous thereby denying him "adequate notice, due process, and a fundamentally fair trial" under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id. at 5.] Second, Parker contends his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was not permitted to cross-examine a key prosecution witness regarding whether the witness had motive to testify favorably for the prosecution. [Id. at 7.] Third, Parker contends thathis trial counsel failed to present a defense emphasizing Parker's Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") symptoms, thereby amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. [Id. at 8.] Fourth, Parker contends that his due process rights were violated when a State forensic psychiatrist was prohibited from testifying about her expert opinion that Parker "was suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the fatal shooting." [Id. at 10.]
Parker was released from prison and granted parole on June 1, 2016. [DN 27-2.] Parker's "custody was then transferred to the KDOC, Division of Probation and Parole." [DN 27 at 1.] As a result, this Court granted the Attorney General's Motion to Substitute the Kentucky Department of Corrections as Respondent for Warden Ravonne Sims [DN 27], who was the original respondent in this matter. [DN 28.] Parker's habeas petition remains justiciable by this Court, as the Supreme Court has explained that "[a]n incarcerated convict's (or a parolee's) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction." Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998). The limitations imposed upon Parker by the conditions of his parole therefore satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement in this case.
As discussed below, the Magistrate Judge filed an exhaustive eighty-six page report and recommendation in which he rejected each of Parker's grounds of relief and recommended denial of the petition and the denial of a certificate of appealability. [DN 20.] Parker filed objections. [DN 22.] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court will "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendationsto which objection is made." Upon such review, this Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id.
The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is "to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors of fact." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). "Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996) ("AEDPA") amended the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and applies to all habeas cases filed after April 25, 1996. The petition in this case was filed after that date, and therefore, the amendments to § 2254 are applicable. See Walker v. Smith, 360 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 2004). "The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-404 (2000)). The habeas statute provides:
§ 2254(b)(1). Section 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, states:
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