Parker v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 20 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-13292.,02-13292.
• Citation: 331 F.3d 764
• Parties: Norman PARKER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

331 F.3d 764

Norman PARKER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-13292.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 20, 2003.

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Julie D. Naylor (Court-Appointed), Billy H. Nolas (Court-Appointed), Litigation Director/LEADA, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Sandra Sue Jaggard, Miami, FL, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before ANDERSON, BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

Norman Parker, a state prisoner convicted of murder and sentenced to death, appeals the District Court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On appeal, Parker only raises two claims: (1) the constitutional deficiency of the jury instruction on felony murder; and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at capital sentencing. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1967, Parker was sentenced to life imprisonment for a first-degree murder committed in Dade County, Florida. In February 1978, Parker escaped from prison and committed two additional murders, one in Miami on July 18, 1978, and another in Washington D.C. in August 1978.¹ The following facts are taken from the Florida Supreme Court's opinion, on direct appeal, affirming Parker's conviction and sentence for the Miami murder:

The evidence at trial established that on July 18, 1978, defendant [Parker] and his partner Manson, were admitted to a Miami home in order to complete an illegal drug transaction with two male occupants of the home. Soon thereafter, defendant and Manson produced a sawed-off shotgun and a chrome-plated revolver, respectively, and demanded cocaine and money from the two victims. The two victims were forced to surrender jewelry, strip naked, and lie on a bed. Two other occupants, a female and her boyfriend (Chavez), were discovered in another room and also forced to strip naked and surrender jewelry. All four victims were then confined in the same room, on the same bed. Defendant and Manson exchanged weapons and defendant guarded the four victims while Manson searched the home for additional loot. Defendant threatened to kill the victims because he said he had escaped from jail and had nothing to lose. The victims pleaded with defendant and Manson to take what they wanted and leave. Chavez also pleaded with defendant and Manson to leave his girlfriend alone. After a period of time, defendant aimed the revolver at Chavez's back, whereupon Manson handed defendant a pillow. The other three victims heard the muffled shot and nothing further from Chavez. Chavez died from a single gunshot wound to the chest. Defendant then committed a sexual battery on the female. Defendant and Manson fled, but were later identified by the surviving victims from a photographic lineup.

On August 24, 1978, defendant shot a man in a Washington, D.C., bar. A bullet from this victim's body was matched with the bullet taken from Chavez's body. Jewelry found in possession of the defendant in D.C. was similar to jewelry taken form the Miami victims. Defendant testified that he had been in D.C. during the summer of 1978, including the day that the Miami murder was committed. Four other defense witnesses testified by deposition that defendant was in D.C. during the summer of 1978 but, on cross examination, were unable to swear defendant was in D.C. during the period, July 17-19, 1978.

Parker v. State, 456 So.2d 436, 439-440 (Fla. 1984) (Parker 1).

In the trial for the Miami murder, the jury found Parker guilty of first-degree murder, four counts of armed robbery, one count of sexual battery, possession of a weapon during a criminal offense, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The jury recommended the death sentence by a vote of 10-2, and the trial judge imposed the sentence after finding five aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. On September 6, 1984, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See id. On February 27, 1989, the Florida Supreme Court denied Parker's petition for habeas corpus relief. Parker v. Dugger, 537 So.2d 969 (Fla.1988) (Parker 2). The state Circuit Court denied Parker's Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief, Florida v. Parker, No. 78-11151-A (Fla.Cir.Ct. Nov 28, 1998), and on February 5, 1993, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed that decision on appeal, Parker v. State, 611 So.2d 1224 (Fla.1992) (Parker 3). Parker filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of Florida, which the District Court denied on January 25, 2002. Parker v. Moore, No. 97-1191 (S.D.Fla. January 25, 2002) (Parker 4).² This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo. In this case, both this Court and the District Court are constrained by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Section 2254, as amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), establishes a highly deferential standard for reviewing state court judgments. See Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002). AEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas `retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1849, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002).

Under § 2254(d) a federal habeas court can grant relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only where the adjudication in state court "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We have previously explained the difference between the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses in § 2254(d)(1):

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if either (1) the state court applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) when faced with materially indistinguishable facts, the state court arrived at a result different from that reached in a Supreme Court case. A state court conducts an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case.

Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir.2001); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

Moreover, § 2254(e)(1) "provides for a highly deferential standard of review for factual determinations made by a state court." Robinson, 300 F.3d at 1342. Section 2254(e)(1) states, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Felony Murder

Parker first claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court gave a constitutionally-deficient jury instruction on first-degree felony murder. During Parker's prosecution, the State pursued two theories supporting a first-degree murder conviction: premeditated murder and felony murder. From the record, it appears that the trial court's oral instructions on first-degree murder failed to instruct the jury on the elements of felony murder. The trial court read the following first-degree murder instructions to the jury:

I now instruct you on the circumstances that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before Norman Parker, Jr., can be found guilty of first degree murder or any lesser included crime.

There are two methods of proving first degree murder. The first method is premeditated murder. Murder, first degree. Before you can find the defendant guilty of first degree murder by premeditation, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

[1] Julio Ceazar Chavez is dead.

[2] The death was caused by the criminal act or agency of the defendant.

[3] There was a premeditated killing of Julio Ceazar Chavez.

"Killing with premeditation" is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing. The law does not fix the exact period of time that must pass between the formation of the premeditated intent to kill and the killing. The period of time must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant.

The question of premeditation is a question of fact to be determined by you from the evidence. It will be sufficient proof of premeditation if the circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the accused convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of premeditation at the time of the killing.

The second method of proving first degree murder is by the felony murder rule.

The trial court gave no further oral instruction to the jury regarding first-degree felony murder.

The trial court next orally instructed the jury on the elements of second-degree murder, and then gave an oral instruction on third-degree felony murder. The third-degree felony murder instructions were as follows:

Before you can find the defendant guilty of third degree murder, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

[1] Julio Ceazar Chavez is dead.

[2] The death occurred as a consequence of and while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit a felony, other than any arson,...