Parker v. Slosberg

• Decision Date: 29 October 2002
• Docket Number: (AC 21936)
• Citation: 808 A.2d 351,73 Conn. App. 254
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: MADOLYN PARKER v. PAUL SLOSBERG, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF MILTON O. SLOSBERG), ET AL.

73 Conn. App. 254

808 A.2d 351

MADOLYN PARKER v. PAUL SLOSBERG, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF MILTON O. SLOSBERG), ET AL.

(AC 21936)

Appellate Court of Connecticut

Argued June 12, 2002

Officially released October 29, 2002

Schaller, Mihalakos and Dupont, Js. Renee Marie Houle, for the appellants (defendants).

Peter J. Bartinik, Jr., for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).

Opinion

MIHALAKOS, J.

In this breach of contract action, the defendant, Paul Slosberg,¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, which awarded a sum of $97,459.51 to the plaintiff.² The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied three separate motions in limine, (2) permitted the jury to decide the issue of whether the corpus of a cash management account, which is at the center of this appeal, was a gift, (3) denied his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and (4) denied his motion to reduce the verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found from clear and satisfactory evidence the following facts.³ In 1959, Milton Slosberg hired Madolyn Parker to be his personal secretary and the office manager for the Griswold Hotel in Groton.⁴ Parker worked for Slosberg at the hotel until it was sold in 1968. Parker then worked for Slosberg at his lumber business. When Slosberg started a real estate business in 1980, which was comprised of three companies, Parker worked for him as an office manager and became responsible for the operation of an apartment complex in Danielson. Although Slosberg died in July, 1997, Parker continued to work for his real estate companies. In January, 1998, however, Parker was terminated from that position by the defendant.

Beginning in 1980, and continuing until his death, Slosberg promised Parker that he would provide for her retirement. Specifically, he promised Parker that she would receive monthly payments from an account and that on his death, she would receive the balance of that account.⁵ In 1994, Slosberg opened a Merrill Lynch cash management account through financial consultant Dennis L. Witkowski. About $100,000 in bonds comprised the corpus of the account. Slosberg informed Witkowski that the account was for Parker's benefit in her retirement years because of her many years of faithful service in his business. Slosberg also directed Witkowski to make monthly payments from the account to Parker and to remit the balance of the account to her when he died. Nevertheless, when Slosberg died, his will directed that all of his assets were to be placed in a revocable trust, which named members of his family as current and future beneficiaries.

Between 1994 and 1997, per Slosberg's oral instructions and a letter of instruction, Parker received $1300 per month from the account. In 1996, Parker added to the account certain stock certificates that she owned. In July, 1997, shortly after Slosberg's death, the defendant and Dudley G. Andersen⁶ contacted Merrill Lynch in an effort to transfer the corpus of the account into Slosberg's revocable trust for the benefit of his surviving family.⁷ As a result of those efforts, the account was frozen and payments from the account to Parker ceased immediately. Nevertheless, until the termination of Parker's employment, the defendant compensated Parker monthly from Slosberg's estate for her continued employment with the family real estate companies.⁸

On September 16, 1998, Parker filed a complaint against the defendant in his capacity as executor of Slosberg's estate and as trustee of a trust established by Slosberg. See footnote 1. Parker claimed, inter alia, that Slosberg breached his promise to provide her a retirement pension, to be paid out of his estate, "in exchange for her loyal work performance." Further, Parker claimed that she relied on the promise and had fulfilled her end of the bargain by "diligently and loyally performing her duties for almost [forty] years." She also claimed that Slosberg's estate would be unjustly enriched if it were permitted to keep the moneys Slosberg had promised to her. On May 3, 2001, in an amended complaint filed after Parker's death; see footnote 2; the plaintiff specified that Slosberg's promise included a $1300 monthly payment from the Merrill Lynch account while he was alive and that the balance of that account would be paid to Parker on his death.

Following a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded $97,459.51, which was the value of the Merrill Lynch account. As indicated by jury interrogatories, the jury found that the plaintiff had proved by "clear and satisfactory" evidence⁹ that Parker and Slosberg had an implied contract, and that the defendant had breached that contractual obligation. The jury further found that this breach required that the plaintiff receive Parker's retirement benefit from the balance of the Merrill Lynch account, as it was valued at the time of Slosberg's death. Following the verdict, the defendant filed motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to reduce the verdict. Both motions were denied. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be provided as relevant.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied three of his motions in limine. We will briefly address our disagreement with the defendant's first two evidentiary challenges. We decline, however, to review his third claim because it is inadequately briefed.

On appeal, a court's evidentiary rulings will be overturned "only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. . . . In reviewing claims that the court abused its discretion, every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of upholding the court's ruling." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kalas v. Cook, 70 Conn. App. 477, 486, 800 A.2d 553 (2002). As we repeatedly have stated, "[r]elevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. . . . One fact is relevant to another if in the common course of events the existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain or more probable. . . . Evidence is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that the evidence tend to support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, so long as it is not prejudicial or merely cumulative." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 54, 770 A.2d 908 (2001). "Additionally, it is well settled that even if the evidence was improperly admitted, the [defendant] must also establish that the ruling was harmful and likely to affect the result of the trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Latifa K., 67 Conn. App. 742, 752, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002). Bearing those precepts in mind, we now address the defendant's evidentiary claims.

A

The following additional procedural history is relevant to our disposition of the defendant's first two claims. In his first motion in limine, the defendant sought to preclude the admission of evidence concerning the assets in Slosberg's estate and trust. The defendant argued that permitting such evidence would confuse the jury and prevent it from deciding the case on its merits instead of on the basis of sympathy and fueled by the deep pockets of the estate and trust. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion. Specifically, the court ruled that no reference could be made to the estate's or to the trust's "ability to pay." The court noted, however, that it would allow "the amount [of Slosberg's assets] into evidence because it has to do with . . . the work that [Parker] performed for what she is claiming." The court expounded on its ruling later in the trial: "[T]he claim basically is that [Parker] performed services in assisting Mr. Slosberg in managing his affairs. And so, I suppose [the value of Slosberg's assets] goes to the value of her services. . . . And so, I suppose showing . . . what he had that she assisted him with is relevant to that claim."

The defendant's second motion in limine unsuccessfully sought to bar the introduction of an unsigned letter that Parker typed at the direction of Slosberg, indicating his desire that she receive $100,000 in bonds as her pension on his death. The defendant claimed at trial that the letter was not authenticated properly and that it did not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule. The court overruled the defendant's objection to the letter's authentication and ruled that the evidence was admissible because it complied with the requirements of General Statutes § 52-172.¹⁰

Having reviewed the record pertinent to the defendant's first two claims, we conclude that in each instance, the challenged evidence had a logical tendency to aid the trier of fact in the determination of an issue, even if only to a slight degree. Thus, making every reasonable presumption in favor of the court's rulings, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. Even if the challenged evidence in those instances was admitted improperly, however, the defendant has not demonstrated that the admissions, separately or together, substantially prejudiced the jury or were likely to affect the result of the trial.

B

The defendant's third motion in limine challenged the admissibility of evidence relating to the "meretricious" relationship between Parker and Slosberg. The defendant's brief on the claim, however, fails to set forth adequately which specific evidence the court admitted, the objections, the grounds for the objections, the claimed grounds for admissibility or the evidentiary rulings by the court that allow for review of the claim. "When raising evidentiary issues on appeal, all briefs should identify clearly what evidence was excluded or admitted, where the trial counsel objected and preserved his rights and why there was error. . . . ...