Parker v. Rampton
| Decision Date | 17 May 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 12494,12494 |
| Citation | 28 Utah 2d 36,497 P.2d 848 |
| Parties | d 36 Susan H. PARKER et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Honorable Calvin L. RAMPTON, Governor of the State of Utah, and Honorable Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General of the State of Utah, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., G. Blaine Davis, Verl R. Topham, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
David S. Dolowitz, Salt Lake County Bar Legal Services, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
Plaintiffs allege: that each is the parent of two children; that each has sought sterilization from their physicians, who have refused because of forebodings as to the effect of Sec. 64--10--12, U.C.A.1953. They seek an adjudication declaring that this section does not apply to them, but prohibits sterilization only as to persons whom we refer to herein as the 'class of defectives.' The subject is dealt with in Chapter 10, Title 64, U.C.A.1953, which provides for procedures to be followed by officials of certain state institutions for the sterilization of persons who are inmates therein or are afflicted with certain named defects.
That chapter commences:
64--10--1. Authorization in general--. . . Whenever the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital, or of the Utah State Training School, or of the State Industrial School, or the warden of the state prison, shall be of the opinion that it is for the best interests of the inmates or of society that any inmate . . . or of any person adjudged to be insane, an idiot, an imbecile, feebleminded, or epileptic shall be sexually sterilized, such superintendent or warden is authorized to cause to be performed by some capable surgeon the operation of sterilization or asexualization on any such inmate or person . . . provided, that such superintendent or warden shall have first complied with the requirements of this chapter. . . .
The statute referred to, Sec. 64--10--12, upon which adjudication is sought provides:
Unlawful destruction of power to procreate, a felony.--Except as authorized by this chapter, every person who performs, encourages, assists in or otherwise promotes the performance of any of the operations described in this chapter for the purpose of destroying the power to procreate the human species, unless the same shall be a medical necessity, is guilty of a felony.
After having made appropriate findings the trial court stated in its conclusions of law:
That the legislative history and codification of the Sterilization Act, Chapter 10 of Title 64, Utah Code Annotated 1953, requires that Section 64-- 10--12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, be construed to apply only to institutionalized persons and said statute does not prohibit a person who is not institutionalized (i.e., anyone eise) from voluntarily undergoing an operation for the purpose of being sterilized, that is, destroying the power to procreate.
And as part of the decree:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
* * *
* * *
That the (named defendants) . . . and all other law enforcement officers of the state of Utah, should be and are hereby enjoined from enforcing the provisions of Sec. 64--10--12, U.C.A.1953, except as said statute is applied to state institutions and the inmates and patients therein.
In connection with the problem which arises in analyzing this statute there is to be kept in mind the principle, essential to a free society, that each individual should be free to choose his own course of conduct, and to take the consequences thereof, except only as restricted by law. 1 This should be especially true of matters relating to one's own person. It is recognized of course that in various phases of conduct, which may interfere with others, or conflict with the interests of society generally, there must be some restrictions. But such regulations and restrictions are for the legislature to determine; 2 and they should be set forth in the statutory law with sufficient certainty and clarity that persons of ordinary intelligence who desire to obey the law can understand what the requirements are in order to conduct themselves in conformity with it. 3 Correlated to the foregoing is the proposition that if there is any doubt or uncertainty as to any such restriction by law, its origin, history and purpose can be examined to determine its correct interpretation and application. 4
The statutes with which we are concerned, Chapter 10 of Title 64 referred to above, are the only provisions in our law relating to sterilization. The original enactment was Chapter 82, S.L.U.1925, and was entitled:
An Act to prevent the procreation of habitual sexual criminals, idiots, epileptics, imbeciles and insane and providing penalties for the violation thereof.
We think it unnecessary to set forth in detail the entire act, but an examination of the original act and all subsequent amendments, now comprising fourteen sections, 64--10--1 to 14, inclusive, U.C.A.1953, reveals that they deal only with the matter of sterilization of inmates of state institutions or those who are 'adjudged to be insane, an idiot, an imbecile, feeble-minded, or epileptic,' whom we refer to herein as the 'class of defectives,' and nothing is said in those statutes which refers expressly to sterilization of anyone else. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the language of Section 12, under scrutiny here, is intended to mean that the 'operations described in this chapter,' that is, sterilization operations upon the 'class of defectives' dealt with therein, must be done 'as authorized by this chapter'; and that it is the failure to comply with the requirements of that chapter, by giving notice, having a hearing, and making a determination of the facts by the board of each institution, that is proscribed as a felony:
There is another aspect of said Chapter 10 which has a bearing on the problem we are concerned with. The section following Section 12, which is the point of focus in this case, states in part:
64--10--13. Word 'person' defined--. . . The word 'person' when used in this chapter shall mean any individual adjudged by a district court to be insane, an idiot, an imbecile, feeble-minded, or epileptic. . . .
Setting forth the restrictive definition of the word 'person' as used in that chapter emphasizes that it is concerned only with the 'class of defectives' enumerated therein. If any idea is projected of giving the word 'person' a broader meaning than the restrictive one just quoted, that would result in such uncertainty and confusion as to make the statute unenforceable. 5
For the reasons stated: that the statute here under scrutiny, Sec. 64--10--12 is directed only to the subject of sterilization of the 'class of defectives' described in Sec. 64--10--1, U.C.A.1953, and the fact that there is no other statute which deals with sterilization, it is our opinion that our law places no restriction upon the right of individuals to have such a sterilization operation if they do desire.
With respect to the issue presented in the dissent: whether there exists a justiciable controversy between the parties, we do not see this action as an effort to obtain an 'advisory opinion in a nonadversary action' in which 'the plaintiffs do not assert that they might be prosecuted under Sec. 64--10--12.'
The affidavit of each plaintiff states:
That I desire to undergo a sterilization operation . . .
That I have been advised . . . that if I do obtain a sterilization operation, I may be guilty of . . . felony . . .
Plaintiffs each state that they have applied to their physicians, each of whom has refused to perform the sterilization because of his fear that he might be guilty of a felony if he did so, as advised by attorney John Snow, counsel for the Utah Medical Association. The plaintiffs' affidavits are uncontradicted. Thus the genuineness of the fear of themselves and their physicians that they might render themselves subject to prosecution stands uncontested; and that is the basis upon which the issue was presented to and decided by the trial court. 6
The matter of justiciability was dealt with in Mayers v. Bronson. 7 The petitioner Mayers had been ordered to show cause in the district court concerning the production of documents and records in a tax controversy. He challenged the authority of the court and its power to punish for contempt in such a proceeding. As against a petition for a writ of prohibition the issue was raised that no justiciable controversy had ripened, and that the right to appeal would be an adequate remedy. This court entertained the writ and through Justice Wolfe pointed out that:
. . . the difficulty in that situation is that the petitioner would be required to let the proceeding against him go on to such a point, where if he appealed and lost he would have to submit to sentence. He would try out his right at the peril of confinement. The petitioner is not required to put himself in such position. It is not the case of having to submit to ordinary judgment . . . But where the matter involves a restraint of personal liberty the case is different. It cannot there be said . . . that he then has an adequate remedy by appeal. . . . To require him to test out his rights on such gamble does not furnish a plain or adequate remedy at law. But if . . . he sues out a writ of prohibition and is found to be wrong, he may still purge himself by compliance. . . .
As to declaratory judgment, the very purpose of that statute was to provide a means for securing an adjudication without the necessity of someone having to suffer damage or get into serious difficulty before he could seek to have his rights determined in court. 8 The subject is admirably treated by Professor Edwin Borchard in an article on 'Challenging Penal Statutes by Declaratory Action' in 52 Yale Law Journal, 445. He points out that the basis of such action is created by the restriction...
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