Parker v. Randolph

Decision Date29 May 1979
Docket NumberNo. 78-99,78-99
Citation99 S.Ct. 2132,442 U.S. 62,60 L.Ed.2d 713
PartiesHarry PARKER, Petitioner, v. James RANDOLPH et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

Respondents were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee court, of murder committed during the commission of a robbery. None of the respondents took the witness stand, and their oral confessions, found by the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, were admitted into evidence through police officers' testimony. Respondent Pickens' written confession was also admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be used only against the defendant who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt. Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the convictions, holding that admission of respondents' confessions did not violate the rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, which held that a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission, at a joint trial, of the confession of a codefendant who did not take the stand. Respondents subsequently obtained writs of habeas corpus in a Federal District Court, which held that respondents' rights under Bruton had been violated and that introduction of respondent Pickens' written confession had violated his rights under Miranda. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held : The judgment is affirmed as to respondent Pickens and reversed as to the other respondents. Pp. 69-77;77-81 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.); (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.).

6th Cir., 575 F.2d 1178, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III, concluding that since the grant of certiorari was limited to the Bruton issue, the Court had no occasion to pass on the merits of the ruling that respondent Pickens' rights under Miranda had been violated. P. 76-77.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice WHITE, concluded, in Part II, that admission of respondents' confessions with proper limiting jury instructions did not infringe respondents' right of confrontation secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 69-76.

(a) In Bruton, introduction at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant's confession had a "devastating" effect on the nonconfessing defendant's case. Introduction of such incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, have the same "devastating" consequences to a defendant who has himself confessed. The constitutional right of cross-examination protected by Bruton has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence. Pp.72-73.

(b) Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized in Bruton to render the incriminating statements of codefendants "inevitably suspect," require application of the Bruton rule when the incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame onto himself. P.73.

(c) The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only against its source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant's confrontation right. Pp.73-74.

(d) When the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, as here, the possible prejudice resulting from the jury's failure to follow the trial court's instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defendant as to require departure from the general rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions. P.74-75.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN would not find the rule of Bruton to be inapplicable simply because interlocking confessions are involved. Rather, even where the confessions of nontestifying codefendants overlap to some degree, he would follow the analysis indicated by Bruton and then determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On the facts of this case, he concludes that any error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pp. 77-81.

Michael E. Terry, Nashville, Tenn., for petitioner.

Walter L. Evans, Memphis, Tenn., for respondents.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court (Parts I and III) together with an opinion (Part II), in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice WHITE joined, and announced the judgment of the Court.

In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), this Court reversed the robbery conviction of a defendant who had been implicated in the crime by his codefendant's extrajudicial confession. Because the codefendant had not taken the stand at the joint trial and thus could not be cross-examined, the Court held that admission of the codefendant's confession had deprived the defendant of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The issue before us in this case is whetherBruton requires reversal of a defendant's conviction when the defendant himself has confessed and his confession "interlocks" with and supports the confession of his codefendant. We hold that it does not.

I

Respondents were convicted of murder committed during the commission of a robbery and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The cast of characters playing out the scenes that led up to the fatal shooting could have come from the pen of Bret Harte.1 The story began in June 1970, when one William Douglas, a professional gambler from Las Vegas, Nev., arrived in Memphis, Tenn., calling himself Ray Blaylock and carrying a gun and a deck of cards. It ended on the evening of July 6, 1970, when Douglas was shot and killed in a Memphis apartment.

Testimony at the trial in the Tennessee state court showed that one Woppy Gaddy, who was promised a cut of Douglas' take, arranged a game of chance between Douglas and Robert Wood, a sometime Memphis gambler. Unwilling to trust the outcome of the contest entirely to luck or skill, Douglas marked the cards, and by game's end Robert Wood and his money had been separated. A second encounter between the two men yielded similar results, and Wood grew suspicious of Douglas' good fortune. In order to determine whether and how Douglas was cheating, Wood brought to the third game an acquaintance named Tommy Thomas, who had a reputation of being a "pretty good poker player." Unknown to Wood, however, Thomas' father and Douglas had been close friends; Thomas, predictably, threw in his lot with Douglas, purposefully lost some $1,000, and reported to Wood that the game was clean. Wood nonetheless left the third game convinced that he was being cheated and intent on recouping his now considerable losses. He explained the situation to his brother, Joe E. Wood, and the two men decided to relieve Douglas of his ill-gotten gains by staging a robbery of the upcoming fourth game.

At this juncture respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton entered the picture. To carry out the staged robbery, Joe Wood enlisted respondent Hamilton, who was one of his employees, and the latter in turn associated respondents Randolph and Pickens. Douglas and Robert Wood sat down to the fourth and final contest on the evening of July 6, 1970. Joe Wood and Thomas were present in the room as spectators. During the course of the game, Douglas armed himself with a .38-caliber pistol and an automatic shotgun; in response to this unexpected development Joe Wood pulled a derringer pistol on Douglas and Thomas, gave the gun to Robert Wood, and left to tell respondents to move in on the game. Before respondents arrived, however, Douglas reached for his pistol and was shot and killed by Robert Wood. Moments later, respondents and Joe Wood broke down the apartment door, Robert Wood gathered up the cash left on the table, and the gang of five fled into the night. Respondents were subsequently apprehended by the police and confessed to their involvement in the crime.

Respondents and the Wood brothers were jointly tried and convicted of murder during the commission of a robbery. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2402 (1975).2 Each defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. Robert Wood took the stand at trial, admitting that he had killed Douglas, but claiming that the shooting was in self-defense. Thomas described Douglas' method of cheating at cards and admitted his complicity in the fraud on Robert Wood. He also testified in substance that he was present in the room when Joe Wood produced the derringer and when Robert Wood shot and killed Douglas.

None of the respondents took the stand. Thomas could not positively identify any of them, and although Robert Wood named Hamilton as one of the three men involved in the staged robbery, he did not clearly identify Randolph and Pickens as the other two. The State's case against respondents thus rested primarily on their oral confessions, found by the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, which were admitted into evidence through the testimony of several officers of the Memphis Police Department.3 A written confession signed by Pickens was also admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be used only against the defendant who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed respondents' convictions, holding that the...

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2 books & journal articles
  • § 8.06 Effectiveness of Limiting Instructions
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (2018) Title Chapter 8 Limited Admissibility
    • Invalid date
    ...can even backfire, making the forbidden use more influential than had no instruction been given."51 --------Notes:[46] Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979).[47] Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring). Another example is Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96......
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    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (CAP) Title Chapter 8 Limited Admissibility
    • Invalid date
    ...not surprisingly, most studies on the topic question the effectiveness of limiting instructions.49--------Notes:[45] Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979).[46] Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring). Another example is Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (......

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