Parker v. Leaf River Cellulose, LLC
Decision Date | 19 December 2014 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:14cv9–KS–MTP. |
Citation | 73 F.Supp.3d 687 |
Parties | Joseph Edward PARKER, Plaintiff v. LEAF RIVER CELLULOSE, LLC, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Michael R. Martz, Freeland Martz, PLLC, Oxford, MS, for Plaintiff.
William T. Siler, Jr., Gregory Todd Butler, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, Jackson, MS, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant Leaf River Cellulose, LLC's Motion to Dismiss [7]. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion is well taken and should be granted.
On January 23, 2014, Plaintiff Joseph Edward Parker filed suit against Leaf River Cellulose, LLC (“Leaf River”), his former employer, alleging that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of Mississippi law. (See Compl. [1].) The Complaint asserts that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship). Parker seeks, inter alia, attorney's fees, punitive damages, and a judgment in excess of $75,000.00 in relief. The Court is satisfied that the requirements of diversity jurisdiction are met in this case.
The following allegations of the Complaint are pertinent to the subject motion. Leaf River hired Parker in or around October of 2008 to work at its plant in New Augusta, Mississippi. On December 12, 2013, Leaf River received a report that Parker had a handgun in his vehicle that was located in an employee parking lot. Leaf River requested and was granted permission to search Parker's vehicle. Leaf River found a handgun in Parker's vehicle. Immediately following the search of Parker' vehicle, Leaf River “suspended Parker's employment and directed him to leave the premises.” (Compl. [1] at ¶ 12.) On December 13, 2013, Leaf River terminated Parker's employment. Leaf River's termination of Parker violated section 45–9–55 of the Mississippi Code ( ).
Presently before the Court is Leaf River's Motion to Dismiss [7]. Leaf River seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and argues that this lawsuit is barred by subsection (5) of section 45–9–55. The motion has been fully briefed and the Court is ready to rule.
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir.2010) () (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A complaint containing mere “labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements” is insufficient. Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, Miss., 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir.2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although courts are to accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, courts are not required “to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as factual allegation.” Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir.2011) (citations omitted). “[W]hen a successful affirmative defense appears on the face of the pleadings, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be appropriate.” Miller v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 726 F.3d 717, 726 (5th Cir.2013) (quoting Kansa Reins. Co. v. Cong. Mortg. Corp. of Tex., 20 F.3d 1362, 1366 (5th Cir.1994) ); see also 5B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed.) ( ). A court may consider matters of public record in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n. 6 (5th Cir.1994) (citation omitted).
Both Parker's claim and Leaf River's defense hinge on the terms of section 45–955. The statute provides as follows:
Miss.Code Ann. § 45–9–55. The Court has identified only one case referencing this statute. See Swindol v. Aurora Flight Scis. Corp., No. 1:13cv237, 2014 WL 4914089 (N.D.Miss. Sept. 30, 2014). In Swindol, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant wrongfully terminated his employment after a firearm was found in his vehicle on company property. 2014 WL 4914089, at *1. The plaintiff relied upon article 3, section 12 of the Mississippi Constitution1 and section 45–9–55 in arguing that the district court should recognize an exception to Mississippi's well-established employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is terminated for having a firearm in a locked vehicle on his employer's property. Id. at *3. Judge Aycock rejected this argument. “[I]n the face of Mississippi's longstanding reluctance to expand its existing public policy exceptions, the Court cannot say that the Mississippi Supreme Court would recognize a third exception to the doctrine of at-will employment as proposed here.” Id. at *4. Judge Aycock also noted that section 45–9–55 “does not provide for a private right of action....” Id. at *4 n. 3. Section 45–9–55's immunity provision, subsection (5), was not specifically discussed in Swindol.
The Court must apply Mississippi's rules of statutory construction in considering the effect of section 45–9–55 to this action. See Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 387 (5th Cir.2013) (applying Louisiana's rules); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 183 (5th Cir.2000) ( )(citation omitted). The Mississippi Supreme Court has issued the following guidance for a court examining statutory law:
This Court does not “decide what a statute should provide, but [ ] determine[s] what it does provide.” Lawson v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 75 So.3d 1024, 1027 (Miss.2011). “The Court's goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Id. To determine that intent, this Court looks first to the language of the statute. Id. “If the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court applies the plain meaning of the statute and refrains from using principles of statutory construction.” Id. Furthermore, words and phrases contained in a statute are to be given their common and ordinary meaning. Id. at 1028.
Palermo v. LifeLink Found., Inc., 152 So.3d 1099, 1105 (¶ 13) (Miss.2014). The Mississippi Supreme Court often looks to standard and legal dictionaries in determining the common or popular meaning of statutory terms. See Lawson, 75 So.3d at 1028 (¶ 9) (citing cases). In construing a state statute in the absence of explicit state-court guidance, a district court is “to predict state law, not to create or modify it.” Truong, 717 F.3d at 381 (quoting Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311, 316 (5th Cir.2012) ).
Parker's Complaint against Leaf River clearly falls under the purview of section 45–9–55(5). Parker seeks damages exceeding $75,000.00 from Leaf River, a limited liability company, based on its termination of his employment. (See Compl. [1] at pp. 1, 2, 5.) Thus, this is “a civil action for damages” against a “private employer”. Miss.Code Ann. § 45–9–55(5). Parker claims that he was terminated the day after Leaf River found a handgun in his vehicle in an employee parking area and that this termination violated § 45–9–55. (See Compl. [1] at ¶ 10, 14–23.) Consequently, this is also an action “arising out of an occurrence involving the transportation, storage, [or] possession ... of a firearm covered by this section.” Miss.Code Ann. § 45–9–55(5). The Court notes that the terms “arising out of” and “occurrence” are not defined under section 45–9–55. However, the plain and ordinary meanings of these terms are sufficiently expansive to operate in the confines of this dispute. In considering a separate statutory provision, the Mississippi Supreme Court has described the terms “arising out of” as “broadly-construed words of causation” simply calling “for some causal connection” or “rational connection”. Big “2” Engine Rebuilders v. Freeman, 379 So.2d 888, 890–91 (Miss.1980) (Miss.Code Ann. § 71–3–3(b) ) . An “occurrence” is “something that takes...
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Parker v. Leaf River Cellulose, LLC
...suit. See Parker v. Leaf River Cellulose, L.L.C., 621 F.App'x 271, 273-74 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Parker v. Leaf River Cellulose, L.L.C., 73 F.Supp.3d 687, 689-93 (S.D. Miss. 2014). These decisions were reversed by the Fifth Circuit after the Mississippi Supreme Court issued its opini......