Parker v. State
| Decision Date | 22 March 1904 |
| Parties | PARKER v. STATE (two cases). |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal and Error from Circuit Court, Talbot County; Edwin H. Brown Judge.
George Parker was convicted under two indictments of selling and giving away intoxicating liquor, and appeals and brings error. Affirmed.
Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, PAGE, PEARCE SCHMUCKER, and JONES, JJ.
Joseph B. Seth, for George Parker.
J.H Covington and William S. Bryan, Jr., Atty.Gen., for the State.
The traverser, George Parker, was indicted on the 21st May, 1903 in the circuit court for Talbot county, for selling and giving away spirituous and fermented and intoxicating liquors to one William Ewing; and on the same day, in the same court, he was indicted for a similar offense, committed in selling and giving away such liquors to another person. In each of these cases there was a demurrer to the indictment. These demurrers were overruled, and in each case there was a plea of not guilty, tried before a jury, and a verdict of guilty and judgment thereon of fine and imprisonment. In each case there was an appeal and a writ of error, but the latter were dismissed at the hearing in this court. The two appeals therefore remain, but they present the same questions, viz., the constitutionality of the acts under which the traverser was indicted; and, secondly, as to the form of the indictment.
This case was most elaborately argued, but we think the general principles involved are well settled. It appears that the two acts were passed at the session of 1902; one of them being chapter 84, p. 105, and the other chapter 265, p. 366, containing the same provisions; both prohibiting the selling and giving away of spirituous or intoxicating liquors in Chapel district of Talbot county. There is a difference, however, in the titles of the two acts. The title of the former may perhaps be properly criticised; but, be this as it may, no objection has been made to the validity of the latter (chapter 265) on the ground that its title does not sufficiently disclose its subject-matter, nor is it objected to for any other reason relating to the imperfection of the title. We may, therefore, for the purposes of this case, concede that the act of 1902, p. 105. c. 84, is not valid, because of the objection to its title based on article 3, § 29, of the Constitution. But as we have said, the title of chapter 265, p. 366, of the same session of the Legislature, containing the same provisions as those contained in chapter 84, is or must be conceded to be free from any objection whatever; and hence, unless there is some constitutional objection to the act itself, the judgment appealed from must stand, unless the indictment is bad in form.
First then, as to the constitutional validity of chapter 265, p. 366, Acts 1902. The objection, as stated by the traverser, is that it is "unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive; invades the rights of personal liberty and security guarantied by the Constitution to the people; and denies them the privileges and immunities secured to them by the fundamental doctrines of the common law." This is certainly very strong language, as applicable to the facts of the case now before us. The traverser was indicted for, and by the jury convicted of, the violation of the act under which he was indicted; that is to say, he was convicted of selling and giving away intoxicating drinks. The question, therefore, is, does the Constitution of this state, or do "the immemorial principles of the common law," guaranty to the traverser the right to sell and give away spirituous and intoxicating liquors? Even the counsel of the traverser concedes the plenary power of the state to abolish and destroy the liquor traffic, or to suppress the evils of intoxication at certain places or at certain times, or to certain classes of persons. But his contention is that the act is void because it does not contain explicit provisos excepting the...
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