Parker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Civ. No. H 78-366.
| Decision Date | 19 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. H 78-366. |
| Citation | 713 F. Supp. 277 |
| Parties | Rithie PARKER, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Sidney Krieger, Skokie, Ill., for plaintiff.
Asst. U.S. Atty., Hammond, Ind., for defendant.
Plaintiff-claimant, Rithie Parker, and defendant, Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary") have both filed Motions for Summary Judgment with supporting briefs. This action was brought pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary denying plaintiff's claim for widow's insurance benefits under Section 202(e) and 223 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), 423.
Plaintiff Rithie Parker married George Parker on February 13, 1970 in Lake County, Indiana. After their marriage, the Parkers lived at 1320 East Sixth Avenue, Gary, Indiana.
Several months after their wedding, plaintiff and her husband separated. Plaintiff continued to live at 1320 East Sixth Avenue. On July 2, 1970, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Separation of Bed and Board in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Indiana. On July 28, 1970, the Circuit Court entered an order granting plaintiff the sole occupancy of the house located at 1320 East Sixth Avenue.
On May 25, 1973, George Parker, unbeknownst to plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Divorce in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Indiana. In conjunction with the divorce complaint, Mr. Parker submitted an "Affidavit of Non-Residence of Defendant" in which he swore that his wife was not a resident of the State of Indiana and that her residence was not known and could not be ascertained upon diligent search and inquiry. Plaintiff had never moved from the marital residence. The affidavit, however, was enough to give the court jurisdiction to issue the divorce decree and also resulted in service by publication rather than personal service, pursuant to TR 4.13 of the Indiana Rules. Plaintiff did not show up for the divorce hearing and a default judgment was entered against her. On April 9, 1974, plaintiff instituted a motion to set aside the divorce decree. While this motion was pending, George Parker died, and the motion was consequently dismissed by the Circuit Court as moot. On May 19, 1975, plaintiff applied for widow's benefits with the Social Security Administration which set in motion the procedural history of this case.
Plaintiff applied for widow's benefits on May 19, 1975. The Secretary denied her application initially and on reconsideration, finding plaintiff did not fall within the statutory definition of "widow." The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), before whom plaintiff, her attorney and witness appeared, considered the case de novo, and on June 23, 1978, found that plaintiff was not eligible for widow's benefits. The ALJ's decision became the Secretary's final decision when the Appeals Council affirmed it on July 21, 1978. Plaintiff then sought judicial review in this court. Judge Kanne subsequently ruled on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on November 23, 1983. Plaintiff's and defendant's motions for summary judgment were both denied and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the order. The Appeals Council, on remand, found that plaintiff did not qualify for widow's benefits. This case is now once again before this court on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.
In the original administrative proceedings, the arguments on both sides came down to one issue: was the divorce decree, which was obviously fraudulently obtained, void or voidable under Indiana law?
Judge Kanne made it very clear in his Memorandum and Order of November 22, 1983 that the court agreed with both parties' arguments. That is, if the divorce decree was voidable, as the Secretary argued, then plaintiff would not be entitled to benefits because she did not meet the definitional requirement of "widow." On the other hand, if the divorce decree was void, as plaintiff argued, then she would meet the definitional requirement and would be entitled to benefits. Judge Kanne declined, however, to decide whether the decree was "void" or "voidable" because he determined that that issue should be decided by the state court. Plaintiff, for reasons unknown to this court, either chose not to reopen her case at the state level, or made an unsuccessful attempt to do so. Nor did she proffer any other evidence on remand to prove her status. Plaintiff, through her counsel, indicated to the Appeals Council that no additional evidence would be forthcoming and restated her position that the divorce decree was void rather than voidable under Indiana law. The Appeals Council found that under Indiana law the divorce decree was voidable and therefore not subject to collateral attack. The Secretary, in determining whether plaintiff was entitled to widow's benefits therefore was found to have properly relied on the validity of the divorce decree.
This court is very disturbed by the way the remand in this case was handled by plaintiff. It basically appears to have been a waste of time as plaintiff did not produce any new evidence. Nor was the state court case reopened, which is extremely difficult for this court to understand, as such action could very well have resulted in a declaration that the divorce decree was void, which in turn, as Judge Kanne pointed out, would have resulted in a determination that plaintiff was entitled to widow's benefits. Granted, Judge Kanne did not order that the state court case be reopened but his "suggestion" was more than casual commentary. His intention that the void/voidable issue be decided by the state court is unmistakably clear:
Instead of taking Judge Kanne's excellent suggestion and reopening the state court case, plaintiff apparently did nothing. It is possible that she tried to reopen the case and was unsuccessful in doing so, but there is no indication of this in the record. She did not attempt to provide additional evidence to support her position. She merely reasserted her claim that the decree was void. As a result, the Appeals Council, on remand, had no more evidence to consider than it had the first time around. Now, back in this court, plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on the basis of the same argument and has done nothing more than cite two additional cases which she believes support her position. This court must now decide the void/voidable issue with basically the same evidence which was available before the remand.
Procedurally, the court considers this case on cross-motions for summary judgment, each supported by a memorandum. All essential questions having been fully briefed by the parties, the matter is ripe for a decision.
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P. 56); accord Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wausau Paper Mills Co., 818 F.2d 591, 593 (7th Cir.1987). A material question of fact is a question which will be outcome-determinative of an issue in that case. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Big O Warehouse, 741 F.2d 160, 163 (7th Cir.1984).
Recently the Supreme Court of the United States took the opportunity to address Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. In two cases decided on the same day, the Court has expanded the scope of the application of Rule 56. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56.
After Celotex it is clear that a non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings to avoid summary judgment. 106 S.Ct. at 2554. See also Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33 (D.C.Cir.1987). The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate "`with or without supporting affidavits'" the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Rule 56). Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine material...
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Parker v. Sullivan, 89-2342
...which again affirmed, agreeing with the agency that since the decree was voidable rather than void, it was valid until set aside. 713 F.Supp. 277 (N.D.Ind.1989). At argument the Administration repeated the district court's earlier suggestion that Mrs. Parker try to reopen the seventeen-year......