Parker v. State
| Decision Date | 30 January 1920 |
| Docket Number | 23,633 |
| Citation | 125 N.E. 772,189 Ind. 85 |
| Parties | Parker v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Lake Criminal Court; Martin J. Smith, Judge.
Prosecution by the State of Indiana against James H. Parker. From a judgment of conviction for murder in the first degree, the defendant appeals.
Reversed.
George E. Hershman, for appellant.
Ele Stansbury, Attorney-General, and A. B. Cronk, for the state.
On July 2, 1919, the grand jury of Lake county, Indiana, returned into the Lake Criminal Court an indictment against appellant charging him with the crime of murder in the first degree. On the same day appellant was brought from the jail in which he was confined into court, and, being arraigned and asked to plead to the indictment, entered a plea of guilty, which the court accepted. On the next day appellant was brought into court, and the court found him guilty as found in the indictment of murder in the first degree, and that he should suffer death in the manner prescribed by law, and pronounced judgment accordingly.
On July 5, two days later, appellant by his attorney filed in the Lake Criminal Court his motion for an order granting him leave to withdraw his plea of guilty entered on July 2, and to enter a plea of not guilty, and also for an order setting aside the finding and judgment of the court entered on such plea of guilty on July 3, 1919. This motion was by the court overruled. The appellant excepted to such ruling, and on appeal bases his assignment of error thereon.
The facts shown by the affidavits in this case, in so far as they relate to the denial of the right of appellant to appear by counsel, are essentially the same as those set out in the OPINION in the case of Batchelor v State (1920), ante 69, 125 N.E. 773. As held in this case, denial of such a right is prima facie prejudicial, and will require a reversal of the judgment unless it is affirmatively shown that he was fully advised as to his rights and the consequences of his plea by the advice and counsel of the court before accepting such plea.
In this case it appears that when appellant appeared before the court for arraignment and plea the court informed appellant that he was charged with murder in the first degree by the indictment, which had just been read to him, and then read in his hearing the statute defining murder in the first degree and fixing the punishment. It does not appear...
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