Parker v. Parker
| Decision Date | 10 June 1994 |
| Citation | 640 So.2d 979 |
| Parties | Joyce Faye PARKER v. Otis Mitchell PARKER. AV92000585. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Paul A. Young, Jr., Enterprise, for appellant.
Daniel F. Carmichael, Jr., Enterprise, for appellee.
The parties were divorced by the Circuit Court of Coffee County on December 23, 1991. The judgment of divorce provided:
As the parties attempted to comply with the provisions of the judgment, numerous problems arose, resulting in the filing of several post-divorce motions, including cross-motions for findings of contempt. On January 6, 1993, the court held a hearing on all pending motions. Specifically, so that the clerk's office could disburse monies being held from the sale of the marital home, the court was asked to interpret or clarify the phrase "joint debts" as it was used in the original judgment. On January 15, 1993, the trial court entered an order stating, "During the hearing the court clarified the term [joint debts] to mean that it included all debts incurred by either or both of the parties prior to their separation on April 15, 1991."
The January 15 order also addressed the pending contempt motions:
The wife appeals.
The wife first contends that the trial court did, in fact, improperly modify, rather than clarify, a property provision of the original judgment. The husband argues that, at the request of both parties, the trial court clarified the property provision to allow disbursement of monies being held by the clerk's office. 1
Clearly, a trial court can interpret and clarify its judgment of divorce for purposes of enforcement and implementation. Grayson v. Grayson, 628 So.2d 918 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); Patterson v. Patterson, 518 So.2d 739 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). Here, monies from the sale of the marital home had been deposited with the clerk's office. The parties could not agree as to how certain debts were to be paid under the terms of the judgment. After each party had filed a cross-contempt motion, the trial court heard testimony and arguments of counsel, and it then proceeded to interpret and clarify its judgment to allow implementation. We find no error.
The wife further contends that the trial court erred in holding her in "criminal contempt" for removing certain personal property from the marital residence, claiming that the husband did not have standing to assert contempt because the residence had been sold and the husband then rented the residence from a...
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