Parker v. State
| Docket Number | CV 22-2097 (GRB)(AYS) |
| Decision Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Parties | KASON PARKER, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, SUFFOLK COUNTY SHERIFF 'S OFFICE CORRECTIONS DIVISION, SERGEANT JOHN HICKEY #S 189, CAPTAIN CALVIN WICKS #C 35, JOHN DOE #1 (WARDEN), JOHN DOE #2 (SERGEANT #S 295), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff Kason Parker (“Parker” or “Plaintiff”) commenced this action against the State of New York (the “State” or “Defendant”), the Suffolk County Sheriff's Office Corrections Division (the “Suffolk County Jail”), Sergeant John Hickey, Captain Calvin Wicks Warden John Doe #1, and Sergeant John Doe #2, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations arising from his incarceration at the Suffolk Jail. Plaintiff seeks monetary, punitive and injunctive relief.
Presently before this Court, upon referral by the Honorable Gary R Brown for Report and Recommendation, see Order dated 07/23/2022, is the State's motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Docket Entry (“DE”) [35]. As discussed below, this Court respectfully recommends that the State's motion to dismiss be granted in its entirety.
As is required in the context of this motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the Complaint, though disputed by Defendant, are accepted to be true for purposes of this motion, and all reasonable inferences are drawn therefrom in favor of the Plaintiff.
While facts to consider in the context of a Rule 12 motion to dismiss are generally limited to those set forth in the pleadings, a court may consider matters outside of the pleadings under certain circumstances. Specifically, in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider: (1) documents attached to the Complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference therein; (2) matters of which judicial notice may be taken; or (3) documents upon the terms and effects of which the Complaint “relies heavily” and which are, thus, rendered “integral” to the Complaint.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-153 (2d Cir. 2002); see Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover. “[a] court may take judicial notice of documents filed in another court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings” Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Where, as here, the complaint was filed pro se, it must be construed liberally with “special solicitude” and interpreted to raise the strongest claims that it suggests. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Court turns now to discuss the facts set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint, construed in his favor.
The Complaint's allegations stem from three separate incidents spanning from December 2021 through March 2022. Each incident is described below.
On December 27, 2021, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with another inmate that resulted in unspecified charged for which a January 6, 2022 disciplinary hearing had been scheduled. See Complaint (“Compl”) at p. 6-7, DE [1]. Parker alleges that John Doe #2, a Sergeant with the Suffolk County Jail, falsely reported that Parker refused to sign the notice of charges. Id. at p. 6. Parker claims that he was not given the requisite twenty-four hours advance notice of the hearing and that this prevented him from preparing a defense and more specifically, produce a witness. Id. at p. 7. The January 6, 2022 disciplinary hearing resulted in Parker receiving a sentence of fourteen days in solitary confinement. Id. Parker alleges that he did not receive a copy of the notice of charges until after the January 6, 2022 hearing had concluded, and thus, did not know that it indicated that he had refused to sign it. Id. at p. 6. The notation of the refusal to sign involuntarily waived Parker's due process rights and left him unable to appeal. Id. Parker claims that he wrote to Warden John Doe #1 advising him of the constitutional deprivation, but both he and Captain Wicks failed to remedy the wrong. Id. at p. 7.
The second allegation of a constitutional violation stems from an infraction for “refusing a direct order” that Plaintiff received on December 28, 2021, while being treated at the Stony Brook University Hospital Emergency Room. Compl. at p. 8. Plaintiff alleges that he received an infraction for complaining about being improperly cuffed to the hospital bed after asking the officers who were guarding him to turn the television they were watching down because it was giving Plaintiff a headache. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the officers improperly kept both his arms cuffed which interfered with his treatment. Id.
On January 19, 2022, a hearing before Sergeant Hickey was held regarding the infraction resulting in a sanction against Plaintiff. Compl. at p. 8. Parker alleges that Sergeant Hickey refused to grant him the right to appeal the January 19, 2022 hearing decision. Id. at p. 9. Due to Sergeant Hickey's refusal, Plaintiff refused to sign the final disposition. Id. Parker wrote to Warden John Doe #1 advising him of Sergeant Hickey's refusal to grant him the right to appeal, but received no response. Id. Parker also filed a grievance which was denied. Id.
On February 25, 2022, Plaintiff was involved was again involved in an altercation with another inmate for which he alleges he was placed in solitary confinement after John Doe #2 falsely reported that Parker refused to sign the notice of charges. Compl. at p. 9. Parker alleges that he was not given twenty-four hours advanced notice of the charges before the March 1, 2022 hearing and was first made aware that the notice indicated the he refused to sign during the March 1, 2022 hearing. Id. Plaintiff appeal was denied by Captain Wicks. Id. at p. 10.
Overall, Plaintiff alleges that “the supervisory officials Captain Calvin Wicks #C-35, The Warden John Doe #1, Sargeant [sic] #S-295 John Doe #2, and John Hickey Sargeant [sic] #S-189 didn't not follow their own prison rules and failed to remedy the wrong once these deprivations came to their attention.” Compl. at p. 10.
Plaintiff commenced this action on April 11, 2022. See Compl. That same day Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See DE [2]. Plaintiff's in forma pauperis motion was granted on May 16, 2022. See Order dated 05/16/2022.
The State sought leave to move to dismiss the Complaint on July 18, 2022. DE [20]. On July 22, 2022, the District Court referred to the undersigned the State's request for a pre-motion conference, or in the alternative a briefing schedule, for Defendant's anticipated motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the motion itself. See Order dated 07/22/2022. On September 19, 2022, the Court waived its pre-motion conference requirement, granted the State's request for leave to move to dismiss the Complaint, and issued a briefing schedule. See Order dated 09/19/2022.
On January 12, 2023, following the State's request for an extension of the briefing schedule, and the Court's granting thereof, the State moved to dismiss the Complaint. DE [35]. On February 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed his opposition. DE [42].
The State moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. First, the State argues that Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The State also argues that Plaintiff's claims fail to establish the personal involvement of a State actor or individual of whom the State has control, and as a result, does not establish the first element of a viable section 1983 cause of action.
The Court now turns to the merits of the motion.
“A case may properly be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “In contrast to the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a ‘plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.'” MacPherson v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 452 F.Supp.2d 133, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ), affd, 273 Fed.Appx. 61 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Tomaino v. United States, 2010 WL 1005896, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2010). “In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may consider affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings to resolve jurisdictional questions.” Cunningham v. Bank of New York Mellon, N.A., 2015 WL 4104839, *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2015) (citing Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008)).
A motion to dismiss for sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) as the Eleventh Amendment “reflects ‘the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [that]...
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