Parker v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 October 1924
• Docket Number: 166.
• Citation: Parker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 125 S. E. 6 (N.C. 1924)
• Parties: 188 N.C. 403, 39 A.L.R. 1085 v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. PARKER
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

125 S.E. 6

188 N.C. 403, 39 A.L.R. 1085

PARKER v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.

No. 166.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 22, 1924

Appeal from Superior Court, Craven County; Daniels, Judge.

Action by Elizabeth W. Parker against the New York Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. No error.

Under clause restricting insurer's liability, in event of self-destruction of insured, sane or insane, to return of premiums, accidental killing would not be "self-destruction."

Moore & Dunn, of Newbern, for appellant.

T. D Warren, of Newbern, and J. H. Stringfield, of Atkinson, for appellee.

CLARKSON J.

The action involves collection of $1,000 life insurance policy on the life of Roger L. Parker, husband of the plaintiff, who died January 29, 1923, within a year from the issuance of said policy. The defendant denied liability, and defense set up a provision contained in the policy which reads as follows:

"Self-Destruction.--In the event of self-destruction during the first two insurance years, whether the insured be sane or insane, the insurance under this policy shall be a sum equal to the premiums thereon, which have been paid to and received by the company."

The court submitted the following issue to the jury, which was answered by them in the negative:

"Did the insured, Roger L. Parker, die by his own hand or act with intent to commit suicide?"

The court below charged the jury, in part, as follows:

"It is alleged that R. L. Parker, the insured, died on the 29th of February, 1923; that prior to his death he had paid the premium on this policy of insurance, and that after his death in February, 1923, the plaintiff furnished the defendant with proof of his death. The defendant admits the execution of the policy, the payment of the premium, the death of Roger L. Parker, and the furnishing of proof of his death, but it alleges there was a clause in this policy of insurance as follows: [The court read said clause as above set forth.] So that, gentlemen, the only question presented to you under the pleadings in this case is embraced in the issue which I have submitted, 'Did the insured, Roger L. Parker, die by his own hand or act with intent to commit suicide?' And upon the issue the burden is upon the defendant, the Insurance Company, to satisfy you by the greater weight of the evidence that he shot himself with a pistol with intent to take his own life. It is admitted that he died from the result of a pistol shot, and the sole question for you is whether this evidence satisfies you by its greater weight that he shot himself intentionally. If the evidence satisfied you that he shot himself accidentally, then you would answer the issue 'no.' Unless you are so satisfied, however, by the greater weight of the evidence, the burden being upon the defendant, that he intentionally shot himself and died as a result of the wound inflicted, then your answer to the issue would be 'yes.' The desire for life is so great in all mankind, there is no presumption that a man commits suicide, and the person who alleges that he committed suicide may show by greater weight of the evidence that he intentionally killed himself, and if he does not satisfy the jury by the greater weight of the evidence, then it is the duty of the jury to answer the issue 'no.' "

The defendant tendered the issue: "Did the insured cause or produce his own self-destruction?" The court below refused to submit the issue, and submitted the one set forth in the record. In Thaxton v. Insurance Co., 143 N.C. p. 36, 55 S.E. 419, an issue like the one submitted in the instant case was held not to be error. Hoke, J. (now C.J.), said:

"Again, the charge of the court is urged for error in connection with the second issue, the issue being in form as follows: 'Did the insured die by his own act or hand with intent to commit suicide?' The policy, bearing date June 18, 1904, contains a condition that if the insured, within one year from the issue of the policy, die by his own act or hand, whether sane or insane, the company shall not be liable for any greater sum than the premiums, etc. A condition of this kind is held to be a valid stipulation. Spruill v. Insurance Co., 120 N.C. 140; Vance on Insurance, p. 532. And it is generally held, also, that such a provision, in its terms, refers to suicide and does not include a killing by accident, even although the act of the insured may have been the unintended means of causing death. Vance on Insurance, supra. The issue was therefore properly framed: 'Did he die by his own hand with intent to commit suicide?' It is also accepted doctrine that on such an issue addressed to this question, the presumption is against an act of suicide, and the burden is on the party who seeks to establish it. Am. and Eng. Ency., vol. 1, p. 331; Vance on Insurance, p. 523; Lawson's Law of Presumptive Evidence, p. 241; Spruill v. Insurance Co., supra; Mallory v. Insurance Co., 47 N.Y. 52."

In Baker v. Insurance Co., 168 N.C. 88, 83 S.E. 16, the issue was as in the case at bar:

"The only issue in controversy upon the second trial was the following: 'Did the insured die by his own hand or act with intent to commit suicide?' which was answered in favor of the plaintiff, and the only exceptions seriously debated are to the charge of his honor instructing the jury that the burden was upon the defendant to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the deceased committed suicide, and to the refusal to charge the jury to answer the issue 'Yes' if they believed the evidence. In our opinion, there is no error in either ruling. When an insurance company seeks to avoid payment of a policy on account of suicide, the burden of the issue is on the defendant (Thaxton v. Insurance Co., 143 N.C. 37), and 'the weight of the evidence must be with the party who has the burden of proof, or else he cannot succeed.' Chaffin v. Mfg. Co., 135 N.C. 100. The evidence as to suicide was circumstantial, and while sufficient to justify an answer to the issue in favor of the defendant, it was not conclusive, and the inference of an accidental killing could be accepted."

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